The making of an immigration model: inflows, impacts and policies in Southern Europe

Joaquin Arango
Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset (IUIOG), Spain

Corrado Bonifazi
Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies (IRPPS), Italy

Claudia Finotelli
Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset (IUIOG), Spain

Joao Peixoto
Research Center on Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Organizations (SOCIUS), Portugal

Catarina Sabino
Research Center on Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Organizations (SOCIUS), Portugal

Salvatore Strozza
Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies (IRPPS), Italy

Anna Triandafyllidou
The Hellenic Foundation for European Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Greece
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1. Introduction

The comparative analysis of immigration experiences in Southern European countries – considering under this designation Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – is not a novel exercise. Since the early 1990s, the many similarities of timing and other characteristics of immigration in these countries led to the frequent gathering of researchers and policymakers, from Southern European and other countries, to discuss the theme. During a period that culminated in the turn of the century, several articles, books and special editions of journals were released (see, among others, King and Rybaczuk, 1993; Iosifides and King, 1996; Baganha, 1997; Baldwin-Edwards, 1997; King and Black, 1997; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999; King, Lazaridis and Tsardanidis, 2000; King, 2002; VV.AA., 2004; Ritaine, 2005; and, more recently, King and Thomson, 2008). Many of these references went so far as to designate these new immigration experiences as a “Southern European model of immigration” (King, 2000), which differed in several ways from the model that predominated in other European host countries during the second half of the 20th century, when the Fordist type of capitalism was dominant.

From the late 1990s on, the interest in drawing comparative analysis between the Southern European countries diminished. This is somehow surprising, since the bulk of the inflows to Southern Europe occurred mostly after the late 1990s. Indeed, the framework and underlying immigration factors remained as much the same as before. But during the new century inflows changed some of their characteristics, several new policies were enacted and the overall outcomes of migration, including immigrant’s integration, varied. It seems clear that an updating of those former comparative exercises is currently in need.

The IDEA project provided the framework for carrying such an exercise. This report results from the common work carried out by the IDEA Southern European research teams since the middle stages of the project. The group benefited from the overall discussions of the project, intended to provide a comparison between Western, Northern, Southern and Eastern European experiences. Further work was based on the updated reports in each of the countries and comparisons along a pre-established template. This common work culminated in a productive workshop held in Lisbon in January 2009, where the first version of the current report was discussed. Compared to previous comparative exercises on Southern Europe, this report may be considered innovative on two main grounds. First, it updates information existing in previous studies, pertaining to flows, underlying factors, policies, impacts and outcomes. Second, it benefited from the use of the IDEA common framework.

One of the main theoretical guiding lines of the project is that the explanation of the “dependent variables”, namely inflows (including immigrants’ demographic characteristics and labour market insertion), policies, impacts and integration outcomes, needs to come across a set of “independent variables”. Among others, the latter include the international context during the formative years (“the generation effect”), the degree of recentness of immigration experiences (the “age effect”), the type of labour demand, the socio-economic regime and the dominant perceptions and attitudes. The current report draws on these

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1 The purpose of King and Thomson (2008) is to enlarge the scope of the analysis to other Southern European countries, namely Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia.

2 The researchers involved in this work were A. Triandafyllidou, M. Maroufof, M. Nikolova and D. Lazarescu (Greece); C. Bonifazi, F. Heins, S. Strozza and M. Vitiello (Italy); J. Peixoto and C. Sabino (Portugal); J. Arango and C. Finotelli (Spain).
variables to describe and explain the Southern experiences, stressing its many commonalities but also some national differences.

The next sections are organized as follows. First, the historical background of immigration in Southern Europe will be set, showing evidence of the specificity of both generation and age effects and alluding to the main explanatory factors. Second, a detailed analysis of flows and stocks of foreign immigration will be done. Third, resulting from the centrality of the labour demand variables for explaining immigration in this context, a section will be devoted to labour market mechanisms and immigrants’ labour incorporation. Fourth, the endemic presence of irregular migration in these countries will be described, together with its explanatory factors (including the informal economy and inadequate regulations) and policy attempts to regulate it (ex-post). Next, different aspects of immigration policy will be examined. The fifth section is devoted to labour migration policies; the sixth examines control policies; and the seventh integration and citizenship policies. As it will be seen, in a short time span several policy instruments were enacted in all Southern European countries, confirming at the same time the tentative character of many policies and the need for new approaches, compared to previous European immigration experiences. The eighth section will focus on three types of impacts: demographic, economic and social, particularly reactions from public opinion. Finally, some conclusive remarks will be set, trying to learn from the comparative material and the insights allowed by the IDEA framework.³

³ Most of the source information for this report and further details about each country may be found in the national country reports elaborated during the project: Triandafyllidou and Maroufof, 2008 (Greece); Bonifazi, Heins, Strozza and Vitiello, 2008 (Italy); Sabino and Peixoto, 2009 (Portugal); Arango and Finotelli, 2008a (Spain). Some parts of the current report consist on excerpts of those national reports.
2. Historical background

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Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have in common two long periods of strong emigration (during the first globalisation and after the Second World War) and now they share a relevant foreign immigration. However, dissimilarities emerge owing to the different histories of the countries, their diverse social and economic characteristics, as well as their specific cultural and colonial links with other geographical areas. During the first globalisation, in the second half of the 19th century and before the First World War, these countries made an important contribution to intra-European migration and to the settlement migration towards North and South America. After the Second World War, these countries were among the main suppliers of the growing economies of Western and Northern Europe. Currently, they are experiencing a relevant inflow of foreigners. This change of role within the European migration system has stimulated many researchers to emphasize the common features of the so-called Southern European, or Mediterranean model of migration.

Considering the period after the conclusion of the last World War, four main phases are generally singled out in the history of European migration (Bonifazi, 2008). The first period was characterized by forced migrations at the end of the War and only partially affected our countries. In fact, only Italy and Greece were involved in this type of migration flow. Italy received nationals who escaped from the territories ceded to Yugoslavia, and from the former African colonies. While in Greece about 130,000 people migrated in the aftermath of the Greek civil war (1946-1949) to the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

The involvement of our countries in the following golden period of European labour migration was tremendously larger. Emigration to Americas and Australia was also important, even if generally already in decline in the second half of the 1950s. Italy was the first country involved in the mechanism of transfer of labour from Southern Europe to the receiving countries of the Western and Northern part of the continent. In the late 1940s, Italy signed bilateral agreements with Belgium and France and for a long part of the 1950s was the main supplier of European labour migration. During the 1950s, emigration started also in Spain, Portugal and Greece. From 1946 to 1975 the statistical sources estimate 7.3 million Italian emigrants, with a migratory loss of 3.1 million. The number of people who migrated from Greece during this period exceeds a million. Even for many Portuguese, emigration was the only possible solution for better living conditions. Only between 1965 and 1974, 1,218,000 Portuguese emigrated. As regards Spain, two million guest workers left the country between 1950 and 1970 and headed towards other European countries like Germany, Switzerland and France.

In the early 1970s, as a result of the restrictive policies implemented in the receiving countries, the period of mass emigration from Southern Europe come to an end. The stop policies of 1973-1974 signalled the end of the recruitment policies and the passage to a period characterised by the “zero-net migration” option and by the stabilisation of immigrant communities.

In the middle of the 1970s important political changes took place in Spain, Portugal and Greece with the end of the right-wing dictatorships and the arrival of democracy. This change stimulated the improvement of the social and economic situations of these countries and
created the conditions for their adhesion to the (then) European Economic Community during the 1980s. Notwithstanding the oil shocks and the global restructuring of the world economy, these countries experienced a period of economic growth that echoes the Italian economic boom of the 1950s and the 1960s.

The fifteen years between the introduction of the stop policies and the fall of the Berlin Wall are characterised by the passage of our countries from departing to receiving areas. At the beginning of this period the return flow of nationals is the main migratory movement, but over time foreign immigration began to appear. The main common factors behind the beginning and then consolidation of foreign immigration in this period were: the growth of push forces in the Third World and, to a lesser extent, in Central and Eastern Europe; the closure to further immigration in traditional European receiving countries; the improvement of the economic conditions in the four countries; their inadequate legislative framework; their large underground economy; and the mainly tolerant attitude towards immigration on the part of both government and public opinion. These factors contributed to create the conditions for the start of foreign immigration, but the size of flows and stocks stayed well below the values of the traditional immigration countries of Western and Northern Europe.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall the last period of recent European migratory history begins and our Southern European countries become important countries of destination, even if the ties with national diasporas remain significant and emigration persists, particularly in Portugal. With the end of the Cold War, political barriers to emigration were removed and countries of Central and Eastern Europe had the opportunity to be involved again in migration movements. For geographical reasons, Greece and Italy were involved earlier in this process. Migration to Greece, especially from Albania, Bulgaria and former Soviet Union, rose dramatically and in the first half of the 1990s became massive. It also included ethnic flows from Albania and from the former Soviet Union. In Italy, the problem of uncontrolled migration from the CEE became the centre of attention in 1991, when several waves of Albanian refugees landed on Italian shores. In these years the fear of an invasion of migrants from the East spread all over the European Union (EU) member states, fuelling the introduction of stricter control on immigration. Migration policies in the Southern European countries incorporated these rules, making the legal channels of entry more difficult. The result was a mismatch between the growing demand for foreign labour and the size of regular flows, the premise for the development of a migration model largely based on frequent regularisations. As a matter of fact, Southern Europe has become one of the most important areas of attraction in the continent. According to the available statistics (see Table 2.1), the number of foreign immigrants in this area can be estimated as ranging from between 950,000 and 1,3 million in 1991 to 8-10 million in 2006-2007: an increase of seven-eight times in just 15 years.

Many reasons for this growth of foreign immigration are common to the four countries considered. The political and economic transition in the CEE countries strongly increased the push forces in this area. While the gradual incorporation of most of these countries in the EU migration system promoted a relaxing of visa policies, labour migration from this area was de facto tolerated even before the EU enlargement. This increased availability of foreign workers has matched the growing needs of domestic labour markets. By and large, many of the causes at the origin of foreign immigration are also behind its recent increase. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the economic growth; the rise in living standards and educational level of native youth that has increased their labour expectations; the persistence of a relevant underground economy and of segmentation processes in the labour markets; the
effects of the low fertility on the labour supply; and the limits of Mediterranean welfare systems, largely unable to face the new needs of the populations, including the effects of relevant ageing processes.
3. Flows and stocks of foreign immigration

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3.1. An assessment of statistical sources on migration flows and stocks

It is well known that data on international migration, which generally refers only to the regular foreign component, has different statistical sources, and even when it comes from the same type of source it is not always comparable in the time and between countries. The specific features of national legal systems have a great impact on numbers.

Data on annual immigration flows is available for Italy, Spain and Portugal. Italian and Spanish data are drawn from the population registers. Their main problems are missing or late registrations of immigrants and non-cancellations of emigrants. In Italy, the holding of the permit to stay is a necessary precondition for adult foreigners (people aged 18 and more) to be recorded in the municipal population registers (Anagrafi comunali). In Spain, the law acts in the opposite way, and the registration of foreign citizens in the Padrón Municipal doesn’t request the holding of the permit to stay. The Law of 2000 on the Rights of Foreigners and their Social Integration into the Spanish Society has introduced incentives to the registration in the Padrón Municipal also for irregular immigrants. The registration is the only legal prerequisite to access health care and other public services such as primary schools for children. It is also a proof of the length of residence in Spain. Data on emigration is not considered here, because very few foreigners residing in Italy or in Spain notify their departure. This causes a considerable underestimation of emigration flows and an overestimation of the stock of foreigners residing in the two countries. Only in the last two years the figure of foreigners’ emigration from Spain has extraordinary increased (120,254 in 2006 and 198,974 in 2007), as a consequence of the reform of the Padrón Municipal de Habitan tes approved in 2003 and effective from 2006.

Data on foreign immigration in Portugal comes from another source and concerns the annual flows of the request for residence permits (solicitações de autorização de residência). This data doesn’t consider the first concessions of the permits to stay (autorizações de permanência concedidas), instituted with the new law of 2001 that introduced for the first time a legal notion of temporary work stays. They were valid for one year and were to be renewed afterwards, until a maximum of five years; after this moment, they could be transformed in residence permits. The increase of the flows of concessions of legal residence registered in the last two years (2006 and 2007) is prevalently due to the transformation of permits to stay into residence permits.

As regards the size and characteristics of the foreign population stocks, three main statistical sources will be used for all the four considered countries, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal: demographic censuses, population registers and permit to stay or residence permits.

The main advantages of population censuses are the wide range of the variables surveyed, many of which standardized at the international level; the highly detailed data collection at the territorial level; and the possibility of identifying at least a part of irregular immigration. However, foreigners are more likely than nationals to be under-enumerated in census, particularly if they are illegal.
The stock data coming from the Municipal Population Registers has the advantage to be more timely than decennial census data and to give intercensus and up-to-date measures of size and characteristics of foreign population. Differences between the Spanish and the Italian case are very important. Although municipalities remain the responsible institutions involved in collecting population data, the Spanish National Statistical Institute centralizes data collected by the municipalities, carries out periodical cleaning and revision tasks and annually publishes official figures of total resident population. Population registers contain data on the entire population living in Spain regardless of the legal status. In Italy the Municipal Population Registers are not yet centralized. From 1992, on the basis of aggregate forms filled out by local authorities, ISTAT began a survey of foreigners registered in municipal population registers. This survey measures the most settled and regular part of the immigrant population and numbers are also influenced by amnesty laws. The small number of cancellations from the registers, resulting from emigration, shows that the departures of foreigners are not completely recorded and, therefore, municipal registers include people who are no longer in Italy.

In all the four countries considered, data on the permits to stay or residence permits is available. As regards this source, the main problems regard Italy and Greece. In the first case, the data collected by the Ministry of the Interior and then revised by ISTAT does not count minors, who are not registered individually but named on their parents’ permits. In the case of Greece, the very restrictive immigration policies had prevented migrants to keep a legal status for long time. Therefore, permits to stay are unsuitable for drawing the evolution of the foreign population living in Greece during the 1990s, because documented migrants were only a minority and because most granted authorisations were of short duration and were affected by bureaucratic inefficiencies (Cangiano and Strozza, 2008). In Greece the permits to stay also don’t count all the regular foreign population, because they strongly underestimate people under 15 years old and citizens of More Developed Countries (MDCs).

3.2. Flows and stocks of foreign immigration

At the beginning of the 21st century immigration experienced a spectacular upsurge in Italy and above all in Spain (Figure 2.1). The Spanish trend is the most impressive. The data of Padron Municipal, that includes also irregular migrants, registers a continuous and regular growth in the foreign inflow since 1996. The volume of this growth is really astonishing. In only 12 years the size of the inflow has increased 55 times, passing from 17,000 arrivals in 1996 to 921,000 in 2007.
Figure 2.1. Immigration from abroad of foreign citizens. Italy\(^{(a)}\), Portugal\(^{(b)}\) and Spain\(^{(c)}\), 1990-2007. Absolute values and percentages of foreigners on the overall immigration

![Graph showing immigration trends](image)

Notes: (a) 2006-2007 provisional data. (b) Data referred only to solicitações de autorização de residência (autorizações de permanência concedidas and vistos de longa duração concedidos pelos postos consulares are not considered). For 2006-2007 provisional data. (c) From 1996 data are not perfectly comparable with the previous ones for the reform of Padrón Municipal.

Sources: Italy - Istat, Anagrafi comunali (Municipal Population Registers); Portugal - Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF) - Ministério da Administração Interna; Spain - Ine, Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (Municipal Population Registers).

The growing share of foreign immigration on the total inflow (foreigners and nationals) testifies to its increasing importance in the Southern European countries (Figure 2.1). In Italy this percentage has exceeded the 80 per cent of the total inflow from 1996 and now it is estimated at 92 per cent; in Spain it has been over 90 per cent since 2000 and it has arrived at 96 per cent in 2007. In this respect, it is worth considering that until the early 1990s nationals were still almost half of the total inflow directed towards these two countries.

The evolution of the foreign presence in the four countries since the 1980s can be quantified using stock data from population censuses, population registers and permits to stay or residence permits (Table 2.1) \(^4\). Regardless of technical differences, all the available information indicates that between 1991 and 2007 the presence of foreign citizens has increased remarkably in all the considered countries. The pace of this growth, however, seems to be much faster in Italy and above all in Spain as compared to Greece and Portugal. In Italy, in particular, data indicates that the number of regular immigrants grew from some hundreds of thousands in 1991 to 2.4-3.4 million in 2007. Consequently, also the share of foreigners on the total population has increased from about 1 per cent to 4-6 per cent. The estimated number of foreigners reaches 4.3 million, that is 7.2 per cent of the total population living in Italy, if we consider non-resident regular immigrants and illegal immigrants too (Blangiardo, 2009).

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\(^4\) Estimates of total foreign population, including the illegal component, are reported in some cases.
Table 2.1. Foreign population according to different sources in the Southern European Immigration Countries around 1991, 2001 and 2007. Absolute values (in thousands) and percentages of total population (at the end of the year or at the census data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country /categories</th>
<th>Absolute values (in thousands)</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits to stay holders&lt;sup&gt;(a)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents&lt;sup&gt;(b)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of total foreign pop.&lt;sup&gt;(c)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>2460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits to stay holders&lt;sup&gt;(d)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>1109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents (census)&lt;sup&gt;(e)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents of Padrón (total foreign population)&lt;sup&gt;(f)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits to stay holders&lt;sup&gt;(g)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents&lt;sup&gt;(h)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of total foreign pop.&lt;sup&gt;(i)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
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<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal residents and holders of visas&lt;sup&gt;(j)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>351</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residents&lt;sup&gt;(k)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>233</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimate of total foreign pop.&lt;sup&gt;(l)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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The progressive increase recorded for the stocks of foreigners in Spain is even more evident. Permit to stay holders and usual residents, who were less than 400,000, became respectively almost 4 million and over 5.2 million. This last value includes also illegal migrants. The percentage of foreigners in the Spanish population grew from less than one per cent in 1991 to 8.6 per cent and 11.3 per cent, respectively, for the two considered groups. High levels in terms of percentage of immigrants on the total population are recorded in Greece too, with 7.9 per cent of residents and 9.8 per cent of total immigrants, including legal and an estimate of illegal presences; here the number of regular foreigners is around 0.9 million, while the stock almost arrives at 1.1 million if we include irregular migrants. In Portugal the size of legal foreign immigration is almost 450,000, around 4.2 per cent of the total population; these
values would increase to 500,000 and 4.7 per cent, respectively, if an estimate of irregular immigrants was added.

3.3. Main types of flows

By and large, labour migration and the related family migration are the two main flows directed towards Southern Europe in the last twenty five years. Southern European countries do not seem to be countries of asylum and do not attract a large number of foreign students. Statistical evidence drawn from different sources confirms these characteristics of migration processes.

As a matter of fact, in Greece, according to the 2001 census, the principal reason for migrant settlement was the search for employment (54 per cent), followed by other reasons (22 per cent), family reunification (13 per cent), repatriation (7 per cent), study (3 per cent), and asylum and refugees (one per cent together). Ethnic and political reasons gain ground in the case of the co-ethnics who had returned from the former Soviet Union. In Italy, the share of permits issued for work reasons was basically constant at around 30 per cent until 1990, but in 1992 it jumped to 65.3 per cent and represented 60.6 per cent of the total in 2007. At the same date, permits for family reasons were almost 764,000 (31.6 per cent of the total), 2.3 times the number recorded only seven years earlier. Spanish data is not differentiated according to the reasons of stay, but other information confirms that the situation is very similar to the Italian one. The importance of economic migration is stated by the high and growing number of labour authorizations issued to foreigners in the last years (from 292,000 in 2000 to 826,000 in 2006), and by the increasing number of immigrants registered in the Social Security System (2 million in 2008). Residence permits issued for family reunion increased in the last years, arriving to almost 98,000 in 2006. Their increasing importance is also reflected by the evolution of the visa issued for permanent residence, whose number represents now between 25-30 per cent of all visas issued by the Spanish foreign consulates (Moya Malapeira, 2006). Even in Portugal, the main channels of entry are work and family reunion. Data for 2005 show that work represented 45.7% of entries, while family reunion 44%. Data for 2007 show a larger gap between entries for work (57.4%) and for family reunion (30%) 5.

3.4. Demographic composition

The main reasons for migration (work and family reunion) affect the demographic structure of immigration flows. In fact, in Italy, Spain and Portugal the first working-age cohorts (20-39 years old) generally accounted for the majority of all immigrants, while the share of the youngest population (less than 20 years old) usually fluctuated around 20-30 per cent of the total (Figure 2.2). Immigration of foreigners aged 60 or older accounted for a negligible share of total arrivals in Italy, whilst the percentages recorded in Spain and Portugal are higher, owing to the relevance of retirement migration in these two countries.

5 In practice, this gap does not represent a real increase of entries for work purposes and a real decrease of entries for family reunification. In fact, this situation is due to the conversion of stay permits (issued in 2001) and long terms visas into residence permits, according to the provisions of the 2007 immigration law.
The gender structure of foreign immigration flows towards Italy, Spain and Portugal has been relatively balanced in the recent years. In Italy and Portugal, women have generally prevailed in the current decade, while in Spain their share on the total has oscillated between 45 and 48 per cent. However, this result can reflect deep imbalances in the gender composition of the different national groups, in some cases in favour of men and in other cases in favour of women.

The effects of foreign immigration on population structure have become increasingly important, as the phenomenon itself has grown in size. The proportion of foreigners has increased in all the age groups in all the countries considered (Table 2.2). The impact on the population differs significantly according to age group, given that the proportion of foreigners ranges from a maximum of 17.4 per cent for those between the ages of 15 and 29 in Spain, to a minimum of 0.8 per cent for the elderly in Italy. To get a general idea of the demographic impact of immigration, it is perhaps sufficient to consider that in Italy, despite
an increase in numbers of foreigners of 535,000 young people and 1.3 million working age people between 1991 and 2007, the amount of these same population groups fell overall in the period under consideration, by 687,000 and 2.3 million persons respectively. Without immigration the decline in these two age groups would, therefore, have been much greater and would, in all probability, have produced significant effects on the labour market, in terms of both size and structure, accentuating the already marked ageing of the working population.
Table 2.2. Foreign resident population by age groups and sex\(^{(a)}\). Southern European Immigration Countries, around 1991, 2001 and 2007. Percentages and mean age (in years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / age groups</th>
<th>% by age groups 1991</th>
<th>% by age groups 2001</th>
<th>% by age groups 2007</th>
<th>% of total population 1991</th>
<th>% of total population 2001</th>
<th>% of total population 2007</th>
<th>% female 1991</th>
<th>% female 2001</th>
<th>% female 2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29</td>
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Note: (a) 1991 and 2001 census data. 2007: Municipal population registers data for Italy and Spain; residence permits for Portugal.
Sources: elaborations from national statistical sources.
Immigration has had a significant impact on the population size and the age structure of Southern European countries, partly because there is still a significant dissimilarity between the demographic characteristics of foreigners and nationals (see also section 8). It is clear that these countries are still in a situation where the demographic advantages of immigration are high and rising. The age distribution of foreigners is, in fact, typical of a population in which the migration process is still in full flow: a strong concentration in the central age range, a growing number of young people, and a rapid decline towards the end of the working life. Most foreigners are between 25 and 40 years, without great differences between the sexes. In Italy the increase in the size of new generations is more evident than in the other countries. On the contrary, the percentages of elderly and the mean age of the foreign resident populations are higher in Spain and Portugal, for the larger involvement in retirement migration of these two countries.

3.5. Main nationalities and their evolution

The evolution of foreign immigration in terms of area of origin is characterised by a rise in the size and proportion of immigration from CEE countries and from the Third World, and a corresponding reduction of the percentage from developed countries, despite its increase in absolute terms (Table 2.3). Alongside these two main common trends, the situation presents important and interesting differences between the countries considered. In fact, each country has a specific area of attraction, as a result of its geographical position, its history, its colonial heritage (if it exists), and its cultural and linguistic links with other countries.
Table 2.3. Foreign resident population by geographical areas\(^{(a)}\) and main countries of citizenship, Southern European Immigration Countries, 1991, 2001 and 2007. Absolute values (in thousands) and percentages by citizenship and of females

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<th>GREECE</th>
<th>Main countries of citizenship</th>
<th>ITALY</th>
<th>Main countries of citizenship</th>
<th>PORTUGAL</th>
<th>Main countries of citizenship</th>
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<td>% by</td>
<td>Abs. val. (thousand/citizen/female)</td>
<td>% by</td>
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<th>2007 Legal residents (\text{(SEF)})</th>
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Notes: (a) MDCs include North America, Japan, Israel, Oceania and non former Socialist countries of Europe; CEE includes former Socialist countries of Europe and Turkey; LDCs include Africa, Latin America and Asia (except Japan and Israel).
(b) Citizens of MDCs are not considered because of their strong underestimation (only 3,569). Under 15 years old are counted in a little amount (only 3,366).
Sources: elaborations from national statistical sources.
Italy is probably the country where this set of factors has been less important. The weight of foreigners of MDCs fell from 32.7 per cent of the total in 1991 to 5.9 per cent in 2007. At the same time, immigration from CEE countries had an extraordinary increase: from 1991 to 2007 it increased 30.2-fold, totalling more than 1.6 million and representing 47 per cent of the total. There was also a strong but not so marked increase in immigration from developing countries, rising from 186,000 in 1991 to 1.6 million in 2007, representing a reduction from 52.3 to 47 per cent of the total. In the current decade there is a clear prevalence of Romanians, Albanians, and Moroccans and a gradual stabilization of many other sizeable communities. With regard to gender, notwithstanding many immigrant communities have a balanced gender structure, differences remain large. As a matter of fact, women are 80 per cent of the total in the Ukrainian community, while among Moroccans are around 41 per cent. Thus, for some countries of origin we continue to have a prevalently female immigration, with women representing the vanguard to be joined later by the rest of family.

In Spain and Portugal the weight of immigration from MDCs has always been higher than in Italy, as a result of the larger diffusion of retirement migration. In 2007 it still accounted for 22.2 per cent of the total in Spain and for 24.8 per cent in Portugal. In these two countries immigration from CEE is less important than in Italy, although Romanians have become the biggest community in Spain and Ukrainians are the third community in Portugal. The main characteristic of the Spanish migration model is the large inflow from Latin America. The tightening of the U.S. immigration policies after September 11 probably contributed to direct to Europe the flows caused by the economic crisis that troubled several Latin American countries (Pellegrino, 2004). Linguistic and cultural bonds due to the Spanish colonial past in the region are probably the main factors that explain why Spain has been chosen as a preferred destination. The differences in gender structure are not so large as in Italy and Greece. Among the main communities, Moroccans have the lowest percentage of female (36.7 per cent) and Colombians the highest (55.6 per cent).

As regards Portugal, a marked increase of immigration from the CEE countries has appeared in the last decade. Until the end of the 1990s, the immigration towards the country was mainly linked to its colonial past and had developed a specific migration system united by the Portuguese language. The reasons for this ‘Eastern revolution’ are probably related to the Portugal EU-membership and to the enlargement of the European migration system. The larger groups in the country are today from Cape Verde, Brazil and Ukraine. The gender structure of the main communities is similar to Spain, with the lack of mainly female oriented national groups. It is interesting to note that in Portugal Ukrainians are prevalently men, while in Italy and Greece women largely prevail.

Some basic facts distinguish recent migratory trends to Greece from those observed in the rest of Southern Europe. First, the dramatic increase in the immigrant population has occurred despite the great number of “administrative deportations” (2.2 million in 1992-2001), carried out with the intention of dissuading immigrant settlement. Forced circular migration was a common pattern for Albanians. Second, one national group (Albanians) represent about 70 per cent of the whole foreign presence. No similar level of dominance of a single source country is found in the other three countries considered. More generally, proximity of the sending countries distinguishes the Greek migration experience, as even

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6 Most of the immigrants came from the ex-colonies in Africa (PALOP – Portuguese Speaking African Countries) and from Brazil.
other important immigrant groups (Bulgarians and Romanians) come from neighbouring countries. Finally, Greece is the Southern European country most often sought by refugees (especially Iraqis and Afghans arriving from Turkey). Initially considered only as a country of transit, Greece has become more and more attractive to asylum seekers, as long as other EU-countries restricted asylum policies. Greece presents the largest differences in gender structures among the countries considered. In fact, some national groups have a large prevalence of women (Ukrainians and Bulgarians); others are mainly composed by men (Pakistanis and Albanians). As a result, the percentage of female has a range included between 1.2 per cent of Pakistanis to 81.7 per cent of Ukrainians.
4. Immigrants and the labour market

Catarina Sabino and João Peixoto

4.1. The strength of labour demand

Economic immigration has long been the main channel of entry and residence of foreign immigrants in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, in recent years, family reunion became also an important channel. In all countries, with the partial exception of Greece, the percentages of asylum seekers and refugees are quite low (see section 2).

The strong labour market orientation of immigration in Southern Europe results from various determinants. From the economic point of view, periods of rapid economic expansion (often resulting from the injection of EU funds); an economic fabric largely based in labour-intensive sectors; the seasonal character of many industries (such as agriculture and tourism); the non-transferability of many of the fast-growing industries (activities such as construction and services cannot be delocalised); the high segmentation of the labour market; the increase in flexible labour arrangements; and the importance of the informal economy are among the main drivers. These can be said to correspond to a combination of specific characteristics of these countries and general traits of the post-Fordist context.

Among the latter, one of the main factors is the relevance of the informal economy. The extent of informal arrangements has been growing in all post-Fordist economies, but its longer tradition in Southern Europe made it more prone to informality. A study from Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) confirms that the informal economy is a common pattern among Southern European countries, exceeding significantly its volume in other OECD countries. The authors estimate the size of the shadow economy in 2002-2003 to be about 28.3% of GDP in Greece, 26.2% of GDP in Italy and 22.3% of GDP in Portugal and Spain. Since foreigners are over-represented in this sector, it has constituted a privileged route of entry for (irregular) labour migrants (Baganha, 1998; Mingione and Quassoli, 2000; Fakiolas, 2000).

From the social point of view, the native population’s living standards and educational levels have increased in the last decades, together with women emancipation, and natives started to refuse to work in less qualified jobs. Moreover, immigrants are supplying services which are often not available in the weak welfare regimes of Southern European countries. Welfare systems provide little direct assistance and rely heavily on families to care for the young, the elderly and others in need of assistance. To alleviate this burden, families on their turn rely on immigrants to fulfil tasks like housekeeping, babysitting and caring for the elderly (Sciortino, 2004). In sum, constraints related to the welfare state have also contributed to the strength of labour demand in these countries.

Demographic factors such as low fertility rates and high life expectancy have also contributed to this situation. On the one hand, a shrinking population is linked to a diminished labour supply. On the other, the amount of nursing and care work is increasing as a result of population ageing. It may therefore be assumed that quantitative labour shortages and the demand for caring will not only continue but also grow.
4.2. Main occupational sectors of immigrant employment

The economic inclusion of foreign immigrants in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain often occurs in low skilled jobs under precarious conditions. Immigrants are often employed in some specific sectors and in the so-called 3-D jobs – dirty, difficult and dangerous –, which mean less stable, less paid and less protected jobs. For all Southern European countries data for economic sectors indicate that immigrants are usually employed in the service sector (mainly domestic work, retail trade, hotels and restaurants), construction and manufacturing industry.

According to OECD data about foreign-born employment in 2005-2006 (OECD, 2008), the construction sector is quite important in the four countries considered, representing 29.1% of total foreign-born employment in Greece, 19.7% in Spain, 14.8% in Portugal and 14.2% in Italy. Mining, manufacturing and the energy sector is particularly relevant for Italy, where it represents 23.6% of total foreign-born employment, known to be concentrated in Central and Northern industrial regions. Comparatively, the same sector is less important in Greece (15.4%), Portugal (13.8%) and Spain (13.0%). The service sector (mainly wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants and domestic work) is also an important recruiter of immigrants in the four countries. Regarding hotels and restaurants, the share is 14.2% in Spain, 10.2% in Greece, 8.7% in Italy and 8.2% in Portugal. Households (domestic service) account for 13.9% in Greece, 13.3% in Spain, 10.4% in Italy and 4.9% in Portugal (although in the latter data is certainly under-evaluated). Finally, the employment in agriculture is also considerable, although its weight has been declining in recent years: data for 2005-2006 show that the agriculture and fishing sector represented 6.2% in Greece, 5.6% in Spain, 3.5% in Italy and 2.0% in Portugal of total foreign-born employment.

In all four countries considered, there are some significant differences about the inclusion of specific national groups of immigrants. One may identify processes of gender and ethnic segmentation of the labour market, with specific groups occupying specific niches. Generally speaking, among immigrant women the domestic service is predominant almost everywhere, while foreign males are over-represented in the construction sector. In most of the cases, Eastern European immigrants are mainly represented in construction (males) and in the service sector as domestic helpers and carers (women); and Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are in some ethnic niches and are mainly represented in restaurants, shops, retail stores and trade.

The different national origins of immigrants in each country correspond to specific insertions. In Greece, Albanian men may be found in construction (72% of the total number of foreign workers in construction are Albanians – National Insurance Service, IKA, data for 2005) and Albanian women work as external domestic helpers and carers. In Portugal, Africans, Brazilians and Eastern Europeans work in construction, cleaning, shops and restaurants (in the latter case, the proportion of Brazilians is more prevalent). In Spain, the domestic sector is more important for Rumanian, Bulgarian and Latin-American, especially Ecuadorian, female immigrants; Eastern European immigrants, especially Rumanians and Bulgarians, along with Bolivians, are mostly employed in construction and the restaurant business; and there is a high percentage of Moroccans, followed by Ecuadorians, in the agricultural sector.

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7 There are no relevant indications about the importance of education for a change of sector. However, it seems that the higher the educational level the lower the probability to be employed in the agricultural sector.
4.3. Overqualification and working conditions

Immigrants’ overqualification seems a general trend in these countries. The lack of employment opportunities in their professions force migrants to accept jobs that not always correspond to their qualifications. Comparative ratios show that immigrant overqualification compared to the native population is substantial in the countries of Southern Europe: in Italy, overqualification rates are 6.4% for native-born, compared with 23.5% for foreign-born; in Greece they are 9.0% for native-born and 39.3% for foreign-born. Also substantial but smaller rate gaps between nationals and foreigners exist in Portugal, with 7.9% for native-born and 16.8% for foreign-born, and in Spain, with 24.2% for native-born and 42.9% for foreign-born (OECD, 2006). These numbers confirm that national populations are also subject to trends in post-Fordist labour markets, as is the case of overqualification. Once again, there are differences among immigrant groups. The educational level of immigrants varies according to their nationality. It is mainly in the case of Eastern European immigrants that there is a considerable mismatch between educational level and type of work.

Linked to these employment patterns, the working conditions of most immigrants are poor. This applies, among other factors, to salaries and contractual arrangements. Immigrants tend to earn less than the native-born. For example, in Greece a research conducted in the mid-1990s showed that the salary of immigrant workers was on average 40% lower than that of natives (Lianos et al., 1996). In Portugal, in 2004, the average total wage of full-time employed foreign workers was almost 20% lower than that of Portuguese workers.

In all countries, temporary work has been expanding over the years. The probability of being in a temporary job is greater for immigrants than for the native population. Temporary work is often seen as one mechanism to satisfy certain labour shortages, especially low-skilled ones, without the need to admit large numbers of workers in sectors which may eventually be subject to significant structural change. This reality reflects the greater precariousness that immigrants have to face in the labour market. According to OECD data, the share of temporary jobs among immigrants is nearly 45% in Spain and almost 30% in Portugal, i.e. 20 and 16 percentage points more, respectively, than for the native population (OECD, 2006: 58).

4.4. Employment and unemployment rates

Given the importance of economic immigration in Southern Europe, the employment rate of foreign immigrants is considerably high, when compared to other Western and Northern European host countries. Also, as seen in section 2, most of the immigrants who live and work in Southern European countries are part of the most productive age groups. The proportion of the working age foreign population (15-64 years) is quite high in all countries.

As regards employment rates, immigrants in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain show higher numbers than natives. This applies to both male and female immigrants. The high employment of immigrants is linked to the strong labour market orientation of inflows and their easy absorption by the labour market. Part of the immigrants’ insertion follows the same pattern of natives. This occurs, for example, with female employment rates, which are higher in Portugal than elsewhere, both for natives and foreign-born. The gap between gender employment rates is more relevant in Greece, Italy and Spain, where women (native and foreign-born) present much lower employment rates than their respective counterparts.
According to OECD data for foreign- and native-born populations in 2006 (OECD, 2008), in Greece natives had an employment rate of 73.9% (men) and 47.1% (women), while foreign-born represented 83.6% (men) and 51.1% (women). In Italy native-born employment rates were 69.6% (men) and 46.0% (women), while foreign-born men represented 82.0% and women 49.9%. In Portugal, the native-born men employment rate was 73.7% and native-born women 61.5%, while the foreign-born men rate was 76.8% and the foreign-born female rate 67.1%. Finally, in Spain, the employment rate of natives was 75.4% (men) and 52.3% (women), while for the foreign-born population it was 81.9% (men) and 57.5% (women).

Generally, the unemployment situation of foreigners is relatively less favourable than for natives. Moreover, vulnerability to unemployment seems to be lower for immigrant men than for women. Recent data also suggest than the over-representation of immigrants in unemployment may mostly occur in periods of economic recession (Martin, 2009). According to OECD data for foreign- and native-born in 2006 (OECD, 2008), in Greece natives’ unemployment rates were 5.8% (men) and 13.6% (women), while foreign-born displayed 5.3% (men) and 15.1% (women). In Italy, unemployment rates were 5.5% (native men) and 8.5% (native women), compared to 5.7% (foreign-born men) and 12.4% (foreign-born women). In Portugal, unemployment rates were 6.9% (native men) and 9.3% (native women), compared to 8.2% (foreign-born men) and 11.4% (foreign-born women). Finally, in Spain, unemployment rates were 6.1% (native men) and 10.8% (native women), and 7.7% (foreign-born men) and 15.7% (foreign-born women).

It must still be noted that, regarding employment and unemployment rates, there are differences according to nationalities. For example, in Portugal the employment rates of the main groups of labour immigrants (PALOP, Brazilians and Eastern Europeans) were considerably higher than the ones of EU foreign citizens. As regards unemployment, the PALOP immigrants (men and women) were among the most affected and, in all immigrant groups, women were disproportionately affected. In Spain, unemployment does not affect all immigrant communities in the same way, as it seems to concern in particular the Moroccan and Rumanian community and to be higher among men than among women (Pajares, 2008).

4.5. Complementarity or substitution

As regards the existence of complementarity or substitution/competition with natives’ employment, the former is by large the most common pattern. This is already well established by former comparative studies on immigrants’ insertion in Southern European labour markets. For example, Reyneri and Baganha (2001: 49) state that “in segmented labour markets, such as those of the Southern European countries, migrant workers are in competition only with marginal sectors of the domestic labour supply and/or in narrow occupational areas. (…) Conflicts between migrants and the local population only seldom concern labour market problems”.

In Greece, several studies have revealed a limited competition between natives and foreigners, as the latter mostly took up work that the former did not accept to do. However, a recent study (Zografakis, Kontis and Mitrakos, 2007) show that immigrants compete with unskilled and low/medium-low income natives for jobs. Nonetheless, they overall create new jobs.

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8 The employment rate, or employment-to-population ratio, is defined as the proportion of an economy’s working-age population that is employed (OECD).

9 The unemployment rate gives the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force (the total number of people employed plus unemployed) (OECD).
jobs for natives, increase consumption, decrease prices, make Greek products and businesses more competitive, contributing thus positively to the national balance of payments. Moreover, in most sectors immigrants take up jobs that Greeks refuse. Evidence suggests that if immigrants were not there taking these jobs, there would be important negative repercussions for Greek businesses, products and exports.

A recent study in Italy concluded that “there is greater complementarity than competition between national and migrant labour (...). In a segmented labour market such as Italy’s, where large pockets of unemployment coexist with difficulties in finding labour (...), non EU workers do “low quality” jobs rejected by Italian workers” (Brandolini et al., 2005: 261).

In Spain, a similar trend is emphasized by a research outlining that complementarity is generally the rule in most sectors (Domingo and Gil-Alonso, 2007). However, the same study stresses that there are not enough studies that allow finding out if there are cases of competition with natives in sectors like, for instance, construction. Some researchers have studied the impact of regularisation on natives’ and immigrants’ employment. It seems that unskilled native workers are affected by regularisations, as their real wages are more likely to fall, while skilled native labour benefits from regularisations (Ferri et al., 2006). Such findings have been also outlined by de Espinola (2006). According to him, real wages in the Spanish economy have been increasing in the manufacturing industrial sector, while they have been decreasing for less-skilled activities in construction and the service sector. But, in spite of these findings, there is still not enough evidence that allows getting an overall and satisfying answer about the consequences of immigration on natives’ employment conditions and wages.

A similar conclusion may apply to Portugal. Until today, most references indicate that complementarity is the norm (Peixoto, 2008). The high segmentation of the labour market, as well as the increased education and aspirations of the Portuguese workforce, suggest that immigrants take up jobs nationals do not want to do. However, systematic research on employment and wage levels has not been conducted thus far. Since immigration and emigration are both significant in the Portuguese case, unclear evidence may also result from the coexistence of inflows and outflows in the same economic sectors.
5. Irregular migration and regularisation processes

Joaquín Arango and Claudia Finotelli

5.1. The size of irregular stocks

The challenge of irregular immigration affects several countries in Europe. However, it is in Southern Europe that the number of irregular migrants is particularly high.\(^{10}\) Since the migration crisis of the 1990s irregular migration has been perceived as a chronic disease of Southern European migration regimes. Actually, it would be no exaggeration if we affirmed that most foreigners that are now living regularly in Southern European countries experienced a more or less long period of irregularity before getting their first residence permit. For this reason, the estimation of the size of irregular migration turned into a prior task of the national governments and the European institutions. Admittedly, estimating irregular foreign population is not an easy task. However, there have been efforts to provide reliable estimates of irregular foreigners. First of all, the frequent regularisation processes carried out in almost all Southern European countries could provide some reliable figures about the presence of irregular migrants. In addition, some research groups tried also to carry out further estimates based on other available sources. In this respect, the Spanish authorities could rely on the most complete statistical sources on foreign population. In Spain, the estimates of irregular migration are based on the comparison between the figures of the non-EU citizens enrolled in the municipal register (Padrón) with those foreigners in possession of a residence permit.

In fact, the estimates provided by the Spanish media usually show certain ignorance about the disadvantages of this statistical source. First of all, most estimates only take into account the absolute number of foreign residents, including EU-citizens, a category that cannot be irregular per se and should therefore be excluded from the group of irregular migrants. Furthermore, such estimates should also take into account categories like asylum seekers or foreign students omitted in the figures on legal residents. Finally, estimates often do improperly include foreigners who have applied for the renewal of an expired residence permit and cannot thus be considered to be irregular migrants. In spite of all, a large group of Spanish researchers argue that the Padrón still represents the ground for achieving more clarity on such an opaque phenomenon like the extent of irregularity. This is, for instance, the case of Recaño and Domingo (2005) who tried, quite successfully indeed, to estimate irregularity before the regularisation of 2005.\(^{11}\) Similar efforts have been carried out by other Spanish researchers like, for instance, Pajares (2006), Cachón (2007) and Cebolla and Gonzalez (2008).\(^{12}\)

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\(^{10}\) Recent research on this phenomenon demonstrated that also countries like Germany, whose governmental authorities often denied the existence of irregular migration in their country, have to deal with a certain degree of irregular migration (Alt, 1999; Schönwälder et al., 2004).

\(^{11}\) The data used for this estimation did not take into account the depuration process of the municipal register and might contain a certain degree of overestimation.

\(^{12}\) Most of those researchers agreed on the fact that there were about 900,000 irregular migrants before the regularisation of 2005. According to Cebolla and Gonzalez (2008), the irregularity rate reached its peak in 2003 when 53 per cent of the foreign population was estimated to be irregular. The percentage decreased after the regularisation of 2005 and the entry of Rumania and Bulgaria into the European Union.
Things are different in Italy, where estimates like those based on the Padrón are not possible, because illegal migrants are not included in the municipal register. However, there have been several attempts to estimate the number of irregular migrants since the early 90s. Migration researches tried first to estimate irregular migration using local surveys or data about illegal employment provided by the Ministry of Labour. More recently, the field surveys carried out by the Regional Observatory of Immigration in Lombardy are considered to be the most rigorous estimates of irregular migrants. In this respect, the estimates provided by Blangiardo (see Table 4.1) suggest a very high share of irregularity at the end of the 1990s. Things changed after the regularisation of 2002 and the entry of Bulgaria and Rumania into the European Union in 2007. The impact of the European enlargement worked as a de facto regularisation in the case of Rumanian immigrants. At the beginning of 2008 the share of irregularity was one of the lowest, with about 350,000 estimated irregular immigrants. However, according to more recent figures, the number of irregular migrants has been increasing again (Blangiardo, 2008).

Table 4.1. Estimates of immigrants and irregular migrants in Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author (a)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigrants (thousands)</th>
<th>Irregular migrants (thousands)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birindelli [1990]</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blangiardo [1997] (b)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>833-912</td>
<td>344-423</td>
<td>41-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blangiardo [1998] (b) (c)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>982-1101</td>
<td>176-295</td>
<td>18-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blangiardo [2006] (b) (d)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3357</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blangiardo [2008]</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3982</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) values at the beginning of the year, if not differently stated; (b) only citizens of CEE and Third World countries; (c) April 15; (d) July 1.
Source: Strozza [2004] and some of the original sources.

All in all, the different type of estimates carried out both in Italy and in Spain show that the governments of both countries have periodically to deal with a large number of irregular migrants. Recent estimates on irregular migrant presence in Greece indicate numbers close to 200,000. More specifically Triandafyllidou and Maroukof (2008) estimate irregular migrants at 167,000, Lianos et al. (2008) suggest that irregular migrants in Greece range between 172,000 and 209,000, while Maroukis (2009) arrives at an estimate of 205,000 irregular migrants living in Greece in 2007. In Portugal, there is a similar lack of surveys, though this has not prevented official institutions to provide some general estimates on irregular migration. This was, for instance, the case of José Magalhães, Secretary of State for Internal Administration, according to whom there are 50,000 irregular immigrants in Portugal (Lusa, 2008). In spite of the lack of periodic estimates in Greece and Portugal, irregular migration represents, as we know, a relevant part of foreign population in both countries. Therefore, the importance of such phenomenon in all Southern European countries drives the attention to the determinants that can favour the development of irregular migration systems and turn irregular migration into a structural component of Southern European migration regimes.
5.2. The determinants of irregular migration

The presence of irregular migrants in Southern European countries has been often explained with weak external controls, their recent immigration experience and a geographic position that favours clandestine entries (Baldwin-Edwards, 1999). A phenomenon like irregular migration, however, cannot be explained through unilateral cause-effect relationships. As a matter of fact, the question of irregularity is part of a more general analysis on the mechanisms of international migration. As Massey et al. (1998) pointed out, immigration can only be understood considering the interplay of socio-economic structure, household strategies and individual decision making. International migration, which encompasses both regular and irregular flows, is the result of a complex mix of push and pull factors, which are often acting in an inadequate regulation frame. Irregularity is produced, first of all, by the intersection of immigration regulations with large migration flows and reflects what Massey (1999) has called the “post-modern” paradox between global forces and restrictive policy rules. In this respect, irregular migration is the product of several factors, according to what could be summarized as an “equation of irregularity” based on the intensity of the flows, restrictive regulations, the attractiveness of the informal economy, geographic proximity, as well as the quality of controls and the activities of the smuggling industry (Arango, 2005). All these aspects have been particularly important for the development of irregular migration systems in Southern Europe.

As seen in section 2, since the 1980s all Southern European countries have registered a considerable increase of immigration flows. Particularly in the last 10 years, the Spanish and the Italian net immigration rates were among the highest in Europe. However, their transformation into immigration countries has been accompanied by certain difficulties to set an efficient regulation system for foreign workers. As a matter of fact, as it will be seen in the next section, their legislation was characterized by a high degree of restrictiveness and inflexibility that hampered an effective programming of the flows. In sum, most Southern European countries have been unable to carry out an efficient programming of the flows, in spite of having recognized the necessity of foreign labour. No wonder that in this case most employers preferred to employ foreigners that were already living in the country and working in the informal economy. Southern European regimes have, thus, a high degree of labour market segmentation where informality mainly concerns construction, agriculture and the service sector (e.g. hotels and restaurants, and, most of all, the domestic sector). As seen above, according to recent estimates the informal economy in all Southern European countries exceeds 20 per cent of the GDP, though the highest rate is certainly the Greek one with about 28 per cent. The informal economy represents, thus, a very important magnet for irregular migrants and turns into a further important element for the development of irregular migration systems (Reyneri, 1998). That is why internal labour market controls acquire certain relevance in the struggle against irregular migration. As a matter of fact, the size of the informal economy goes along with the weakness of labour market controls in all the mentioned countries.

In Portugal, the inspections on the activity of immigrants are carried out by the Aliens and Borders Service (SEF) and ACT (Autoridade para as Condições do Trabalho), an entity belonging to the Ministry of Labour. The number of inspection activities increased significantly in the last years, though the volume of the informal arrangements still remains hard to tackle. The same can be affirmed for Greece and Italy, where the number of labour
market inspections does not seem to be enough to control the extended informal economy.\textsuperscript{13} In Italy, such weakness might be related, among other things, with the weak administration structures. Furthermore, trade unions have reported that the time between denouncing and inspecting is usually longer than one year (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). Spain represents the Southern European country where the government did more efforts to improve the quality of the labour market inspections since 2004. The majority of the inspections were carried out in the construction sector and the restaurant business. Another important economic niche for irregular migrants, the domestic sector, has been left aside because of the difficulties of carrying out labour market controls in private households. According to the interviews carried out with administration representatives and immigrants’ associations, the fear of inspections has increased in the last years. Nevertheless, the largest firms do still complain about the unequal distribution of labour market controls, that favours small firms. Finally, the main obstacle to effective labour market controls remains, no doubt, the cultural attitude towards informal work and shadow economy which is far from being considered a crime, not only by the Spanish, but by a large part of all Southern European societies.

Together with the pull factor represented by the informal economy, the presence of irregular migrants has been clearly favoured by the geographic position of Southern European countries and the difficulties to control their maritime borders (see section 6). The increase of the flows toward Southern Europe coincided with the necessity to protect the common European borders after the enforcement of the Schengen Agreement.\textsuperscript{14} The lack of experience and the exposed sea borders caused a certain degree of mistrust toward Southern European member states, which was also encouraged by the media effect of boat people arriving on their coasts. However, the percentage of clandestine entries does not seem to be a relevant part of the overall irregular migration flows. According to the ENI1 survey (2008), one of the most recent immigration surveys published in Spain, 63 per cent of all immigrants living in Spain have entered the country by plane, while only 1 per cent came using the sea channel. As far as Italy is concerned, surveys indicate that clandestine entries represent only a small part of the irregular entries (Pastore et al., 2006). Also in the case of Greece the number of irregular migrants apprehended at the sea borders is fairly low.\textsuperscript{15} The northern Greek border is actually the most important port of entry for irregular migrants, who are mostly Albanian citizens or more generally immigrants proceeding from Central and East Eastern Europe. Portugal represents the only Southern European country where the geographic position probably plays the less relevant role, being its Atlantic coasts more inaccessible for the smuggler routes than the Mediterranean ones. Smuggling and trafficking of human beings in Portugal started to become visible at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. The best organized networks seemed to be the Eastern European ones, while the Brazilian and the African networks were less organized. Another different and most relevant case is represented by the trafficking of women from Brazil, that are usually employed in the sex industry. Smuggling networks in Spain are also very active and flexible. In the last couple of years, they have shifted their main routes from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Canary Islands, due to more intensive controls in the Mediterranean area. In Italy, networks seem to be particularly active on the Southern coasts, exploiting the Libyan route, due to the efforts of the Spanish authorities to control the Moroccan channel. In the case of Greece, smugglers seem to rely on different types of organisational structures, that range from small informal networks to some

\textsuperscript{13} Of course, there seem to be some exceptions, like the activities of the Labour Inspectorate in Northern Athens.

\textsuperscript{14} The Schengen Agreement became operative in Spain and Portugal in 1995 and in Italy and Greece only in 1998.

\textsuperscript{15} Most of the irregular immigrants apprehended in this region are Afghans, Iraqi Kurds and Pakistanis, followed by Turkish Kurds.
more mafia-like organisations. Interestingly, the low number of asylum seekers in the four considered countries points to a limited relevance of the so-called “asylum strategy of immigration” (Teitelbaum, 1984) in Southern Europe.\footnote{However, even though Southern European countries cannot be considered classical “asylum countries”, we know that the number of asylum seekers has been recently increasing in Greece (see section 2 of this paper) and in Italy. In this later case, the number of asylum seekers increased from 20,000 to 40,000 in 2008.}

All in all, smuggling networks seem to be almost everywhere flexible organisations, that are able to adapt very quickly to the defensive strategies enforced by the nation states (Pastore \textit{et al.}, 2006; Coslovi, 2007; Carling, 2007). However, it seems to be quite evident that irregular immigration in Southern Europe usually starts with overstaying and not with a clandestine entry. In this case, several favourable visa conditions come into play. Nowadays visa policy and its effects do not depend any longer on national decisions but on European policies, which define the countries whose citizens need a visa to enter the Schengen space. However, visa policy is also embedded in the interests of each country and the migration systems in which they are involved in. In this respect, some countries might be more generous than others, because of economic and historical ties. Most irregular migration systems involving Portugal consist, for instance, in overstayers proceeding from the PALOP countries, Eastern Europe and Brazil (the latter not needing a visa to access the EU). Furthermore, the existence of the Schengen space allows “false tourists” to move around Europe with a visa obtained by the foreign representation of one EU-member state. This is what happened to Ukrainian immigrants, that obtained their visa from Germany and moved to Italy, Spain and Portugal, where they could find a job in the construction sector and domestic service (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2006).

Finally, irregular migration in Southern Europe has been also favoured by quite a tolerant attitude of the native population and the same administration. Indeed, living as an irregular is by far easier in Southern than in Northern Europe. In most Southern European countries irregular migrants have access to compulsory education and basic health services. Nevertheless, irregular migrants remain in a very precarious condition and represent a challenge to the control capacity of the state. For this reason, regularisations turned into a very important instrument for Southern European states to recover control on foreign population and prevent a further extension of the informal economy.

5.3. Regularisations as Ex Post Regulation Instruments

The regularisation of irregular immigrants is, of course, not a Southern European peculiarity. Almost all European countries had to resort to a regularisation at least once in their migration history. However, there are few doubts that the majority of such processes were carried out in Southern Europe (De Bruycker/Apap 2000)\footnote{Estimates say that Western European countries regularized about four millions immigrants since 1973, three millions of them in Southern European countries (Papadopoulou, 2005; MPG/Weil, 2004).}. For this reason, regularisations have been often considered to be a proof for the Southern European “public ambiguity” towards irregular migration and for the “Southern” incapacity to control migration (Brochmann, 1993; Baldwin-Edwards, 1999).\footnote{In 2005, the German and the Dutch government, for instance, sharply criticized the Spanish regularization, fearing an “invasion” of regularized immigrants in Spain to other European countries and blaming the Spanish government for not having informed the other EU-member states in time about the process.} As a matter of fact, the lack of efficient recruitment procedures turned regularisations into the most useful way to “repair” \textit{a posteriori} the structural mismatches of most Southern European migration regimes. Since the 1980s six regularisation
processes have been carried out in Spain and Portugal, while the Italian government carried out five processes in the same period. In Greece regularisations are a more recent phenomenon, since the first one was executed in 1998, followed by two other processes in 2001 and 2005/2006.

Today regularisations represent, both at the national and at the international level, a very controversial issue, whose necessity is withdrawn by the majority of the political parties. Recently, the European Council has agreed on limiting regularisations to individual and ad hoc processes (European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 24 September 2008). Nevertheless, in the past years regularisations were not linked to a particular government majority in all Southern European countries. In Spain, the right-wing government chaired by the Partido Popular carried out the regularisations of 1996, 2000 and 2001, while the Socialist Party executed the regularisations of 1986, 1991 and the “big” regularisation of 2005. In Italy, the left-wing majority carried out the regularisation process in 1998, while centre governments carried out other regularisations in 1986, 1990 and 1995. However, the largest regularisation ever carried out in this country responded to the decision of a right-wing coalition constituted by the House of Freedoms (Casa delle Libertà), the party ruled by Silvio Berlusconi, the populist Northern League (Lega Nord) and the conservative National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale). Furthermore, we should add to the mentioned processes the special flows decree approved in 2006 by the centre-left government of Romano Prodi, which enlarged the quota for 2006 up to the number of applications received. The rationale behind such decision was the persuasion that most of the applications had been filed for workers already living irregularly in Italy, so that the increase of the contingent would work as a de facto regularization program. In Portugal, regularisation processes were carried out both by the Social Democratic Party (1992-1993, 2003 and 2004) and the Socialist Party (1996, 2001 and 2007). The same occurred in Greece, where both the PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) and the New Democracy have executed regularisation programs. All in all, regularisation processes show in each country a certain degree of periodicity, though all of them were presented as exceptional “one-time-only” measures by the national governments. In absence of effective recruitment systems they soon became part of the regulation system, used to ‘repair’ the lack of an efficient migration policy (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2. Overview of regularisation processes in Southern European migration regimes (1985-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration.

The requirements for a regularisation application were not everywhere the same. However, we can recognize common features. In general, the applicants had to prove that they had been living in the country before a certain date (reference date). The lack of criminal records was another relevant essential condition for most processes. In the Spanish case, employment was declared an essential application condition only in 2005, though in some previous cases the requirements for application included previous employment as a desirable condition (Cachón, 2007). During the regularisation of 2005 the residence status depended for the first time on
the existence of a work contract and the registration of the foreign workers in the Social Security System. It was, therefore, the employer who had to apply for the regularisation of his or her employee. In Italy, the regularisation of the residence status has been always made dependent on the regularisation of the labour condition, except for the regularisation of 1990. The same can be affirmed for Portugal, where the regularisation processes of 2001, 2003, 2004 and partly of 2007 were directed to facilitate the labour market insertion of immigrants. In this case, the existence of an effective work contract (or of a promised work contract) was the condition to obtain a residence permit. Only the regularisation of 2007 introduced a wider set of application conditions. As far as Greece is concerned, applicants did not only have to prove that they were working in Greece, but had also to provide a health certificate issued by a public Greek hospital. Interestingly, the national background was relevant only in the case of the regularisation process for Ecuadorian migrants in Spain in 2001 and Brazilian immigrants in Portugal in 2003.

Italy and Spain regularised the highest number of irregular migrants, not only in Southern Europe but also in comparison to other European countries (Table 4.3). In Spain, the total number of regularized immigrants between 1985/1986 and 1996 fairly exceeded the 150,000 persons. However, their number increased after 2000, with respectively 138,490 regularized immigrants in 2000 and 277,709 in 2001. All in all, about 1.2 millions foreigners were regularised in Spain since 1986, half of them after the regularisation of 2005, which was without any doubt the most successful regularisation ever carried out in the country.

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19 The only exception was made for domestic workers with more than one employer, who could apply for the regularization by themselves.
20 The open-ended regularisation of 2007 considers both labour market criteria and other integration criteria.
21 In some cases the reference category was extended to other migrant categories, like relatives (Italy and Spain) and asylum seekers (Spain).
Table 4.3. Results of regularization processes in Southern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-90</td>
<td>322 626</td>
<td>34 832</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>244 492</td>
<td>109 135</td>
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<td>39 166</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>217 124</td>
<td>221 748</td>
<td>370 000 (white card)</td>
<td>35 082</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>220 000 (green card)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2007</td>
<td>634 728</td>
<td>811 049</td>
<td></td>
<td>183 833 (a)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(470 000)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: (a) Data only refer to the regularisation of 2001, while data about the 2003 and 2004 regularisations and the 2007 on-going process are very scarce.
Source: own elaboration.

The case of Italy is quite similar. The number of immigrants regularised between 1986 and 1998 did hardly exceed 250,000 regularised persons during each process. Irregularity increased after the surge of the flows between 1998 and 2002 and, hence, the number of people regularised in 2002. Also in Portugal, a large part of immigrants have been regularised in 2001, at the time of the most intensive immigration flows. As far as regularisation processes are concerned, they were not always (and not everywhere) accompanied by the appropriate implementation measures.

According to Massey (1999), the weak bureaucratic structure of Southern European migration regimes might have influenced their implementation capacity in immigration matters. This was, in particular, the case of Italy, where the implementation of regularisation processes was often accompanied by a series of administrative memos that modified the legislative provisions to carry out regularisation processes. In particular, administrative memos softened the condition to participate to a regularisation process in order to allow the regularisation of as many immigrants as possible (Finotelli, 2007). A similar development has been observed in the case of Spain, where the regularisation processes have been characterized by a certain lack of administrative coordination. Some of them have been also criticized because of their imprecise application conditions. However, in 2005, in contrast with the previous regularization processes, the Spanish government tried to provide the necessary organisational structure for the regularization process, setting up 742 information points on the whole territory and reinforcing the administration personnel with about 1,700 additional employees. Such provisions improved the dynamic of the process, though it was not possible to avoid entirely the long queues in front of the competent offices. Both in Greece and Portugal regularisation procedures have been criticised for being bureaucratic and slow, even though things seems to have improved in Portugal during the last three regularisation processes.

All regularisation processes carried out in Southern Europe had a high recognition rate. Nevertheless, such rate does not necessarily say very much about the real success of regularisation processes in the integration of foreign population. As a matter of fact, the residence permits issued after a regularisation process are often short-term residence permits that have to be renewed usually after one year. Such renewal often depends on the discretionary power of the public officials. For this reason, regularisation processes have been frequently criticized for not being able to stabilise a large part of the population. Furthermore, it has been widely assumed that regularisations do not contribute to the stabilisation of foreign population, since many of the regularised immigrants fall back into illegality as soon as their residence permit has expired (Reyneri, 1999). Finally, regularisations are supposed to
produce a pull-effect that attracts further irregular migration, instead of reducing the rate of irregularity.

Indeed, assessing the effects of regularisation processes is not a simple task, as there are not enough empirical studies that allow an overall answer about the effects of regularisation processes in Southern Europe. Nevertheless, some studies conducted in Italy and Spain outlined some positive aspects. Given the restrictive and often inadequate orientation of the legislation, regularisations are likely to have allowed the legal inclusion and stabilisation of a large part of foreign residents, in spite of the precariousness of the residence permits issued.

Since 1986, 1.4 millions of immigrants got their residence permit through a regularisation process in Italy. According to Carfagna (2002) and Blangiardo (2004), the largest part of the immigrants that have been regularised in Italy maintained their regular status over the years. Furthermore, it seems that the number of those that lost their residence permit and applied for several regularisation processes is not very relevant. The case of Spain seems to be quite similar, as regularisations contributed to the inclusion of almost half of the foreign population (Arango and Finotelli, 2009). Furthermore, recent studies carried out to assess the effects of regularisation processes in Spain demonstrate that such processes could reduce the irregularity rate (Recano y Domingo, 2005; Pajares, 2006; Cachón, 2007; Cebolla and Gonzalez, 2008; Arango and Finotelli, 2009). There seems to be no similar research results in Portugal and Greece. In Greece, however, the general assumption is that the number of re-applications in each process is very high. Such assumption seems to be true at least as far as the case of Bulgarian immigrants is concerned. According to the research results of Markova (2007), it is not always easy for foreign workers in Greece to renew their residence permit, because of the uncooperative attitude of Greek employers.

Nevertheless, saying that regularisations were able to “stabilize” a large part of the foreign population in most Southern European countries does not mean that they are to be considered a panacea against irregularity. The effect of regularizations on irregularity depends on several factors, such as, first of all, the age of the migrant communities. Older communities, like the Moroccan one, have a lower irregularity rate than the most recent ones. Furthermore, regularisations are able to reduce the irregularity rate of those immigrants who are already in the country, but cannot avoid “new” irregular entries. These, however, do not depend on a cause-effect relationship like the so-called pull-effect, but are embedded in a more complex set of factors which does not only include a possible attraction of regularisations on irregular flows, but also visa policy, geographic proximity, networks and, of course, the attraction power of a widespread informal economy (Arango and Finotelli, 2009). In addition, not all irregular migrants had the possibility to participate to a regularisation process. A regularisation, for instance, which is only meant for migrants with a real work contract, excludes unemployed irregular family members. This was the case of Italy and Spain in 2002 and 2005, respectively, as well as Portugal in 2001. Furthermore, not everybody can fulfil all pre-conditions required by the regularisation. It seems, for instance, that a sizeable number of immigrants in Spain could not fulfil the pre-condition of having registered in the Padrón. Finally, we should not forget that those immigrants whose application is rejected on administrative grounds remain irregular.

All in all, regularisations do not substitute an efficient immigration policy. They remain a regulation tool a posteriori, while there is no doubt that national governments cannot tackle the issue of irregular migration without seriously improving their migration policies. The real struggle against irregularity is only possible if each national regime acts on the determinants that constitute the equation of irregularity. For this reason, both the Spanish and the
Portuguese government considered the last regularisations to be a necessary and exceptional decision to “clean-up-the-state” before carrying out a wider legislative reform of their migration regimes. In both countries, “stigmatized” extraordinary regularisation processes have been substituted by discrete and individual regularisation forms. Such important policy change breaks with the past and seems to be related, among other factors, with the improvement of the labour recruitment policies and the control system in the past years.

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22 The Spanish Regulation Act of 2004 assumes the risk of a certain volume of irregular migration, introducing the *arraigo*, which is an individual regularisation and an on-going regularisation system. The Portuguese immigration law of 2007 contains some mechanisms allowing the legalisation of formerly irregular situations: these include, among others, a stable labour activity, allowing individual regularisations until a maximum determined by the annual labour contingent fixed by the government, and some indicators of social integration, such as the attendance of basic education by children of immigrants already born in the country.
6. Labour migration policies

Catarina Sabino and João Peixoto

During the first phase of Southern Europe’s immigration history, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain developed legislation which was more focused on administrative issues concerning entry and residence, than on the concept of effective regulation instruments. The development and improvement of immigration laws of such type was the price Greece, Portugal and Spain had to pay, alike Italy at that time, for their European Union membership or at least prospects of becoming an EU Member State. More sophisticated immigration control mechanisms were mostly enacted after the late 1980s, when massive inflows started to occur in some of these countries, first Italy and Greece, then Spain and Portugal (see next section).

Since the mid-1980s intensification of immigration flows, awareness of large labour demand and the volume of irregular migration contributed to the development of legal mechanisms of admission into the labour market. As a part of a broader objective of regulating the labour market, these mechanisms constituted an attempt to outline an economic migration management policy, allowing for legal provision of labour immigrants, just functioning of the labour market and a crackdown of irregular migration.

Despite their tentative character and many failures, it can be argued that some of those policy initiatives were pioneering in the EU context. After the World War II, many labour migration programmes were drawn by European immigration host countries, and in many cases they were not successful – at least in their intended objectives. After the recognised failure of guest worker policies of the 1950s and 1960s, the “zero migration” objective predominated in the EU, particularly regarding workers’ movements. In recent years, new attempts have been enacted to promote orderly labour migration, either for permanent settlement or temporary jobs. Among other malfunctions, the preference to accept highly skilled inflows has not been matched by correspondent efforts to match low skilled occupations. The latter have been mostly subject to new temporary arrangements and, frequently, irregular conditions.

The issue of labour migration management policies has only been the object of systematic reflection in recent years (Martin, Abela and Kuptsch, 2006; Martin, Martin and Weil, 2006; OECD, 2008). The launch of new initiatives and the quest for effective regulation, either unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, justifies that the OECD considers that the management of labour migration is today “the single biggest topic of policy change” (OECD, 2008: 120). It has been within this framework – and often in the forefront of European policies – that several attempts of immigrant labour regulation have been enacted in the Southern countries.

6.1. Main regulation attempts and policy failures

The legal channels for entry of immigrants into the labour market differed across time and varied from country to country, although part of the rationale behind them maybe considered similar. Whether it were quota systems, invitation schemes or shortage lists, they were designed to regulate future labour immigration and avoid the need of further regularisations. These systems were usually based on labour market needs (domestic skill and labour shortages) and on labour market tests, which give preference to natives and other resident citizens to fill a job vacancy.
When observed in detail in each Southern European country, the process of construction of labour admission policies was lengthy and cumbersome. As it will be seen ahead, its outcome may be considered to have been mostly ineffective. The basic tenet of those labour migration policies was that admission was accepted – a principle that contradicted, from the early stages, the “zero immigration” target of most EU countries at that time. However, the practical mechanisms for achieving regulation, by matching immigrants with jobs, have rarely proved to be successful. As argued in the previous section, this failure led to large irregular migration.

In the early stages of these labour migration policies, a system of individual nomination or invitation of immigrants was coupled with the principle of the labour market tests, whereby the native, the EU and the legal third country nationals resident workforce would be protected and given priority in employment.

In the mid-80s Spain was the first to introduce a labour recruitment procedure, coupled with the labour market test system. The Foreigners Bill of 1985 allowed hiring migrants presenting a nominal request in the frame of the General Regime (Regímen General). However, the bureaucratic procedure to hire a migrant was very complex and always depended on the labour market test, and thus most employers preferred the option to employ their workers irregularly. Similarly, in the same period, Italy introduced a nominal request procedure and a labour market test system that were not successful as well. The law that regulated the admission of foreign workers in 1986 requested foreigners to be specifically nominated, after checking on the availability of the local workforce. This rule soon turned out to be too restrictive to deal with the actual inflows.

A system based on an invitation scheme has been set in Greece since 1991, and again the requirement to protect local workers was enacted. Since this first law that intended to regulate immigration, and more specifically to tackle irregular migration, the only way for a foreign worker to obtain a residence permit with the purpose of employment was through invitation (Emke-Pouloupolou, 2007) – a procedure still in place today. This policy for labour migration (metaklisi) is a rather complex one, allowing immigrants to work in Greece, for a specific employer and performing specific type of work, only if there is an available position for them which cannot be filled by the Greek labour force or the immigrant labour force that already resides in Greece.

In a later stage, systems based in labour market quotas (or equivalent) were common to all Southern countries. Italy (1990) and Spain (1993) were the first to introduce this kind of system, followed by Greece (2001) and Portugal (2001). It may be argued, mainly when looking at the Spanish and Italian cases, that the choice of a system of annual quotas for economic migrants – representing all skill levels – was pioneering among the EU countries, since it was against European guidelines at the time. It seems that the strategy adopted by Southern European countries was a precursor of the EU’s later position of recognising the current and potential role of immigrant labour in the European economies.

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23 The principle was set in 1990, although quotas would only be defined in 1995 and enforced in 1998.
24 It was only in 2000 than the (then) EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, António Vitorino, stated that “the zero immigration policies of the past 25 years are not working”, urging for “new legal ways for immigrants to enter the EU” (cit. in Martin, Martin and Weil, 2006: 74-75).
It must also be noted that the wording “quotas” was itself also innovative. Quota systems, as existing since many decades in traditional immigration countries, such as the North American ones, usually designate categories of people and not estimations of jobs to fill.

Following this principle, in Italy, in 1990, a new law (Martelli law) introduced the principle of immigrant inflow programming (the “programmed number”, or numero programmato) and in 1995 quotas were introduced, although in a limited volume. Since a restrictive stance was still dominant and the immigration pressure was high, the quota-based entry mechanism was revolutionised in 1998. The Consolidation Act of 1998 on immigration and status of foreigners (the Turco-Napolitano Law), and its amendment of 2002, improved the system of entry quotas. Every year, the Italian Government, with one or more decrees, had to set maximum quotas of foreigners allowed to enter. The volume of quotas was proportional to the needs of the Italian labour market (the necessary data was provided by the Ministry of Labour) and to the residence permits already issued for family reunification or for reasons of temporary social protection. A specific number of authorisations were assigned to each entry category (payroll labour, self-employed labour, seasonal labour, etc.). Also the number of immigrants that could enter Italy from each country was set. If the decrees were not published, the quotas were determined in accordance with the decrees published the previous year.

However, the recruitment of foreign workers according to the “programmed number” (numero programmato) and the quota system never worked properly. Like in the case of Spain, such a programmed number was used to regularise those immigrants that were already living and working in the country. But also the apparently more efficient quota system introduced by the Turco-Napolitano Law (1998) did not work as expected. As a matter of fact, it was very difficult for the government to estimate the real needs of the labour market. Consequently, established quotas were always far below real labour market demand. The situation did not improve after the abolition of the “sponsorship”, through a law of 2002, and the reduction of privileged quotas imposed by the second Berlusconi government (2001-2006).

In Spain, in 1993, together with the nominal request, the government introduced labour entry quotas (contingente). Immigration quotas were published yearly by the Ministry of Labour, after consultations with the trade unions and employers’ associations. In this case Spanish companies requiring foreign labour had to forward their demand to the Ministry of Labour. The administration would then evaluate the inclusion of such requirements into the contingente for the following year. However, the contingente never turned into an effective policy regulation instrument, since it was simply used to legalise irregular migrants already living in Spain. This situation worsened with the Foreigners’ Bill of 2000, which limited legal employment of foreigners to yearly immigration quotas, eliminating the possibility of nominal requests. The contingente alone could not fulfil the demand of an expanding economy. As a result, until 2003/2004 the quota system (the contingente) did not turn into an effective labour supply channel.

Further problems existed in the Spanish approach. Aparicio and Roig (2006) point out that bad communication between the central and the autonomic governments deeply affected the efficiency of the contingente as a regulation instrument. Furthermore, workers’ selection often depended on bilateral agreements with sending countries. The content of such agreements was, however, very rigid in contrast with the changing character of migration flows. Finally, both the contingente and the nominal request represented “blind” recruitment
tools that did not take into account that an employment relationship usually begins on the basis of trust and mutual knowledge.\textsuperscript{25}

Greece and Portugal followed this “quotas trend” in 2001. The Greek Immigration Law of 2001 established an administrative procedure for the issuing of stay permits with the purpose of employment, based on a plan outlined yearly by the Organization for the Employment of the Labour Force (OAED). The plan included domestic labour market needs within sectors and regions. This type of economic migration management policy involved several actors in the process of recruitment: the Greek state, the consulate authorities, the Greek employers and the foreign workers. In 2005, Greece introduced a new system, similar to the one of 2001. The underlying principle was the same: on the basis of a report, the Ministry of Employment determined “the highest number of stay permits for work purposes that can be issued each year to third country nationals, per prefecture, per nationality, per type and length of employment, and all related details”.

Nevertheless, the main problem of the Greek approach lied in the invitation system. This procedure, existing since 1991, may be considered extremely complex and time consuming. Thus, very few employers in Greece choose to invite foreign workers through this channel. The invitation system is generally a failure for short- or mid-term employment positions, as the invitation procedure may last up to 18 months and, in any case, not less than a year. Employers cannot wait so long for one or more workers who are urgently needed. At the same time, it is also extremely difficult for a firm to foresee their labour needs and, hence, apply much earlier then the vacancy arises. The Greek metaklisi procedure remains very complex and time consuming, even after the reform of 2005 and a further simplification of the requirements introduced in early 2009. In particular, the long waiting periods are dysfunctional in relation to the necessities of small firms that need quick and flexible entry policies more than others.\textsuperscript{26}

In Portugal, in 2001, a system of quotas for immigrant recruitment was envisaged according to a report on domestic labour shortages. The number of visas had to match the job vacancies detected in various economic sectors (the quotas). The quotas were supposed to be defined by a report carried out annually by the Institute of Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP, a department of the Ministry of Labour) based on an employers’ survey and the hearing of various stake-holders, including trade unions. In 2003, a new immigration law was launched, reinforcing this system of quotas. To work legally in Portugal, immigrants had to correspond to labour shortages and apply for a work visa in their country of origin.

All in all, the Portuguese system of quotas for labour market recruitment was scarcely effective and has not helped in the fight against irregular immigration. It was a complex, bureaucratic and ineffective procedure. On one hand, there was a mismatch between the real and the predicted needs of the labour market, given the dynamics of the economy and many short-term needs. On the other hand, some sectors were not even considered. This was the case of the domestic service, for which quotas were never created, since the sector was not included in the employers’ survey. As a result, formal quotas were not fulfilled and foreign workers continued to enter irregularly in the Portuguese labour market.

\textsuperscript{25} This aspect is even more important in the case of domestic service, where trust is an essential condition for employment.

\textsuperscript{26} The agricultural sector seems to represent an exception.
Taking all these labour immigration policies together, it is clear that their degree of restrictiveness and their complex administrative requirements were unable to deal with the high labour demand and vast immigrant supply, thus being incapable of regulating inflows and limiting irregular immigration. As argued in section 4, this was the cause for the continuity and large volume of irregular inflows.

Given these constraints and the failure of the adopted regulation mechanisms, the regularisation policies enacted by all Southern European countries can be seen as a last recourse for regulating the entry of immigrants into the labour market. As also seen in section 4, regularisation programmes have been an important instrument of these migration regimes. Many of the regularisations have focused on the labour market. Application prerequisites asked for proof of employment for a minimum amount of time and/or the payment of social insurance contributions. This means that, even when proactive regulation policies failed, the labour market was still a crucial variable for regulating immigration.

6.2. Recent initiatives

Given the inefficacy of former systems, some of the Southern countries have profoundly changed their labour immigration policies in the recent years, in order to develop a more adequate system meeting the needs of the labour market. Spain may be considered more advanced in this respect. In 2004, simultaneously with the announcement of the large regularisation of 2005, the Spanish government approved a new Regulation Act to make the recruitment procedure of labour immigrants more flexible. The regulation re-established de facto the possibility to hire foreign workers in the country of origin through a nominal offer in the Regimen General. As in all immigration host countries, employment of a foreign worker according to such a procedure still depends on a preceeding labour market test. To make recruitment easier, every three months a list (Catalogo de trabajos de dificil cobertura – Catalogue of Hard-to-fill Positions) is published, containing jobs for which there are usually no available candidates (Spanish citizens or other EU citizens). If an employer is in need to fill a vacancy listed in this catalogue, he/she can immediately begin the recruitment procedure.

The contingente remains another important admission channel. Furthermore, the new regulation introduced an entry visa for “job search”. The aim of this type of visa was to promote further flexibility of recruitment procedures. However, the possibility to apply for such a visa is restricted to a limited number of sectors, like the domestic sector. Very few visas have been issued for this purpose since the approval of the regulation. Finally, Spain is involved in a series of bilateral agreements, with various sending countries, which are effective in providing long- or short-term workers to the Spanish labour market.

In 2007, Portugal also adopted a new immigration law and introduced a new system, called “global contingent”, which reports total labour needs and is published every year. Again, this exercise is carried by IEFP and requires the hearing of stakeholders, including employers and trade unions. This new framework represented an attempt to improve and make issuance of residence and temporary visas for work purposes more effective. Foreign citizens have direct access to job offers through the IEFP website, and there is also the possibility of direct contact between potential candidates and recruiters. Such as in Spain, several bilateral agreements were signed. The economic situation of the country and the decrease of immigration in recent years have not yet allowed the testing of such measures, although the bureaucracy involved seems to maintain some of the former rigidities.
Summing up, labour migration policies adopted by Southern European countries have changed through time, but their efficacy has always been questioned. In most cases, they consisted of bureaucratic and time consuming measures which involved the approval of a number of entities. These schemes were ill-defined to respond to the rapidly changing needs of the local labour markets, and the importance of filling vacant places in due time in order to maintain the viability and competitiveness of firms. Considering that the labour market sectors where immigrants are predominantly employed (agriculture, construction, hotels and restaurants, retail trade and domestic service) are dominated by small firms which have to adapt flexibly and quickly to labour market needs, it is difficult for potential employers and immigrants to follow the legal procedures required. As a result, few employers choose to recruit immigrants within those frameworks. Informal networks keep functioning and immigrants keep coming illegally. Very often the legal channels of entry have served to legalise irregular migrants already present in the country, instead of being a means of recruiting new immigrants.

The short experience in dealing with labour immigration, as compared to Western and Northern European host countries, as well as the new economic context under which immigration is now occurring, characterized by increasing competition and flexible economic arrangements, may explain the tentative character of most labour immigration policies in Southern Europe, as well as its meagre results. From this point of view, the recent policy approach taken in Spain may be considered the most comprehensive one in order to deal with immigration in a new, global context. However, results are uncertain, as the system is strongly based on employers’ demand and cases of employers’ fraud exist. Furthermore, the recent economic recession turned up and prevented from further testing of the system.
7. Control policies

Anna Triandafyllidou

The countries of the so-called soft underbelly of the European Union have been known for their lack of a long-term planning of immigration. Immigration flows have taken place in Southern Europe especially in the post-1989 period as a result of general geopolitical and economic changes in the wider European area (notably the debacle of the Communist countries and the opening of their borders), and in the entire world (the increase in global disparities between North and South). Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece were all traditionally emigration countries that had been sending immigrant workers and their family members to Northern and Western Europe, as well as overseas to the USA, Australia, and Canada, for over a century. Hence, they had neither migration management policies nor migration control policies. Nonetheless, these latter have developed fast as a reaction to relatively massive inflows - initially to Italy (in the late 1980s and early 1990s already), Greece (since the early 1990s), and Spain and Portugal since the late 1990s. Moreover, migration control policies have developed under pressure from the EU, which stressed that Southern countries have to stop being an easy route of irregular migrants heading to Northern and Western Europe.

The impact of EU policy on shaping border and internal controls in Southern countries cannot be underestimated. Nonetheless, there are other factors that have largely conditioned the practices and policies of migration control in the region. These include the geographical morphology of these countries, their strategic position in Mediterranean migration pathways (and Portugal in the Southern part of the European Atlantic coast), their lack of previous immigration experience and their large informal economies, that have provided for irregular employment opportunities for immigrants.

All four countries have long sea borders on the Mediterranean. Tiny islands like Lampedusa, between Sicily and North Africa, the Greek islands of Chios and Lesvos, in the Aegean Sea, or the Canary islands in the Atlantic, have become hubs of dinghy and other types of illegal small boat traffic of desperate irregular immigrants from Asia and Africa. Despite the sophisticated technological equipment used, it is still difficult to intercept all such arrivals. Greece has also been a target of irregular immigration flows through its Northern mountainous border with Albania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Irregular migration of Eastern European immigrants, who cross the continent with Schengen tourism visas, also took place through the Pyrenees to Spain and Portugal.

While Italy and Spain are larger, richer and overall more powerful countries than Greece and Portugal, all four economies are characterised by structural imbalances, periods of relatively high unemployment among natives and a large informal sector. As seen in previous sections, these features have been important in attracting irregular immigrants and in allowing for both legal and undocumented immigrants to survive, despite immigration control and enforcement policies. The survival and even settlement of legal and irregular immigrants has been directly or indirectly supported by the existence of immigrant as well as native networks, including NGOs that have helped immigrant workers and their families. These networks have been crucial in helping immigrants find accommodation, employment and also getting access to basic social and economic services, such as registering their children to school, opening a bank account, obtaining a business license, getting a mortgage or even simply getting a phone line.
Last but not least, all four countries are important tourism destinations, what makes strict border controls more difficult to implement especially during the tourist high season. At the same time, some of their prospective immigrants (in Spain and Portugal in particular) are, or have been, exempted from the requirement for a visa, because of their Latin American or Luso-speaking origin. These measures make policy enforcement at borders very difficult in practical terms.

In conclusion, despite their very different political and economic position within Europe, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal are marked by their common Southern European features with regard to immigration flows and their control.

In the following sections we shall consider the challenges that Southern European countries face with regard to migration control and related policies, discussing separately sea borders, that present the main challenge for Southern EU member states, and land borders, that are mainly of concern for Greece. Last but not least, we seek to assess the scope and success of control policies in Southern Europe.

7.1. Sea borders and their management

The European Union has paid increasing attention to the management of its external borders with a view of preventing and combating irregular migration. This has been an issue of top priority prior to the 2004 enlargement, enhancing cooperation and mutual training among border patrols in the EU 27, providing new member states in Central and Eastern Europe with sophisticated equipment and advanced know how. Moreover, a European Neighbourhood Policy has been established, which mainly aims at promoting friendly relations, political and economic stability in the EU’s Eastern European ‘neighbourhood’. The objective is both preventing immigration flows, as well as externalising their management and control in the neighbouring countries - before irregular immigrants reach EU’s external borders. The European Neighbourhood policy has recently been expanded to include the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the Middle Eastern countries, but it is yet too early to assess its outcomes, especially on the migration front.

Less attention has been paid until recently to the management of sea borders. Their importance has been felt acutely since 2006, because of a dramatic and unexpected increase in arrivals of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia to the southern coasts of Europe.

The Canary islands in the Atlantic, which form a part of Spanish territory, have been a preferred target destination for thousands of irregular migrants sailing off the shore of Mauritania and Senegal for a week-long journey to Tenerife. Numbers have fluctuated significantly, setting off from 4,000 in 2001, rising to nearly 10,000 per year in 2002-2004, falling to approx. 5,000 in 2005, only to rise to over 30,000 in 2006 (a so called crisis year for the Canary Islands sea border of the EU) and falling again to approximately 12,000 in 2007 (data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior). In 2006, the year of the largest number of arrivals, there were another 4,000 irregular migrants intercepted and stopped near the African coast, while Spanish nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have registered over 1,000 who died during the crossing (albeit estimates that the actual number of dead could be six times higher). During the same period (i.e. since year 2000), numbers of arrivals at the Gibraltar strait, starting from 13,000-14,000 in 2001-2002, have fallen by a half during most of the
remaining years (thus fluctuating around 7,000 per year). The inversion of the trend at the Gibraltar strait is attributed mainly to the operation of the SIVE, the integrated border control system put in place by the Spanish government and to the building of a militarised border around Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves in Morocco (Carling, 2007).

The second most important destination in terms of numbers in 2006 has been the tiny island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily. Each year Lampedusa receives between 15,000 and 20,000 irregular immigrants, mainly sub-Saharan Africans setting off from the Libyan coast (and more recently from Algeria and Tunisia) aboard large fishing boats or other sea vessels. In total, Sicily received 21,400 irregular migrants arriving by sea, in 2006 (data of the Italian Ministry of Interior). Some vessels and small boats reach the coasts of Malta mainly by mistake or in an attempt to avoid interception by the Italian coast guard, while seeking to reach Lampedusa or Sicily. As a result, Malta has received about 1,000 irregular migrants during 2006, a dramatically large number for an overpopulated island that has a total of 400,000 inhabitants.

The islands of the Aegean in Greece are the preferred target destination mainly for Asian irregular immigrants (Afghans, Iraqis, Syrians, etc.), who seek to enter Europe through Turkey and cross the narrow straits from Turkish mainland to the islands of Mytilini (Lesvos), Rhodes, Samos, Chios or even some smaller islands like Leros. The Greek coast guard and police forces have intercepted nearly 9,000 people in 2007 and just over 15,000 persons in 2008. This data includes people apprehended on the islands as well as at sea. Coast guard authorities estimate that these numbers account for approximately 70-80% of all irregular migration flows through the Greek sea borders.

Migration through EU’s southern sea borders is, in total numbers, relatively small. Adding up the numbers stated earlier, in 2007 it was approximately 50,000, in 2006 it was 45,000 and in 2005 it had been under 30,000. Considering that the EU27 are home to an estimated number of between 2.8 and 6 million irregular migrants, that the EU15 (excluding Greece) received in 2004 a total of 2.6 million legal immigrants according to OECD data, and that the EU 27 have a total population of 486.5 million, it becomes evident that such irregular migration presents only a tiny fraction of overall irregular flows and stocks, and indeed a rather small number in the overall population of the EU as well as in the overall immigrant population of the EU.

The nature of migration through sea borders, however, gives it a high news value: arrivals are dramatic, small boats are sometimes capsized or sunk near the shore and immigrants (including pregnant women or children) often die in their attempt to reach the EU territory. The tens or hundreds (certainly not thousands) of migrants aboard each of these ‘boats of fortune’ arrive in small islands where even a small number of Black Africans or Southeast Asians are highly visible by locals. The facilities in these first places of arrival are limited and coast guard, police and immigration officers, also including the staff of international organisations (IOM, Red Cross, UNHCR), find themselves unable to deal with these small

27 Nearly 16,000 irregular migrants were apprehended upon arrival in Lampedusa in 2006. There were approximately 23,000 such arrivals during the first 8 months of 2008, while numbers seem to rise in early 2009 as 2,120 people have been intercepted during the first two months of 2009, compared to 1,650 during the first two months of 2008.

28 This estimate is provided by the CLANDESTINO research project database, published on 20 February 2009, at http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/category/clandestino-database-on-irregular-migration/
crises. Nonetheless, outlined above, these are the true features of the phenomenon, which should drive policy making and not be exploited by the media.

Both media attention on irregular arrivals through sea and the rising numbers of such arrivals have led to the more active involvement of the FRONTEX agency in patrolling of the southern EU borders. Following the European Council Meeting on 14-15 December 2006, FRONTEX was invited to establish, as soon as possible, together with the Member States in the region, a permanent Coastal Patrols Network at their southern maritime borders. After the ‘MEDSEA’ technical feasibility study on a Mediterranean Coastal Patrol Network was carried out by FRONTEX, and in line with the Commission’s Communication on reinforcing the management of the European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders, FRONTEX and the Member States concerned (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Malta, Greece and Cyprus) have opted for a regional approach as the first step, based on bilateral cooperation between neighbouring states. FRONTEX provided assistance in drawing up operational plans, defining the geographical areas to be covered and the intensity and use of resources. During the first stage of the project (March 2007-December 2008), the European Border Patrol Network (EBPN) has not been co-financed by FRONTEX. By contrast, the second stage of the project aims to further develop the European Patrol Network, by establishing the organisational structure, the National Coordination Centres (NCCs) and strengthening the cooperation and coordination among Member States involved in the network, to ensure the permanent activities of the European Patrols Network, which also cover the open sea and which are planned and implemented jointly by FRONTEX and Member States together.

7.2. Land borders and their management

Although the sea border is the one that is of major concern for the southern EU member states, the external EU green border in the south-east needs to be considered as well. Italy had experienced problems with the control of its border with Slovenia during the 1990s with regard to both irregular migration control and the management of visas (citizens of former Yugoslavia or Albania would go to Slovenia and apply there for a visa to enter Italy as tourists). The northern and north-eastern land border has presented a major challenge to Greek authorities for migration control since the early 1990s.

Irregular migration from the North follows many routes, including ones from Turkey via FYROM and Bulgaria, or from Greece via Albania to (Antonopoulos and Winterdyk, 2006: 453). The empirical research of these two authors shows that a variety of means is used by irregular migrants, including public transportation, truck, car, taxi, motorcycle. Smuggling fees vary a lot (ibid.) and can range from 150 USD to 7000 USD, depending on the risk factor and nature and length of the crossing (by land or sea). However, clearly not all irregular migrants use the services of smuggling networks. Police and border guard patrol operations performed in order to combat irregular migration have attracted less media or public attention than the sea border controls and possible abuse of power by coast guard and police officers there. This is quite interesting if one notes that the northern Greek border has been the main point of entry of undocumented migrants especially in the 1990s, for not only Albanian citizens but generally for people from Central and East Eastern European countries (Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania) and from Eurasia (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia). The explanation perhaps lies in the fact that many of the undocumented migrants who crossed the northern borders did so alone or in small groups by foot or car along unguarded paths. A

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second explanation is that many of these irregular migrants used fake passports and documents (Papantoniou et al., 1998) and hence entered legally but then abused their visas and overstayed.

Antonopoulos and Winterdyk (2006) also note the evolution of smuggling networks across the years. Until 1998 and the setting up of the Greek border guard forces, as well as the intensification of the coast guard patrols near Corfu, many Albanians were smuggled on foot through the mountains or by speed boat from the Albanian coast to Corfu or the Greek coast south of the Greek-Albanian border. Indeed Papakonstantis (2000) puts at 75.5 % the percentage of undocumented migrants entering Greece through the mountains, nearly 14% crossing a river and only 10% crossing the sea. The data provided by the Ministry of the Interior confirms this view.

There have been several FRONTEX joint operations implemented in the area of the Balkans in the last couple of years (since 2006 mainly). However, their effectiveness may be questioned. To cite an example, the POSEIDON operation was a combined land-and-sea effort targeting Greece's land borders with Turkey to the east, Albania and Bulgaria to the north, as well as the Aegean Sea, and employed patrol boats and land cruisers, fixed and mobile radar, and aerial surveillance. Each phase of the Poseidon operation led to the apprehension of less than one thousand irregular migrants and a total of nearly 30 smugglers. Moreover, about 350 illegal immigrants were diverted back to their country of origin and a few hundreds of forged and/or falsified documents were detected.

While overall land borders do not present a major challenge for Southern European countries as they have largely internal EU borders and increasingly so no borders at all (due to their participation in the Schengen no-internal-border-area), another green border that has been a source of apprehension has been of illegal migration from and through Croatia to the European Union. The external border sector between Slovenia and Croatia and through Slovenia to Italy (or Austria) has been under comparatively high pressure. The KRAS joint operation of FRONTEX took place in this border area in 2007 and detected 32 irregular migrants (see http://www.frontex.europa.eu/examples_of_accomplished_operati/art21.html).

7.3. Internal Controls

All four Southern European countries have practised random controls in public places to tame irregular migration. In Greece, these controls were particularly frequent during the 1990s, targeting mostly Albanian immigrants. In the early to mid-1990s massive deportations mainly of Albanian citizens became common police practice and were often used as a means for exerting pressure on the Albanian government with regard to the latest treatment of the Greek minority in Albania. Between 1991 and 1995 250,400 foreigners were expelled, almost all of them (241,000) of Albanian citizenship. Controls were enforced usually in public places, took place under public view and people were loaded on buses and directed to Albania, sometimes without even having the possibility to notify their relatives.

Greece has gradually refrained from such practices, as these operations cost a considerable amount of money without resulting in the desirable effect of actually holding migration at check. Actually, these measures, apart from being inhuman and non-effective, also reinforced

a common view of migration as a crime and of all migrants as criminals. They were abandoned to a large extent in the mid-1990s.

Internal control policies in recent years have given emphasis to internal controls targeting informal work. As seen in section 3, all four countries have large informal economy sectors where not only immigrants but also natives are employed. Construction, hotels and restaurants (including tourism) and of course domestic work are the most important sectors where informal work is observed. In Spain, since the regularisation of 2005, state authorities have given emphasis to labour inspections as a means to combating irregular migration. Their strategy has been three-pronged: border management has improved, irregular migrants who live in the country have been given the possibility to legalise their stay and work, and labour market inspections have been intensified. In Greece, Italy and Portugal, the intention is there to tame the informal economy and combat informal work in general, but labour inspection mechanisms remain under-resourced and to a certain extent ineffective (Maroukis, 2009; Pastore, 2008). Moreover, in all four countries, areas like domestic work (cleaning and caring in families) are very hard to control by their very nature and hence it is indeed implausible that any informal work control policies can effectively regulate these sectors through labour inspections. It is rather different incentives (e.g. tax relief if one employs a nanny or a caregiver for an elderly person) that can lead to the emergence of this sector out of the underground economy. In Greece and in Italy an effort has been undertaken in this direction by the introduction of flexible insurance schemes for cleaners/caregivers and for construction workers who have multiple employers. They are able to register with the dependent employee welfare fund under special conditions and hence both have an affordable insurance and retain their legal migration status.

7.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, our study shows that Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain face important challenges as regards irregular migration pressures, since their coasts are external borders of the EU. They are exposed to two main irregular migration paths: one from Asia, the Middle East and Africa through their southern coasts and their islands in the Mediterranean; and Greece is also exposed to a second path from former Communist countries through the northern Greek land border (mainly Albania, but also FYROM and Bulgaria). Efforts to combat illegal entries through border controls and the enforcement of internal controls have fluctuated over the years. While in the 1990s internal controls were massive even if ineffective, today internal controls are targeted and selective (targeting specific areas or groups of people with a certain stereotyped physical appearance or dress code). There is no concern that such controls may harass legal immigrants.

External control policies have increasingly paid more attention to cooperation with neighbouring countries. Readmission agreements have been signed between Greece and Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey (Protocol of Readmission), while there are local cooperation agreements on the Greek-Macedonian (FYROM) border. Spain and Italy have signed readmission and mutual cooperation agreements with Morocco (Spain), Albania and Tunisia (Italy). The implementation of the Protocol of Readmission between Greece and Turkey is far from satisfactory, but Moroccan, Albanian and Tunisian authorities have been overall more cooperative.

Overall, the philosophy of enforcement of external controls has changed since the 1990s: Southern European countries do not seek to fend off their borders from the inside, or rather
not only from inside. They aim at acting in cooperation with neighbouring countries that are important sending or transit countries, providing programmes of seasonal migration and development aid in exchange.

Regarding border controls, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal have benefited from joint border patrol operations. However, the cost effectiveness of these operations is questionable. The relative success of the European Patrol Network remains to be assessed though and may prove a more fruitful avenue.

Our study shows that there is limited purposeful coordination between external and internal border controls and the overall policy for managing migration flows and stocks. Border control efforts have been increasing through the years, despite the fact that during the last ten years all of these countries have enacted more than one large regularisation programme.

One would have expected that after these repeated regularisations, there would be a coordinated effort, on one hand, to regulate legal migration and avoid the errors of the past while, on the other hand, to combat irregular migration. However, with the main exception of Spain, in the other countries the two parts of the policy often seem to be implemented independently from each other. While government authorities are aware that migration cannot be stopped so long as dramatic socio-economic inequalities persist between sending and receiving countries, they do not have an effective plan for managing migration. Their control policies appear to a certain extent detached from regularisation, management and integration policies, indeed seeking to accomplish a Sisyphus task.
8. Integration and citizenship policies

Anna Triandafyllidou

8.1. Integration policies

All the Southern European countries have developed their integration policies in response to the arrival and settlement of relatively large numbers of migrants in a relatively short period of time. Although it is a euphemism to claim that they are still “new” hosts since their experience dates back to the early 1990s, it is also important to note that migration to Southern Europe took place in the post-Cold War era, largely without planning and without a legal framework. Migrants did not arrive at a period of industrial expansion – they found jobs mainly in the service industry and in particular in the secondary labour market, notably at jobs that are under paid with low prestige, and precarious condition. These overall socio-economic conditions mark also the process of immigrant integration and the policies of integration that Southern European countries have (not) developed.

Italy, the first southern country to experience significant immigration in the late 1980s, developed its first integrated migration policy that included issues of immigrant integration and political participation in 1998. Greece and Portugal have had their first comprehensive immigration laws tackling issues of integration in 2001 and Spain in 2000. Mainly during this last decade, all four countries have developed a set of integration policies tackling the issue of health, housing, education and socio-economic assistance to migrants.

Regarding issues addressing immigrant poverty and housing, it is fair to say that all legal immigrants are incorporated into the mainstream housing and welfare schemes, in line with the welfare fund and professional category. Even although Southern European welfare states are quite poor compared to their Northern European counterparts, immigrants are included in those at an equal footing. There are, however, few studies that check whether the actual policy provisions are implemented in practice - whether migrants experience discrimination when applying for public housing, unemployment benefits or other allowances. 32

There are important differences between the four countries regarding the public administration structures that manage welfare policies. In Spain and Italy these policies pertain to regions (or Comunidades Autonomas in Spain) and hence there are different policies and practices in different regions. In Spain, migrants concentrate in the two largest cities (Barcelona and Madrid) and in the region of Andalucia in the South. It may be argued that the regional and municipal authorities in the respective regions have developed successful plans for the social integration of migrants and their Social Services have responded well to the needs of these new populations.

In Italy too, regions with large immigrant populations in the north, north-east and in the centre are known for providing welfare assistance to legal migrants and their families, This includes housing, welfare allowances and other services (see Zincone, 2000a, 2000b).

32 Despite of the limited number of studies, it is worth mentioning, in the case of Spain, the analysis of Concha Carrasco Carpio and Gregorio Rodríguez Cabrero (2008) on the inclusion capacity of Spanish welfare state policies; in the case of Italy, the studies of Tiziana Caponio (2002); and, in the case of Portugal, the work of Pedro Silva (2005).
Southern regions have been lagging behind in this respect, but their share in the migrant population is also decreasing, as the opportunities for employment are better in the centre and north of the country.

In Greece and Portugal there are national plans for integration that are administered in a more centralised way than in Spain and Italy. Often these plans for integration have suffered from partial implementation and lack of continuity. However, in Portugal, the early creation of the ACIME, later renamed into ACIDI 33 (a High Commissioner for Immigrants whose role is to act as a go-between: facilitating communication between the government and immigrants and ensuring that the rights of the latter are respected and their needs attended to) guaranteed some continuity of policies and improved immigrants’ integration prospects.

In all four countries, EU initiatives and European Social Fund programmes have also been visible and have given the opportunity for immigrant organisations and other NGOs, as well as municipalities and universities, to promote the social and economic integration of immigrants. Indeed, the European Social Fund programmes and the more recent European Integration Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals have been instrumental in creating synergies, mobilising resources, even reorganising public administration offices with a view of providing services to migrant communities. Such services have included access to training and special education courses, language training and training to specific professions, programmes of apprenticeships and other forms promoting labour market integration of immigrants. EU-funded programmes, especially those belonging to the EQUAL initiative, have been important in addressing the media, raising the awareness of both the public and media professionals with respect to issues such as non-discrimination, avoidance of ethnic stereotyping, and an ethical code of reporting on migration related issues. On the whole, the outcome of these programmes has been positive, although their structural effect on the socio-economic integration of foreigners is limited. Migrants in Southern Europe remain confined largely in 3D jobs, in poor housing and are often the target of negative stereotyping in the media.

As far as health provisions are concerned, Spain is at the forefront of policies, not only among Southern European countries, but among all EU Member States, as it provides full health coverage to all migrants who are registered at their municipalities of residence, regardless of their legal or undocumented status. Italy, Greece and Portugal provide health care to minors regardless of legal status and to other migrants who are in need of emergency care or of medical services which, if not provided, would lead to a medical emergency situation (e.g. heart disease medicines). Serious illnesses (e.g. cancer) or AIDS are also treated exceptionally regardless of the legal status of the migrant patient. In all four countries, health services are provided to legal migrants on an equal footing to natives. There are however very limited special services, mainly provided by NGOs and immigrant organisations, tackling any special health problems that migrant populations may have related to their adjustment to a new environment and to the overall difficulties of the migration experience (e.g. psychological assistance, family therapy etc.) and also to their previous conditions of life in the country of origin (e.g. diseases that they may have contracted there and that are recurrent, e.g. malaria, but also problems related to previous malnutrition or different dietary or living conditions).

33 The High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities was a governmental position created in 1996. It was the basis of ACIME (High Commissariat for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities), in 2002, later designated ACIDI (High Commissariat for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue), in 2007.
Last but not least, with regard to education, in Spain and Italy policies are again decentralised, with different regions/Comunidades Autonomas providing different levels of service and different approaches to multiculturalism in education. Overall the main challenges appear to relate to language acquisition and secondarily to religious difference. In all four countries, studies have shown that immigrant children perform worse at school than their native counterparts. Poor educational performance for these usually 1.5 generation immigrants (who arrived during infancy or childhood in the country of settlement) relate generally to language issues, feelings of alienation at school, discrimination and the lack of valorisation of their own cultural capital (language and culture of origin). The inability of parents to follow and help their children at school (because they do not know the language of the country of settlement well enough, because they work long hours or because their educational background is low) is sometimes interpreted as lack of interest by school teachers. Parents’ unions do not appear particularly sensitive to the issue and immigrant organisations have not yet managed to mobilise adequately in the domain of intercultural education, to provide for assistance to immigrant parents and pupils. In most countries there are specially designated schools, special policies and special institutions aiming to respond to the needs of non-mother tongue children, but their level of success varies widely, as their resources and the local environment in which they operate varies too. The most successful examples of integrated schools are those located in neighbourhoods where there is an overall pro-active approach to integration by the entire municipality. Here the importance of local and regional authorities in supporting education in an environment that respects cultural diversity cannot be underestimated.

The process of immigrant integration in Southern European host countries has taken place mainly through labour market insertion and at the personal or family level, through informal and personalised social networks. In other words, this slow process of piecemeal integration has had less to do with formal integration policies in these countries and related state structures, like welfare services, education services, and other social agencies. Although the importance of integration policies is not to be underestimated, in Southern Europe we witness a situation whereby immigrants find their local niches of life and work, initially even without papers, they quickly (have to) adopt the local customs and through personal relations with natives manage to take part in the local networks of clientelistic relations, that generally structure both the labour market (e.g. the process of finding employment or improving one’s work position) and interaction with the state in Southern Europe. Their life is of course facilitated when appropriate integration policies (such as access to housing, health care, schooling) are provided in their cities and towns of residence.

Portugal is perhaps the most notable exception to this rule. The creation of the ACIDI (formerly ACIME) has been decisive in increasing policy coherence, although the constraints faced daily by immigrants limit the overall outcomes. The role of the High Commission for Immigrants in structuring the civic sphere for migrant representation and participation and promoting socio-economic integration policies at the local and national level has been crucial (Teixeira and Albuquerque, 2005; see also MIPEX 2007 34). The only possible weakness of this approach is the centralised nature of the Commission.

34 http://www.integrationindex.eu/countries/
8.2. Citizenship Policies

Southern European countries have overall rather restrictive citizenship policies. In Spain, Italy, Greece, and in Portugal until 2006, third country nationals must reside in the country for at least ten years to apply for naturalisation. In Italy and Greece citizenship policies have been applied in a restrictive manner, leading to very low numbers of naturalised citizens (about 11,000 cases per year in Italy, mainly related to marriage with an Italian citizen) and about 50 cases a year in Greece. In the latter, applications from citizens of neighbouring countries have routinely been rejected during the past two decades, even when applicants satisfied all the requirements for naturalisation and even when they were married to a Greek citizen.

In Spain and Portugal citizenship policies have been more relaxed than in Italy and Greece. In Spain, naturalisation of citizens from former colonies in Latin America is possible after just two years of legal residence in the country. In Portugal, citizens of Portuguese-speaking countries (PALOP and Brazil) could apply for Portuguese citizenship after six years of residence already since 1994. Since 2006 all third country nationals may apply for naturalisation after six years. However, the requirement for Portuguese language skills has become more difficult to meet (hence perhaps indirectly benefiting again people from PALOP and Brazil).

In Greece, preferential treatment applies to its co-ethnic migrants, notably people residing in Central and Eastern Europe or in Eurasia who are of Greek ethnic origin and Christian Orthodox religion. This has been the case of Pontic Greeks, who arrived massively in the late 1980s and early 1990s from Armenia, Kazakhstan and Georgia. They acquired automatically Greek citizenship through a special procedure called “confirmation of nationality”, rather than naturalisation. It is as if their Greek nationality was always there and the Greek state comes only to confirm its existence and to bestow it with legal rights.

In line with this principle of *ius sanguinis*, Greek authorities have recently (since November 2006) privileged the naturalisation of co-ethnic Albanian citizens, the so-called Vorioepirotes. Ethnic Greek Albanians have been encouraged to naturalise during the past two years. They apply through the same procedure foreseen by the law for other foreigners, notably they have to meet the requirement of ten years of residence in the country and several other conditions, but they do not have to pay the 1,500 Euro fee per application foreseen in the law. In 2007 there were over 7,000 applications and more than 5,000 were processed (Ministry of Interior data).

In Spain, Portugal and Italy marriage to a citizen of the country makes naturalisation easier and the residence requirement shorter (2-3 years depending on the case). In Greece naturalisation requirements remain the same even for spouses of Greek citizens and even if they are parents to children who are Greek citizens through the nationality of their other parent.

From what has been mentioned above it is clear, that naturalisation laws in Southern Europe relate mainly to ethnic descent. Naturalisation is easy if one has Greek, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian ancestors even two generations back (i.e. one grandparent). By contrast, legally resident immigrants find it much harder to naturalise even after 10 years of residence (six in Portugal). In all four countries preference is given to people who are of the same ethnic
descent (Greece) or who can prove ancestry, besides the ones who come from former colonies (Latin American countries for Spain and Luso-speaking countries for Portugal).

Interestingly, in Italy naturalisations by residence accounted for less than 10% of the total in 2002 (917 people naturalised by residence in that year, against 9,728 who naturalised through marriage). In 2007, the percentage of those naturalising by residence has risen to approximately 20% (6,857 by residence vs. 31,609 through marriage), although the overall number of naturalisations (approximately 10,000 per year between 2002 and 2005, and about 30,000 per year in 2006 and 2007), compared to the size of the country and to the number of people satisfying the 10-year residence requirement (approximately 0.5 million) remains pretty small.

In Spain, most naturalisations take place through the preferential channels available to Latin Americans or to people with Spanish ancestry. Data from the Ministry of Interior shows that Spanish naturalisation policy has been actually increasingly generous. Naturalisation rates have been increasing between 25% and 50% per year since 2000. There were 12,000 citizenship acquisitions approximately in year 2000, about 40,000 in 2004 and 2005, and over 62,000 in 2006. Indeed, Cebolla and Gonzalez (2008) note that the stringent requirement of ten years of residence has affected only about 20% of citizenship acquisitions in the past.

In Portugal, modification of the law in 2006 - easing the residence constraints for acquiring Portuguese citizenship by naturalisation - has also produced notable results, since the number of valid requirements to get citizenship almost quadrupled between 2007 and 2008, increasing from approximately 9,000 to 35,000.

As for the second generation, provisions vary. In Italy, children of foreign parents born on the Italian territory, who have continuously resided in Italy until their 18th birthday can opt for naturalisation during the 12 months that follow their birthday. If they fail to do so they lose this right. In practice the provision is not as straightforward as it seems, as it is not always easy to prove the continuous residence requirement. In Portugal, children born in the country, whose at least one parent has been residing legally in the country for at least five years can become Portuguese citizens. The citizenship is also granted when one of the parents was born in Portugal, regardless of legal status, or when the children have completed the first cycle of basic education (four years) in Portugal. In Spain, the children of immigrants do not receive citizenship at birth but they may apply for Spanish citizenship without additional conditions.

In Greece, children born of foreign parents who have lived in the country until their 18th birthday and have studied at least nine years in Greek schools, and whose parents continue to reside legally in Greece, may, when they come of age, apply and receive the status of a Long Term EU Resident through a preferential channel. This provision, acclaimed as a law in late December 2008, aims at providing for socio-economic equality of the second generation, albeit keeping them out of Greek political life and delegating them to a long term status of denizen in the country where they were born. The bill has been the subject of fervent criticisms by intellectuals, NGOs and opposition parties in December 2008, albeit to no avail. In Greece restrictive naturalisation policies are not only related to the ethno-cultural conception of citizenship, closely tied to ethnicity and descent, but also to fears that naturalising immigrant residents who come from neighbouring countries might destabilise Greece and raise issues of secession or lead to the creation of ethnic parties.
Overall provisions for the second generation are more generous than naturalisation policies in three out of the four countries (with the exception of Greece that is). However, overall second generation provisions in Southern Europe fall short from becoming effective integration mechanisms for the children of immigrants. They often seem to perpetuate the distinction between “native” and “foreigner”, without taking into account that children born in a country or who arrived at pre-school age in that country have done all their education and have been socialised to the local and national norms and habits. It is thus morally and politically questionable to treat them as foreigners.

8.3. Immigrant Political Participation

The restrictive naturalisation policies in Southern Europe have a direct impact to the political participation of immigrants. Actually we can mostly talk about political participation and perhaps, to a lesser extent, political representation of co-ethnic migrants in Greece and of former colonial citizens in Spain and Portugal. In Greece, co-ethnics from the former Soviet Union (Pontic Greeks) number about 150,000, many of whom are over 18 and hence able to vote. While they have traditionally supported the Socialist party, which actually had started the process of their “return” to the homeland, in the 2004 national election most of them supported the Conservative party of New Democracy, because they felt PASOK had not kept its pre-election promises regarding the improvement of local infrastructure and/or access to employment and public services in the Athens suburb area where most Pontic Greeks live (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2009). Gropas and Triandafyllidou argue that co-ethnic migrant political participation follows a typical pattern of clientelistic relations between MPs and their constituencies. In line with the Greek political cultures, naturalised citizens support the party that promises them most in return.

Left-wing political parties have however approached resident immigrants with a view to getting them involved in political life. Thus, the Socialist party includes immigrants in its Central Committee, a measure that is strictly speaking unconstitutional. Socialist politicians have also generally embraced educated migrants, with a view to obtaining influence and popularity among migrant communities. Some politicians of the right wing party have done the same, albeit without any formal support by the party. The left wing parties, Coalition of the Left and the Greek Communist Party, have also tried to attract immigrants among their members and supporters, but have no special institutional positions for migrants.

In Italy and Spain, trade unions have been the major vehicle for immigrant political and civic participation. Migrants have started their political careers as trade union activists and have later converted themselves into community leaders and/or have created their own NGOs, while always remaining close to one of the major Italian trade unions (CGIL, CISL or UIL). Local participation in regional councils on migration, instituted in Italy in 1998, have also played a positive role in integrating immigrants into the social fabric (Kosic and Triandafyllidou, 2005; Gonzalez, 2005; Zincone, 2000a and 2000b). Indeed this has been a typical case where contacts with native allowed migrants to build the human and social capital necessary to organise their own communities and set up associations.

Parties have taken part in this process indirectly, to the extent that the trade unions are affiliated to specific parties and often function as the greenhouse where party politicians acquire skills and create networks.
In Portugal, the role of some political parties, maybe left wing ones, and trade unions was complemented with immigrants’ associations and other NGOs in promoting immigrant political and civic participation. The support given by ACIDI to immigrants’ associations, as well as their participation in national and local consultative councils on migration, reinforced the process.

Surveys conducted usually on behalf of major newspapers seem to suggest that immigrants, if given the right to vote, would support left-wing parties, probably since these parties have shown much more immigration friendly policies than their right wing counterparts. However, immigrant political participation is still to materialise in Southern Europe. The issue of political representation of immigrant populations remains a taboo, although in all four countries native ethnic minorities are duly represented in Parliament and/or are conceded advanced levels of autonomy at the regional level (Comunidades Autonomas) in Spain.

* Southern European countries have developed a reactive rather than proactive framework for immigrant integration. Policies and practices have been more developed at the regional and local rather than the national level. The third sector, particularly immigrant associations and NGOs, has played an important part in assisting immigrants and integrating them in their societies of settlement. However, formal policies of integration, including citizenship acquisition and overall social and political integration, have to date showed important “deficits” that need to be addressed in the near future.
9. The impacts of immigration

Joaquín Arango and Claudia Finotelli

9.1. The demographic impact

All Southern European countries are characterised by a low fertility rate, which is between 1.3 and 1.6 children per women, and a rapid ageing population. There are, thus, good reasons to assume that immigration contributes to compensate the low, or even negative, natural growth rate in those countries. In Spain, the huge population growth from 40.5 to 45.5 millions people between 2000 and 2006 was clearly immigration driven. The rest of the Southern European countries had similar experiences. Population in Italy increased of 2.1 millions inhabitants between 2001 and 2007. Such increase can be attributed to a large extent to the direct and indirect effects of immigration. Also in Greece, 86 per cent of the population increase between 1995 and 2005 is related to immigration. Finally, in Portugal, also immigration has been the main driver of recent population growth. For example, the net migration rate of 0.18 per cent compensated a negative natural growth rate of -0.01 per cent in 2007, the first negative natural decline known by the country since long ago. Immigration flows had also a considerable effect on the age composition. As a matter of fact, foreigners are usually between 15 and 39 years old and their average age is, thus, lower than that of natives (see section 2).

Most of the immigrants come, as seen earlier on this report (section 2), for work or family reasons. Family reunion affects both spouses and children and clearly contributes to the total population growth. It is, however, mostly the increase of children born to at least one foreign parent that alleviates the low fertility rate in Southern European countries. In Spain, the average fertility rate of immigrant women is 2.03 children, much higher than that of native women (ENI 2007). There are, though, differences depending on the nationality of foreign women. The fertility rate of African and Latin American (especially from Peru, Colombia and Ecuador) women is higher than the average, with 2.57 and 2.46 children per woman, respectively. Also in Italy the fertility rate of immigrant women is higher, at least for the moment, with about 2.46 children per woman.\(^{35}\) The fertility rate of foreign women in Portugal is, with 2.38 children per women, only slightly lower than the Italian one.

In Spain, the number of children born to a foreign mother and/or father went from 16,449 in 1996 to 78,590 in 2005. In percentages, this means an increase from 4.5 per cent to 16.9 per cent of the total number of births. In Greece, children born to foreign parents represented 13 per cent of all births between 2004 and 2006, while those born to at least one foreign parent represented over 20 per cent of the total births. In Italy, foreign children born to both foreign parents are 10.3 per cent of all births, while those born to couples with only one foreign parent are 13 per cent.\(^{36}\) Similarly, in Portugal, there were 9,887 births from foreign women, which represented 9.6 per cent of all births in Portugal in 2007. The number of children born to a foreign parent, mother or father, increased from 8.8 per cent in 2002 to 11.8 per cent in 2007.

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\(^{35}\) Researchers, however, emphasize that this might be an overestimation, due to the recent regularisation processes carried out in the country.

\(^{36}\) There are, however, relevant regional differences. In the region Emilia Romagna, for instance, the birth rate of foreigners ascends to 17.4%.
The number of children born to a foreign mother/father is directly related to immigration growth but also to the number of mixed marriages, that has been steadily increasing in all considered countries. In Spain, 14.2 per cent of all marriages in 2006 were mixed marriages, which is almost twice the rate of 2002 (8.5 per cent). Most marriages are celebrated between Spanish women and foreign men, mainly from Latin America (IPF 2006). Also in Portugal the number of marriages between Portuguese and foreigners keeps growing: the percentage increased nearly five times from 2000 (2.6 per cent) to 2005 (8 per cent), reaching 12.3 per cent in 2007. In contrast to Spain, mixed marriages are predominantly celebrated between Portuguese men and, mainly, Brazilian women. In the case of Italy the number of intermarriages was 8.8 per cent of all marriages in 2004. The yearly rate of intermarriages was steadily increasing in the last years (from 4.8 per cent in 1995 to 12.5 per cent in 2005). The number of Italian men that marry a foreign woman is much higher than that of Italian women that marry a foreign man. Most of them marry an Eastern European woman (Istat 2006). Finally, data on intermarriages in Greece are very limited. As far as we could see, they did not increase relevantly between 2004 (3,961) and 2007 (4,145). The majority concerns the union of a Greek man with a foreign woman, mostly from Eastern Europe and in particular Albania and Russia.

All in all, it seems that immigration has a positive impact on the demographic development of all Southern European countries. It is, of course, too soon to say whether the demographic impacts of immigration will be sustained in the long run. As we know, immigrants usually adapt their reproductive path to the society of destination. Furthermore, the positive implications of the age structure tend to decline with the passing of time. We can, however, conclude that immigration changed the socio-demographic profile in Southern European countries and slowed demographic stagnation.

9.2. The economic impacts of immigration

The relationship between immigration and economic growth in most Southern European countries is out of question. Especially in Spain, immigration became one of the most important determinants for the spectacular economic growth observed at the beginning of the 21st century. In the last ten years immigration contributed to 6.6 per cent of the state income (about 5,000 millions of Euro), while the Spanish GDP grew 2.6 points in the same period. Actually, the relatively high increase rate of the Spanish GDP would not have been possible without the contribution of immigration (Melguizo and Sebastián, 2004). Immigrants contributed to 1.6 per cent of an overall economy growth of 3.1 per cent, whereas 50 per cent of the new jobs have been created for immigrants, according to unofficial estimates. Similarly, 6.1 per cent of the Italian GDP has been produced by immigrants, while the contribution of immigrants to the Portuguese GDP has been estimated of about 7 per cent in 2007. In the case of Greece, the estimated contribution lies between 2.3 per cent and 2.8 per cent, which is the lowest one among all Southern European countries (Zografakis, Kontis and Mittrakos, 2007). There is also an interesting difference between Italy and Spain, because the overall GDP growth rates in Italy have been lower than the EU average, while the economic growth in Spain was higher than the EU average between 2000 and 2006.

All in all, immigration seems to have had a positive economic impact in the countries considered. The overall economic impact of immigration in Southern European countries is not surprising if we consider that foreign workers are younger, more flexible and easier to employ than natives (see section 3). Nevertheless, immigrants do not bring along, at least for
the moment, relevant costs for the welfare regimes. In Spain, immigrants benefited only of 4.6 per cent of the public expenditure in health and of 6.6 per cent in education. Although we do not have comparable data for the Italian case, recent Italian surveys highlight that immigrants are the objective of low municipal spending. In the case of Portugal, there is still a positive balance between State revenues and expenses related with immigration, though there are no specific data on immigrants’ contribution to the Portuguese welfare system. Finally, immigration does not seem to have had any serious impacts on the Greek welfare expenditure. There might be, however, certain differences between the effects of immigration in the long run, in contrast with its effect in the short and medium term. Things might change in the long run due to the ageing of the foreign populations and its increasing dependency on state pensions. Such perspective will surely have important impacts on the orientation of public opinion and the attitude of national political parties.

9.3. Immigration and the public opinion

Southern European countries are mostly the destination of economic immigrants that take those jobs which are withdrawn by native citizens. For this reason, the native population in all four countries maintains a positive attitude toward immigration, as long as immigration remains a source of economic benefits. There are, however, differences of intensity in the level of acceptance of immigrants by natives. Spain is known for the positive and tolerant attitude of Spanish people towards immigration. Only recently, Spanish people have become more worried than in the past about immigration and its consequences for Spanish society, even though such concern seems to be somehow related with the intensity of the so-called 

The evolution of the Portuguese public opinion has been similar to the Italian case, whose attitude toward immigrants has become more precise and differentiated over the years. The highest level of agreement concerns the importance of immigration in the Italian labour market, while the negative attitude towards immigrants seems to be especially related with the supposed nexus between immigration and criminality (Bonifazi, 2006; Colombo, 2007). Finally, recent surveys carried out in Greece show that a generalized acceptance of immigration is in contrast with an utmost xenophobic discourse which is present in a large part of the media. In particular, the “negative” media discourse on immigration in Greece also has an “ethnic component”, which is quite uncommon in the other Mediterranean countries. Generally, in the latter, the negative discourse on immigration mostly focuses on “law and order” aspects, like illegal migration and the criminality of immigrants. Such aspects usually receive more attention by the media than the beneficial effects of immigration.

Interestingly, in most Southern European countries there are very few political parties with a racist and anti-immigration discourse. The only exception might be represented by the Italian xenophobic party Lega Nord (Northern League). The Lega Nord is an anti-southern and anti-immigration party which became a member of the government coalition for the third time in 2008. Its electoral discourse has been characterised by harsh tones and political provocations. Nevertheless, the Lega, in spite of being a xenophobic party, had not a very relevant influence on the making of Italian immigration policies (Perlmutter, 2002). Such contradiction is deeply embedded in the internal mechanisms of the Italian fragmented party system and the logic of its government coalitions (Ziccone, 2006; Colombo and Sciortino, 2003). Portugal and Greece are the other two Southern European countries that witnessed the development of extremist right-wing parties. Nevertheless, the political impact of both
organisations is nearly irrelevant. The Greek LAOS has only one representative in the Greek Parliament, while the Portuguese Partido Nacional Renovador (“National Renewal Party”), a nationalistic party with a clear anti-immigration attitude, had very little electoral support until today. Spain still remains the only Southern European migration regime without a xenophobic party. The attitude toward immigration of all other political parties remains clearly affected by the importance of immigrants for the home economies. As a matter of fact, all Southern European countries accepted immigration in spite of the European non-immigration dogma. Such acceptance marked certain continuity between left-wing and right-wing policies and allowed the execution, as could be seen, of several regularisation processes, no matter of the colour of the government coalition.
10. Conclusive remarks

The comparative study of the Southern European countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – immigration experiences allows a set of conclusive remarks, which confirm the many similarities existing in this framework but, also, some significant differences.

First, the evolution of migration flows has been quite similar. All these countries have had important emigration experiences until recently. During the turn of the 19\textsuperscript{th} to the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and after the World War II the Southern countries were engaged in mass migration flows directed first to the new immigration continents (mainly North and South America) and afterwards to Western Europe. During the 1970s and 1980s a migration turnaround took place. Emigration decreased, return migration increased (although declining later) and foreign immigration augmented. In a short time span, these countries went from net emigration to net immigration. The timing and rhythm of inflows was not exactly the same. Foreign immigration was manifested in all of these countries during the 1980s, but the bulk of the movements depended on contextual factors. In Greece most of the inflows occurred during the 1990s, in Italy and Portugal during the early 2000s and in Spain all along the new century, until the recent economic recession. At the same time, emigration has not ceased completely. The most exceptional case is the one of Portugal, where immigration decreased and emigration resumed during the new century. Although net migration is still positive, this proves that international flows do not follow a linear trend and may know unexpected variations. In sum, there is a case for admitting a long-term transition from net emigration to net immigration in Southern Europe, but the recognition of anything similar to a “mobility transition” (Zelinsky, 1971), with the linearity prevailing in demographic transition models, must not be done without many reservations.

Second, despite a considerable variation in the national origin of immigrants, their demographic characteristics are very similar. Given the recent character of flows, most of them are composed by young adults, who either targeted directly the labour market or came in the framework of family reunion (although many of the latter also inserted rapidly in the labour market). This demographic profile explains why the immigrants offspring’ is only now becoming visible, with an increased proportion of 1.5 or second generation children with an immigrant background. The most significant exception to this age profile, although not very large in relative terms, is the presence of retirement migration coming from developed countries of the EU, mainly to Spain and Portugal. In gender terms, immigration is in general balanced, although an observation by specific nationalities reveals some more male- and female-oriented flows.

Third, the labour market insertion of immigrants displays many commonalities. In all cases, immigrants have high employment rates, both for male and female immigrants, confirming the labour orientation of most inflows. Immigrants are mostly inserted in the same economic sectors: construction, manufacturing (mainly Italy), hotels and restaurants, retail trade, domestic work and agriculture (except Portugal). In many of these sectors they benefit from the seasonal character of some activities, namely tourism and agriculture. When observing the type of jobs most immigrants perform, it is clear that they are mainly inserted in the so-called 3D jobs, normally rejected by natives. They also often face over-qualification for the jobs they perform, due to a relatively high educational background, and are over-exposed to precarious labour arrangements, including temporary contracts and unemployment.
Fourth, migration policies present some similarities in terms of general evolution and objectives, but also many differences resulting from institutional contexts. The main resemblance results from a similar path taken by policy approaches: all countries first started to deal with administrative norms about the entry and residence of foreigners, mainly as a result from the EU adhesion requirements, in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain; they afterwards looked for a stricter control and rigorous enforcement, when the inflows started to increase; they progressively sought for ways of managing labour migration, when immigration became widespread, using procedures that varied from invitation schemes to, mainly, labour quotas; they developed integration approaches in later stages, either at the national, regional or local level; and, in every case, they carried out regularisation processes from time to time, in order to regulate ex post what they were unable to regulate ex ante. Moreover, some traits of ethnic preference were present, either regarding ancestry or postcolonial contexts (Joppke, 2005). The timing and concrete expression of these policy initiatives is, however, very different from country to country, revealing specific institutional structures and a varied political framework.

Fifth, immigration impacts were considerable and display, in many cases, similar patterns. The demographic impacts were evident, since these Southern countries are among the ones with a lower fertility and more rapid ageing in the world. The entry of foreign young adults helped to sustain total population growth, revitalised births (births from foreign parents rapidly attained a large proportion of total births) and also marriages (mixed marriages increased more rapidly than the proportion of foreigners). In economic terms, several studies confirm that immigrants have contributed strongly to economic growth and are net financial contributors to the welfare state. In social terms, impacts have varied, since the social context of reception and public opinions had multiple views about the issue. Nevertheless, a considerable degree of acceptance seems to exist, tempered by concerns about criminality or, mainly in the case of Greece, ethnic cohesion.

Sixth, integration outcomes are generally limited, although prospects vary from case to case. Although systematic research was not carried out during the project about immigrants’ integration, several elements confirm that, besides a rapid insertion in the labour market, much need to be done on this field. Moreover, the labour insertion itself is confined to the least protected and desired segments of the labour market. This segmentation, considered as structural exclusion by some authors (Calavita, 2005), has far-reaching implications. However, the increase in the duration of stays (many immigrants in other contexts face harsh working conditions in the earlier stages, which are followed by upward mobility – Chiswick, 1978), the insertion in social networks (either of fellow foreign citizens, other foreigners or nationals) and policy assistance have led and may lead in the future to some improvement.

The questions to be asked are why have all these processes evolved like this, and why did similarities show up so often among the Southern European countries? A set of explanatory variables can thus be added – which must be understood as interrelated factors, often acting in a context of multiple causality.

A first factor has to do with the timing of inflows. Despite differences in rhythm and the non-linearity of the migration process, it may be argued that all Southern European countries are marked by the same historical imprint in their immigration experiences. Using another terminology, they are affected by the same “generation effect”. They all have witnessed strong immigration growth and had to deal with their outcomes after the 1980s, a period characterised by de-industrialisation, flexibilisation of the labour markets and de-regulation.
in all advanced economies. This means that the regulation of migration, i.e., the enactment of effective control and recruitment policies, and the prevention of integration deficits would always be utmost difficult – as recent immigration to many other world contexts may confirm.

A second factor has to do with the prevalent stages of the migration cycle. In all Southern European cases immigration flows are recent and display a similar demographic pattern. Most of the inflows are composed by young adults in the first stage of the migration cycle. Only now the immigrants’ offspring starts to be significant, either by means of 1.5 generation immigrants (children arrived early in their lives) or children already born in the host countries. In another terms, Southern countries are affected by the same “age effect”. Some outcomes are that the immigrants’ impacts over the welfare system are still generally positive (they are net contributors, since they are mostly engaged in the employed labour force, but this may change in the future) and that issues related to the second generation only now are becoming challenging (and they will confirm, or not, the prospects for integration).

A third factor is the type of labour demand. In all Southern European countries a vast labour intensive economic sector exists, sometimes linked to traditional activities in these countries, others to new types of demand. This is the case of agriculture, construction, some manufacturing industries, hotels and restaurants (often related with tourism) and domestic work. In all these sectors foreign manpower is substituting native manpower – as is exemplary the case of domestic work, a sector existing since long ago but now affected by a decreasing native supply. During the last decades, job creation in these sectors was vast, a process that was due to the high rates of economic growth during part of this period. The strong labour demand for immigrants is also related to the extent of the informal economy. Although informal arrangements are now part and parcel of all advanced economies, comparative studies show that Southern European countries are the ones with higher levels of informality (Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004). This factor explains the endemic presence of irregular immigrants in this context.

A fourth factor results from the socio-economic structures or regimes. A number of elements can be enumerated here, sometimes revealing similarities and others differences among these countries. One of main elements is the type of the welfare state. Although there is no consensus about a “Southern European” type of welfare state, all approaches stress commonalities. The “conservative model” adopted by some authors (Esping-Andersen, 1990 and Sciortino, 2004), attributes to families many welfare obligations; do not directly provide many welfare services (using instead the principle of monetary transfers to the households); and protects extensively the already employed. The “Southern European model” adopted by other authors (Ferrera, 1996) adds to this the importance of private-public partnerships and clientelism. All these traits, not always specific to this context, help to explain the immigration demand for some sectors (for example, caring for the elderly at the households – a fast-growing immigration recruitment sector in this context) and the segmentation of the labour market (coexistence of protected and non-protected segments). If we add the law enforcement difficulties faced by Southern states, we may also explain the very acceptance of informal and irregular situations – common to natives and foreigners.

Another important element of the socio-economic regimes is the organisation of the civil society. Again, this helps to explain some immigration and policy trends. The presence of strong labour unions is a relevant variable, since it is related to the coexistence of well protected sectors of the labour force and less protected “immigration jobs”. The accrued
presence of women in the labour market explains part of the immigrant recruitment for the households. The increased levels of education and, generally, social expectations among the youth explains their shunning away from the bottom sectors of the labour market. The power of individual employers and employers organisations explain the use of irregular workforce, some labour exploitation and the lobbying for pro-immigration policies. The role of some NGOs explains the support given to immigrants and the improvement of their integration prospects, even in the absence of adequate governmental policies. The importance of the Catholic Church, in all countries but Greece, explains the strength of the pro-immigrant coalition. All these elements are linked to the modes of immigrants’ incorporation and, also, to the making of immigration policies (Zincone, 2006). Last but not least, the integration in the European Union is an obvious factor constraining directly immigration policies, in a manner that approximates the Southern countries from other EU member states.

A fifth factor is the dominant perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants. Here again some similarities arise between the Southern countries, although many differences prevail. The importance of this factor is linked to the practical acceptance of immigrants in daily life, which affects their integration prospects, as well as to the role of political parties, a decisive element in modern democracies. Public opinion seems generally divided in Southern countries. Some indicators confirm the acceptance of immigration, whilst others demonstrate fear and concern. Past colonial and historical links, specific language and culture, and various stereotypes add to the complexity in this field, making into impossible to generalise to different countries and immigrant groups. All in all, perceptions and attitudes are a dependent and an independent variable – as occur with other factors mentioned beforehand. It evolves in a dynamic way, affecting and being affected by other variables.

In sum, it can be said that a Southern European model of immigration still exists, as was admitted by research during the 1990s and early 2000s (see, among others, King, 2000). This model encompasses many similar traits, factors and outcomes, although specific contextual frameworks make a difference (for example, the various timings and characteristics of inflows have been accompanied by various timings and characteristics of immigration policies). But the most important point to be stressed is that this model is dynamic, in the sense that new dimensions are arising (for example, the second generation), new social frameworks are built (for example, evolving social attitudes) and new policies are enacted. In this latter case, a long way has been done since the first policies were drawn – although the results have not been always much more effective. A point that needs further observation is the effect of the current economic recession over migration (Martin, 2009). It is known that previous recessions have re-shaped the world map of migrations, and maybe unexpected outcomes may now arise in the Southern context. All this means that the Southern European model of immigration, as has been theorised in the late 1990s, needs updating.

During recent years, immigrants, native populations, civil society and governments have struggled to adapt to a new environment in Southern Europe, which is arguably structural and will influence many years to come. Immigration became part and parcel of Southern societies. While immigrants struggle to make a living in this new environment, local populations and institutions seek a way of managing immigration and its consequences. In a sense, it is not only immigrants that are looking for Southern Europe. It is Southern Europe that is looking for itself.
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