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CITIZENS AND GOVERNANCE IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED SOCIETY



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“Old” Immigration Countries

Synthesis report

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Introduction

IDEA is essentially a comparative project, an exercise in comparison among European migration receiving countries from which to draw suggestions to improve the understanding of national immigration experiences. IDEA aims to identify significant and meaningful groups of migration receiving countries in Europe, and to gain a better understanding of the latter's implications for policy and its development. The selection of countries follows a specific conceptual idea: In the course of their immigration experience, receiving countries go through a migration cycle – a notion inspired by the life cycle concept.

In this synthesis report we endeavour to apply this conceptual model to the past and recent migration history of the “old” immigration countries in Europe. We critically evaluate the applicability of the model and ask for specific as well as general characteristics. For this purpose, we include the most important “old” immigration countries in our considerations – namely Germany, France and Great Britain as well as Austria. We summarize the results and seek to thoroughly examine the main findings in the final chapter of this report.

Heinz Fassmann and Ursula Reeger

1. Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework of IDEA is based on two main general observations. The first is the observation that countries undergo a migration cycle; the second is a general explanatory model for the dynamics of migration flows. Both will be described in the section that follows.

1.1 The migration cycle

The concept of “migration cycles” is based on the assumption that all European nation-states develop from emigration into immigration countries. During this transformation they experience specific cycles. The main drivers for this general developmental process can be seen in the demographic development of both sending and receiving countries, the economic development in both sending and receiving countries and, finally, in the paradigms of migration and control policies.

We state furthermore that the transition from a country of emigration to a country of immigration is characterized by discrete, significant phases. These phases can be differentiated by features of the migration flow itself, by socioeconomic circumstances in the sending and receiving countries and by the transformation of the dominant migration regime.

A certain number of such intermediate phases cannot be postulated and it is very difficult to define the final closure of this cycle. However, features that are helpful in defining the closure of the cycle might be the stability of migration flows, a migration policy that is seldom reformulated or a public opinion that accepts immigration as something normal. But it is obvious that the end of one cycle could be followed by the start of the next one, therefore we postulate there being a relative or preliminary end of the cycle and not an absolute one.

The concept of a migration cycle is based on the general idea that a country (or a household or an enterprise or a region) adapts to a new situation and develops certain mechanisms to handle the new environmental conditions. Countries are “learning”, reflecting past experiences and developing new adaption strategies. Learning processes are time-dependent and lead to discrete, significant phases. An initial phase might be followed by a peak phase and a mature phase describing and characterising the “age or cohort effect” of an adaption process.


Cycles are embedded in a certain temporal and spatial context. This by no means implies that all European countries pass through exactly the same cycle. Furthermore, it is not postulated that the individual phases of the cycle last for the same amount of time or display identical characteristics. The position of an immigration country on the recentness/maturity scale has an implication that can be described as a “period or generation effect”. It stems from the influence exerted on the course and characteristics of the migration transformation by the international context existing during the initial and formative years of the immigration experience. These influences may leave a long-lasting imprint on later stages of the immigration experience.¹

¹ To make this clearer, the implications of becoming a country of immigration in the 1950s and 1960s are bound to be quite different than those of becoming a country of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, when the era of globalisation was in full swing.

Despite these limitations it remains apparent that “young” immigration countries go through more or less similar stages within the migration cycle as the “old” immigration countries did two or three decades previously. Let us assume that there are at least four different phases (stages) of the migration cycle, which can be defined and summarized as follows:

1. Preliminary Stage: In the preliminary stage, emigration is more important than immigration but emigration starts to decline rapidly. The reason for the decline could be a decrease of births, an increase of deaths, an economic upswing or a further segmentation of the labour market. The inflow of foreign workers and population becomes significant and, over a certain period of time, larger than the outflow of local workers. A former emigration country becomes, step by step, an immigration country.
2. Take-off stage: a quantitatively significant immigration inflow starts due to a further growing economy or due to a loss of population (negative birth balance). The demand for additional labour is rising and the internal labour supply is not sufficient anymore. The increase of a demand-driven labour migration appears as formally regulated (recruitment agreements) and is accompanied by an unregulated immigration of irregular workers.
3. Stagnation stage: With the emergence of the first economic crisis and a relative “overshooting” of immigration, new mechanisms appear that signalize the end of the take-off stage. The unemployment of both the local and the foreign labourers is growing and the closing down of the primary as well as secondary labour market for the foreign labour force begins. Migration control is discussed in public; immigration is limited and re-migration stimulated. Migration in this phase is changing from single males to family migration, and these units move from rural areas and the outskirts to inner city areas.
4. “Mature” stage: Immigration is recognized as a necessary supplement to a demographically decreasing working population on the one hand and growing economy on the other hand. The public is not surprised anymore and comes to terms with a culturally heterogeneous society. Extreme expressions of opinion of one view or another are losing popularity and a new political rationality is underway. This can also be seen in the rather differentiated way of regulating immigration. While there was only one type of “labour migrant” during the intermediate phase, a whole panoply of residence and settlement titles has meanwhile been developed. Factual differentiation of the inflows and juridical differentiation of the people who are allowed to come or who have to stay abroad are important features of the “maturity” stage.

Figure 1: Generalized migration balance



Source: Own design.

1.2 The main drivers

If we establish that a migration cycle can be understood as an adaptation to and learning process about a new demographic and economic situation, launching an additional inquiry might be necessary to determine which factors are responsible for the new circumstances. This question leads to the concept of main drivers. We define main drivers as the most important independent variables explaining the dependent variable, which is the relation of immigration and emigration. The main drivers are responsible for the phases within the migration cycle as well as for the periodic effect.

The selection of main drivers follows the usual migration theories (such as the push and pull model or the migration system theory) and is a result of lengthy discussions within the project. It is also important to note that these main drivers are interdependent, interacting or mutually dependent. They also display temporally different effects. Drivers such as demographic development have a long-term effect while economic influences bring about short-term effects.

1. Economy and labour market: The demand for labour usually constitutes a major determinant of immigration flows, especially in countries in which labour migration is prominent. The demand itself depends on overall economic development. A growing economy results in a rising demand for labour if the factors “productivity” and “work time” are kept constant. External events may play a special role that leads towards an above-average increase in the demand for labour. Such events may be large investments within short periods of time (such as world championships or Olympic games). They result in an especially strong demand for labour in the building and tourism industries and, often, this additional demand is met by immigration. Contrary

to demographic development, these external events only result in short-term changes of the order of the migration cycles.

Normally the demand for labour does not affect all sectors of the economy and segments of the labour market in the same way. As a rule, the immigration of labourers targets the secondary labour market. An expanding low wage sector in tourism, agriculture and the building industry as well as in the industrial and services sectors makes immigration an attractive option. Often, there is an accompanying self-reinforcing effect: Native labourers leave the low-wage sector if there are other job options in a growing economy. The internal labourers are subsequently substituted by foreign labourers who are willing to work for lower wages. Thus the low wage sector remains competitive and may even expand, which again results in increase in immigration.

Especially during the take-off phase, the duality of the labour market constitutes an important factor. Thereto the influence of the welfare system is added. The more pronounced the outsourcing of social services (nursing services, care) into the private sphere, the likelier the employment of illegal personnel, if other factors (control system, labour supply, growing wealth) allow for that.

2. Demographic development: The second most important driving force in relation to economic development is demographic development. Decreasing numbers of births lead – after a certain amount of time – towards dropping numbers of entries into the labour market and to an ageing of the workforce. Conversely, a positive development of births results in a growing work force. A shrinking and ageing labour force will have a marked effect on pull factors and will stimulate immigration, especially when economic development leads to an increase in labour demand. Furthermore, an ageing society will exhibit some effects not only on the quantity of immigration but also on its selectivity. An ageing society will increase the demand for health and care services which are usually taken over by the female labour force.
3. Migration regulation and control capacity: The capacity and the will to control flows, and therefore to avoid, or rather reduce regular and irregular migration, varies from time period to time period and from country to country, and is affected by the types of policies in place. International migration is not only a consequence of regional wage differences, but is also highly regulated through political measures. To what extent these political measures are put into practice is an open question. The capacity to control flows, and therefore to avoid, or rather reduce irregular migration, affects the consistency between policies and outcomes in a dynamic way, and subsequently the perceptions of and attitudes towards immigration. The ability to control flows (i.e., entries and stays) greatly varies among countries on account of a number of factors. In some countries it is considerable, in others, very limited. This clearly affects the degree of consistency between policies and outcomes, which in turn may affect the public mood towards immigration. It also affects the relative weight of types of flows (regular or irregular, more or less asylum demand, etc.).
4. Historical framing (chronology of immigration): The time-dependent processes that lead to sectoral change and to an increase of global interactions in the economic and societal sphere also have to be taken into consideration as being among the main external drivers. The “generational” or period effect – which modifies the phases of the cycle – is especially influenced by the development of globalizing processes in

general. The time and space compression due to the improvement of information and communication technologies as well as the improvement of the transport system is not only a pre-requisite for globalization but is also changing the circumstances for migration significantly. De-industrialization and the growth of the service industry are other structural developments that determine the course of immigration.

5. Political or other crises in surrounding countries: The inflow of asylum seekers and refugees fluctuates considerably and does not depend on the needs of the labour market, but on political or other crises in nearer or farther countries. This main driver of migration is short-term in nature and it is impossible to predict the development of political crises, wars or economic turmoil.

2. “Old” immigration countries

After the clarification of the conceptual framework of IDEA, one might endeavour to test its applicability with empirical observations. Are the migration cycle and the concept of the main drivers useful to describe and to analyse concrete examples? The answer will not be a simple “yes” or “no”. It can be shown that the reality of migration development is fractured by the very specific circumstances of countries’ historical, political and economic development. The longue durations of country-specific development are useful for understanding the modification of the migration cycle as well as the importance of the main drivers.

Before country-specific results are presented and discussed, we define “old” immigration countries in Europe and select the most relevant ones. We define immigration countries as countries where immigration exceeds emigration, and “old” countries are those in which the overbalance of immigration has persisted in recent decades.

In a majority of European countries immigration exceeds emigration, but the most important target country in the EU – in terms of absolute volume of immigration – is the Federal Republic of Germany, with approximately 10.1 million foreign-born residents and 6.7 million foreign citizens. After the USA and Russia, it is the third most popular country for immigration worldwide. France is the second most important country of destination for immigrants in Europe. Around 3.3 million people currently residing in France are foreign citizens, while 6.5 million residents were born abroad. The third most popular country for immigrants is Britain, with roughly 2.9 million foreign citizens and 5.4 million foreign-born residents. Austria is by far the smallest country in terms of population and absolute volume of immigration, but has the biggest shares of both foreign citizens (10.0 per cent) and foreign-born population (15 per cent) among the countries being considered.

Table 1: Foreign citizens and foreign born residents of the EU-27 and in Germany, France and the UK in 2005 and in Austria in 2007

	EU-27	Germany	France	Britain	Austria
Resident population (in thousands)	475,067	82,501	58,521	58,614	8,299
Resident foreign citizens (in thousands)	22,875	6,739	3,263	2,857	826
In %	5.2	8.9	5.6	2.9	10.0
Resident foreign born (in thousands)	40,560	10,144	6,471	5,408	1,236
In %	8.8	12.3	10.7	9.1	14.9

Sources: EUROSTAT; Statistics Austria.

2.1 Germany

2.1.1 Industrialization period: Immigration happened

Germany is without any doubt – in statistical terms – an “old” immigration country, dating back to the last quarter of the 19th century. However, in terms of self-assessment, Germany is a very young immigration country. It was only in the last decade that the fact that Germany is, in quantitative terms, an immigration country, became more and more accepted by the political class.

The main driver during the 19th century was the economic upswing in the Western part of the German Reich. With the industrialization of the Ruhr Area and the urban centres, Germany became a prominent target country for migrants especially from the Eastern parts of Europe.


The Polish immigrants constituted an important minority population until the eve of the First World War. Additionally, the immigration of Italians and Ruthenes were significant and counterbalanced the emigration of Germans to the USA. The immigration of the so-called “Wanderarbeiter” was not the result of a political decision, but more of the liberal structure of the labour market of the 19th century (cf. Bade 1996).

The first years after the Second World War were characterised by large-scale immigration to Germany. These immigrants were German refugees (Vertriebene) from the Eastern parts of the former “German Reich”, from Eastern European countries and from the Soviet Union. According to the 1950 Census, when the forced resettlements came to an end, 7.9 million refugees and expellees were resident in the Federal Republic of Germany and 3.6 million in the German Democratic Republic. In the same period (1945–1950), about ten million people (forced labourers, prisoners of war and concentration camp prisoners) left Germany and returned to their countries of origin.

2.1.2 Active recruiting of guest workers

With the integration of the German refugees, the start of the German “Wirtschaftswunder” and smaller cohorts of those born during the war and the years there after, Germany began to react to the shortage by recruiting labour migrants from the South. Between 1955 and 1968, the German government signed recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (both 1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). However, between 1955 and 1961, the number of foreigners living in Germany rose by only about 200,000. After 1961, steady economic growth and the GDR’s decision to close its borders to the West, which cut off the flow of workers from East Germany, led to increasing labour shortages (cf. Rühl 2008).

Figure 2: Net migration in Germany, 1950–2005



Source: United Nations population division, own design.

In total, about 14 million workers (“guest workers”) from the recruitment countries entered Germany between 1955 and 1973 in order to take up employment mostly in the automobile, steel and electric industries and coal mining. The majority of these recruited workers returned to their countries of origin before 1973, when the German government declared a halt to recruitment in response to the oil shortage and subsequent economic slowdown. For many of those who stayed, the ban may have been an incentive to settle in Germany permanently, as the new legal regulations prevented them from re-entering Germany after a temporary return

to their country of origin (see Cyrus 2005: 9; Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann & Zwintz 2005: 206–207).

During the recruitment period from 1955 to 1973, the foreign population in Germany increased from half a million (0.9 per cent of total population) to almost four million (6.4 per cent of total population). Net migration rose almost annually and reached its peak in 1970 at +542,000. Only in the recession year of 1967 was a negative net migration (of about 200,000) registered.

The period between the cessation of recruitment and the end of the 1980s was primarily characterised by migration through family reunification. From 1973 to 1979, the number of foreigners residing in Germany remained stable. Overall, until 1988, the number of foreigners rose quite slowly, from 4 million to 4.6 million.

The political changes in Central and Eastern Europe (i.e., the fall of the Iron Curtain) at the end of the 1980s triggered a new period of migration to Germany. The number of foreigners moving to Germany increased significantly, exceeding the number of those leaving. A large proportion of these incoming migrants were asylum seekers and ethnic Germans (Aussiedler).

2.1.3 Established immigration policy

In spite of rising and diversifying migration inflows, it was not before 1998, when the new government coalition of the Social Democrats and the Green Party took office, that the country's traditional defensive self-definition, according to which Germany was not a country of immigration, was abandoned. The following years saw numerous amendments and reforms in migration and foreign resident policy and legislation. This paradigmatic shift was initiated by the 1999 reform of the German Nationality Law, followed by the appointment of an Independent Commission on Immigration in the summer of 2000, and the passing of the so-called Green Card Regulations in August 2000, which broadened the access of non-German specialists to the labour market in Germany.

Finally, in 2004, the German parliament passed the new Immigration Act, based on a compromise between the government and the opposition. The new law, which came into force on 1 January 2005, contains, amongst other provisions, regulations on the entry and residence of foreigners (and ethnic German migrants) and aims at simplifying the existing set of migration regulations. Thus, the new law reduces the types of residence permits from five to two: the (temporary) residence permit and the (permanent) settlement permit. Moreover, a much-discussed element of the law enables highly skilled third-country nationals to immigrate to and settle in Germany. This amendment has been interpreted as an important shift in German migration policy since it loosens the restriction on recruitment. Furthermore, the Immigration Act contains, for the first time, regulations on the integration of migrants at the national level. For example, under the new law, new residents are generally obliged to participate in integration courses (Rühl 2008).


Table 1: Overview of migration legislation in Germany

1965	Foreigners' law
1973	"Anwerbestopp": halt on recruitment for non-EEC-nationals
1978	German parliament approved establishment of the "Commissioner for the Promotion of Integration of Foreign Employees and their Families", affiliated with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
1983	Law for the promotion of foreigners' repatriation, political mobilization against "abuse of the right to asylum"
1990	New foreigners' law, replacing the 1965 regulations
1990	"Anwerbestoppausnahmereverordnung": decree on exceptions from the halt on recruitment, escalation of the dispute on asylum and the constitutional article 16 (right to asylum for political refugees)
1992	So-called "asylum compromise": amendment of article 16 of the German basic law, restricting the right to asylum by the safe third country rule; amendment to the German citizenship law (introducing a limited <i>ius domicilii</i>)
1997	Amendment to the foreigners' law: Increasing the visa-requirements for foreign unaccompanied children
2000	Installation of an Independent Commission on Immigration (important representatives of NGO's, churches and business), recommending the introduction of a point system similar to the Canadian model in its final report in 2001; introduction of <i>ius soli</i>
2001	Proposal for an immigration and foreigners' law by the Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, resulting in a prolonged political conflict between the conservative opposition and the government being supported by most civil society and trade associations
2005	New foreigners' law, combining regulations for immigration, labour market access, the stay of foreigners and the integration of resident migrants into an integrated legislative concept for the first time
2007	New foreigners' law introduced 15.07.2007

Source: Borkert and Bosswick 2007: 11.

At the end of 2005, about 6.8 million people living in Germany held a foreign nationality. This amounts to a share of 8.2 per cent of the total population. The majority of the foreigners in Germany are nationals of the former recruitment states, most of them of Turkey (26.1 per cent of all foreign nationals), Italy (8.0 per cent), the succession states of former Yugoslavia (14.3 per cent), especially Serbia and Montenegro (7.3 per cent), and Greece (4.6 per cent). In addition, a significant number of nationals of Middle and East European countries live in Germany, especially from Poland, Russia and the Ukraine. The presented numbers and the legal developments very obviously point out the maturity of the German migration cycle.

Figure 3: Foreign population in Germany according to nationality 2005



Source: Fassmann, Reeger and Sievers 2008.

2.2 France

2.2.1 Immigration country in the 19th century

Another “mature” immigration country is France, and it has been one for many decades. The migration cycle of the transition from an emigration country to an immigration country dates back to very long ago. France never was a country of mass emigration on the scale of its European neighbours in the 19th century, and it was already a major importer of labour before World War I. France has received successive waves of immigrants who arrived in the country beginning the second half of the nineteenth century in order to offset sluggish population growth. This demographic revolution, in combination with the industrial revolution, created a strong demand for new immigrant workers in France, a country of early fertility decline and early economic prosperity. During the 19th century, and particularly since 1945, France has continued to rely on migrant labour to fill many gaps in the labour force and has actively recruited and received immigrants (cf. Ogden 1995, Thierry 2008).

Migration from Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy, and later from Poland and Spain, peaked in the early 20th century. In 1931, the number of foreigners was more than 2.7 million, accounting for more than 6 per cent of the total population. Economic recession in the 1930s took its toll, with some decline in the resident population to 2.2 million by 1936, however, these numbers exceed those of the neighbouring countries.


2.2.2 Active recruitment of permanent immigrants

The World Wars of the twentieth century created a need for immigrant inflows to make up for the human losses incurred and to contribute to reconstruction or, more generally, to meet the needs of industry. After the Second World War, France resumed the active recruitment of immigrants that it first started during the inter-war period. For this purpose, it established the

Office National d'Immigration (ONI), which was given the monopoly of recruitment. The ONI signed a first recruitment agreement with Italy in 1947. From 1946, after freedom of movement was granted to the Algerian population, a massive wave of “French Muslim” workers arrived from Algeria. Heading a colonial empire, France was attractive for emigrants from the African colonies after the Second World War. Hence, French populations of immigrant origin come from a wide range of geographical areas.

In contrast to Germany and Austria, the aim of the active recruitment was always to encourage permanent settlement of workers and families to strengthen the demographic structure and to turn foreigners into French resident population. Migration was therefore to be selective on the basis of the supposed ease of assimilation (cf. Ogden 1995).

Figure 4: Net migration in France, 1950–2005



Source: United Nations population division, own design.

The peak period of recruitment started in the middle of the 1950s. The decolonisation process initiated in 1956 further increased immigration, marked by the return of populations of French descent from the lost territories. Several million civil servants, soldiers, and settlers of European origin had moved to the colonies held by France. Following the independence of these colonies, many Frenchmen moved back permanently to their countries of origin. Thus, the average of around 300,000 people per year immigrating into France in the first five years of the 1960s is also a result of the Algerian War and Algeria’s subsequent independence. Moreover, a large number of native Algerians, who at the time were French citizens, moved to France to live and work there.

This phase was characterized by a diversification of geographical origins, the rise of worker rather than family migration and a certain degree of spontaneity that left migration uncontrolled by government policy. Like in Austria and Germany, the 1960s were a period of unprecedented economic growth, and the recruitment of unskilled labour became important. Between 1954 and 1975, the total foreign population doubled from 2 per cent to nearly 4 per cent.

With the rise in French unemployment after the oil crisis, as elsewhere in Europe, new legislation introduced in 1974 made it more difficult for immigrant workers to enter the country. However, this development coincided with the recognition of the right to family reunion, resulting in large-scale family migration, thanks to which net migration has never fallen to zero or below. The immigrant population has thus continued to grow at least as fast

as the native population. The 1990 census reinforces the view that the immigrant population changed its character: The former migrant workers were being transformed into ethnic minorities as families formed and members of the second generation were born in France.

There have been a series of twists and turns in the governmental policy since the mid-1970s – as Ogden pointed out – but a clear tendency is recognisable. Migration control is becoming more and more important in French policy as well as in the incentives to reduce illegal entries. The government policy towards new arrivals has become tighter over the past two decades, beginning with Mitterrand from 1981 onwards and ending with Sarkozy in contemporary times.

Table 2: Overview of migration legislation in France


1945	ground law in immigration, open immigration policy
early 1970s	end of open immigration policy, measures to favour the return of migrants
1977	ongoing incentives for return migration, restrictions to family reunification
1980	“Bonnet law”, illegal immigrants should be expelled
1986	“Pasqua law”, reduction in the number of residence permits
1991	Law introducing penalties for people helping illegal immigrants
1993	New “Pasqua law” reinforcing repressive measures concerning illegal migrants, limited entry and residence for many categories of migrants
1998	“Chevenement law” established clearer terms for claiming refugee status
	“Guigou law”: reintroduction of the automatic right to French citizenship for children born in France
2000	Laws aiming at the fight of discrimination, following EU Directives
2002	French employers can recruit highly skilled workers from outside the EU; movement towards a “brain gain” approach
2003	security issues, fight against illegal migration

Source: <http://www.legislationline.org/?tid=131&jid=19&less=false>; author: Antonella Attardo.

2.2.3 Current situation

The French model of assimilation made sure that these immigrants soon became a part of the French resident population. Immigration in France is a long-standing phenomenon that has significantly evolved since the 19th century. Nowadays France is the second most important country of destination for immigrants in Europe. Around 3.3 million people currently residing in France are foreign citizens, while 6.5 million residents were born abroad. This means that almost half of those born abroad hold French citizenship, which can, on the one hand, be explained by the fact that a large number of the immigrants originate from French colonies. On the other hand, it has always been much easier for immigrants to receive citizenship in France than in Germany. While the immigrants residing in West Germany almost exclusively originate from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the immigrants residing in France have come from all over the Mediterranean region, including Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Italy. Only a marginal number of labour migrants in France originate from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey.

Figure 5: Foreign population in France according to place of birth 1999



Source: Fassmann, Reeger and Sievers 2008.

2.3 United Kingdom

2.3.1 UK as an emigration country in the 19th century

Britain has never considered itself as a country of immigration (Coleman 1994). One of the reasons for this perception is that Britain has always been a country of emigration: “Throughout its history it has exported population, particularly to its English-speaking former colonial territories and dominions, both those that broke away – the United States and the Republic of South Africa – and those that remained within the Old Commonwealth – Canada, Australia, and New Zealand” (Coleman 1994: 37). Emigration was seen as an instrument with which to export unemployment and poverty and to strengthen the Commonwealth as a multinational but English-speaking power. In 1922 the Empire Settlement Act was decreed to promote emigration. The Overseas Migration Board, founded in 1953, served a similar purpose. Political power through expansion of the territory can be seen as one of the general principles in UK – in contrast to the French paradigm, which emphasizes the growing population (cf. Sturm-Martin 2001).

In addition, Britain is not, and never was, a country actively recruiting immigrants. On the contrary, the British government was always more concerned with limiting the immigration of certain groups. After the Second World War, despite huge labour shortages and the need to rebuild the country, the government, unlike many European counterparts, did not try to attract migrant workers. Whereas Germany, Switzerland and Austria started to encourage foreign workers to migrate to Western Europe, labour migrants from the former overseas colonies arrived without Britain having introduced any special policy measures.


2.3.2 Immigration after World War II

The start of massive immigration was the arrival of around 500 inhabitants from Jamaica who had been working in the UK during the war and who were unable to find jobs when they returned to the West Indies.

Immigration from India and Pakistan started later than it did from the West Indies, but also reached a very high level from 1960s onwards. Under the 1948 British Nationality Act, citizens of the former colonies were British subjects, and were therefore allowed to come to Britain. In the beginning this migration was not organized, but later on it turned into chain migration, with pioneer migrants encouraging and helping friends and relatives to follow them. The sponsorship and patronage of friends and relatives by those who are already in the UK resulted in a mass migration of people both from the West Indies and the Indian sub-continent (cf. Anwar 1995).

At the same time, like many European countries, the UK was facing a labour force shortage in the 1960s, and entered the initial and take-off phase of the migration cycle. It started welcoming guest workers from Poland and Italy first, but, more importantly, from what remained of the British Empire, especially from the West Indies. Thousands of migrants were drawn to Britain, especially to the Greater London area. Soon the country had two parallel systems of immigration control: one for foreigners, and one for the citizens of the colonies and the Commonwealth.

Figure 6: Net migration in the UK, 1950–2005



Source: United Nations population division, own design.

As pressure for immigration control grew, the Conservative Party changed its policy of free personal movement and migration to a policy of immigration control. The turning point came with the race riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in London in 1958. At that time the “people of colour” were not very welcome and the government soon started to try to discourage them from coming. Thus, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced immigration controls for Commonwealth citizens who were not born in the UK or Ireland or did not hold a UK or Irish passport. The debate about the 1962 act resulted in a greater increase of immigration into the UK from the New Commonwealth than had occurred before. The controls were primarily to prevent or slow down the entry of non-white people and to slowly remove the rights of colonial and Commonwealth citizens to full British citizenship (cf. Anwar 1995).

The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrant Act was designed to prevent further immigration waves by specifically subjecting those of colonial origin in newly independent countries to entry controls (cf. Gemenne 2008). In 1971 the British government passed the 1971 Immigrant Act, which established a distinction between those who could enter Britain free of control (these were called “partial” at the time and included all those who could prove a link to the UK, such as birth, naturalisation, marriage or at least five years of ordinary residence in the country), and those who were subject to control, including all aliens, Commonwealth citizens and British subjects whose status derived from the colonies.

Table 3: Overview of migration legislation in the UK

1948	British Nationality Act: guarantees the privilege of access to citizens of the former colonies, distinction between UK-citizens, Commonwealth citizens and others
1962	Commonwealth Immigrants Act: restrictions also for Commonwealth citizens
1968	Commonwealth Immigrants Act: entry controls for people with colonial origins
1971	Immigration Act: ongoing restrictions for immigration
1981	British Nationality Act: more restrictive
1988	Immigration Act
1993	Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act
2002	Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act including “Life in the United Kingdom Test”

Source: modified after Currle 2004: 125f.

Ten years later, in 1981, when most of the colonies had become independent, the government enacted the British Nationality Act, which reduced the number of people eligible to pass on British citizenship; this was done in order to further limit immigration (Dummett 2006: 567–570). This relationship between nationality and immigration is peculiar to Britain, a country that has never had a comprehensive immigration policy as such but that attempted to limit immigration by differentiating between its subjects.

2.3.3 Current situation


In 2001, the UK was the third most popular country for immigrants, with roughly 2.9 million foreign citizens and 5.4 million foreign born residents. Of the 2.9 million resident foreign citizens, roughly 60 per cent come from African or Asian countries (esp. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). Immigration from Europe is, by comparison, low; Britain never actively recruited guest workers from Yugoslavia or Turkey. Almost three-quarters of all European immigrants originate from Ireland, Britain’s socio-economic and demographic reservoir. Most of the immigrants living in Britain reside in London, the South East and major cities such as Birmingham and Manchester.

Immigration is one of the main political issues in the country, and was a central axis of the Conservative Party campaign in the 2005 general election.² Notwithstanding these debates on British national identity, the role of immigrants in the economy is widely acknowledged, and they are considered one of the main factors behind the British economy’s dynamism, as well

² The attacks of July 2005, plotted by UK-born Muslims, have also raised questions about the linkage between immigration and terrorism and Britain’s identity, though the terrorists were born and raised in the UK. Reconsiderations of British identity have also led to a questioning of firmly established multicultural policies in the country.

as the continuous growth of its population. Britain continues to actively seek to attract high-skilled migrants to strengthen some sectors of its economy (IT, health sector). In this sense, Britain has entered into the mature phase of the migration cycle. Immigration is recognized in the public as a necessary supplement to a demographically decreasing working population and a growing economy. The British government developed and imposed differentiated instruments to allow foreigners to immigrate to Britain and to gain citizenship.³

Figure 7: Foreign population in the UK according to place of birth 2001



Source: Fassmann, Reeger and Sievers 2008.

2.4 Austria

2.4.1 Emigration and immigration country


Austria – defined in the boundaries of the Republic of Austria – was an immigration country with the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, which was, in the late 19th century, a country of emigration. This demonstrates how complicated territorial linkages are from historical perspective and how difficult it is to apply the migration cycle concept with real data. At the beginning of the 20th century, Austria-Hungary was one of the most important countries of origin for overseas migration to the USA. At the same time, immigrants from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Galicia came in great numbers and settled down in the fast growing capital, Vienna.

A sharp decline of immigration can be observed with the beginning of World War I for obvious reasons. Austria experienced a transition from an immigration country to an

³ The government introduced measures such as a “Britishness test” for immigrants seeking naturalisation or indefinite leave in the UK. The concept of the test, officially called the “Life in the United Kingdom Test”, was laid out in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002, but the test itself was only implemented in late 2005 for naturalisation, and in April 2007 for settlement. Those applying for naturalisation or indefinite leave now have to demonstrate “sufficient knowledge” of life in the UK, as well as sufficient knowledge of English.

emigration country. Especially during the 1920s and 1930s, emigration from Austria to the neighbouring countries, to the USA and to South America achieved massive scales. In the second half of the 1930s and during the 1940s, the emigration of economic and political refugees as well as the expulsion of the Jewish population was outbalanced by refugees and expellees who settled down after the World War II. The migration balance in the period between 1934 and 1951 was positive.

Figure 8: Net migration in Austria, 1950–2005



Source: United Nations population division, own design.

In the 1950s, Austria became an emigration country. The economic upswing happened later than in Germany and many Austrians left the country to work abroad. Higher wages and better employment opportunities were the main reasons for the emigration, especially to Germany and Switzerland. With the return of the allied troops to the UK and to the USA – and, to lesser extent, to France – so-called war brides left the country and moved to the home countries of their husbands.

2.4.2 Active recruiting – the start of the guest worker migration

With the economic upswing in the early 1960s, Austria started to recruit foreign workers in Southern and South-Eastern Europe systematically, since the Cold War and the Iron Curtain had cut off its traditional reservoirs for labour migrants from Eastern Europe. However, the workers coming from Italy, Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Turkey were not necessarily perceived as immigrants. Rather, the Austrian and German policies at the time were guided by the idea that the labour migrants should enter their countries for a limited period of time in order to fill the labour shortages resulting from economic growth.

The motto of the active recruiting was “rotation”, which implied short-term help through foreign labour when there was demand, but also a return home when this demand decreased. Foreign workers were supposed to behave like spinning tops on the domestic labour market. They should come and go, if possible alone and without families, and be very flexible both occupationally and geographically. This would bring maximum benefits to German and Austrian businesses while relieving society from fundamental questions of integration, which were inevitable when labour migrants began to settle. Neither their countries of origin nor their countries of destination regarded these migrants as permanent emigrants or immigrants respectively, and therefore did not count them as such.

Table 4: General legal trends and specific measures in Austrian migration legislation

Phase	general legal trends	specific measures
1960 up to 1973	no specific immigration policies at hand; labour market policy is dominating	1962 Raab-Olah-Agreement with the dominance of the rotation principle; 1964 Recruitment Agreement with Turkey 1965 Recruitment Agreement with Yugoslavia 1968 First Austrian Asylum Act
1973–1993	oscillating between liberalization and tightening of political measures	1975 Aliens Employment Act introduced a system of stepwise access to different types of permits; 1991 Asylum Act, introducing the principles of “safe third countries” and “safe country of origin” 1993 Residence Law marks the beginning of a controlled immigration system following the American example
1994 until today	differentiated legislation with a multitude of “channels of immigration” to control migration more efficiently	1997 Revision of the Asylum Act 1991, abolished the heavily criticized “safe country of origin” principle and provided for the inclusion of the Schengen Agreement and the harmonization of the Austrian asylum law with the 1990 EU Dublin Convention 1997 Aliens Act, merged the 1992 Aliens Act and the 1993 Residence Act into a single law. The main aim of the reform was to promote the integration for aliens already living in Austria, in the place of new immigration. This concept was called “Integration before immigration”, and the law became known as the “Integration Package” 1998 Naturalization Act retained the core elements of the previous regulations: principle of <i>ius sanguinis</i> and a regular waiting period of 10 years for naturalization. It shifted the burden of proof to the individual immigrant, who now has to prove that he/she is sufficiently integrated into Austrian society, is economically self-sufficient and has a sufficient command of the German language 2005 Aliens Law Package, a comprehensive legislative reform in order to implement EU directives and strengthened measures against irregular immigration and fraudulent marriage and adoptions. The reform contains, among other things, the Settlement and Residence Act, the Aliens Police Act and the revised Aliens Employment Act

Source: own scheme.

The phase of rapid growth in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s was followed by an economic slump in the 1970s, which also brought the recruitment of foreign workers to a halt. As a result of the oil price shock and the ensuing economic stagnation, the fight for jobs became harder. Foreign workers came to be seen as a threat, and their presence was discussed in the public arena. While the British government introduced regulations that tried to stop immigration from their former colonies, the Austrian government (as well as the German one) introduced political measures that aimed to make the “guest workers” leave. However, these measures did not always produce the desired result. Although some guest workers did indeed return to their countries of origin, others not only stayed, but also brought their families. In fact, the end of active recruitment seems to have been a clear signal that those who wanted to

stay would have to attain permanent residence. For this reason, the total foreign population residing in Austria rose much more significantly than the number of foreign citizens working there.

Labour migration from Turkey and Yugoslavia began to increase again with a renewed phase of economic growth in the mid-1980s. At the same time, the political changes in the communist countries led to a growing number of people from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe seeking political asylum in Austria, since they could not know at the time that these changes would be lasting and irreversible. For the same reason, the countries receiving these asylum seekers continued to grant them refugee status. Finally, an economic slump in the early 1990s led the Austrian government to markedly restrict immigration to Austria by introducing stricter requirements for asylum and by setting upper limits (quotas) for the recruitment of new workers and the number of dependants allowed to join them. This resulted in a stabilisation of the proportion of foreign nationals in the population as a whole (Fassmann and Reeger 2001).


2.4.3 “Mature” immigration country?

Austria could be seen as an example of a “mature” immigration country. Considering mere citizenship, the size of the immigrant population in Austria currently amounts to 826,000 persons, with a share of foreign citizens of 10 per cent in the total population. In 2007, 14.9 per cent of the Austrian population was born abroad, 8.5 per cent of the population was foreign-born and of foreign citizenry, 6.3 per cent was foreign-born but of Austrian citizenry and 1.4 per cent was foreign citizens who were born in Austria (members of the second or third generation not having immigrated themselves). In total, the number of persons with a direct migratory background living in Austria amounts to 16.3 per cent, or 1.35 million people.

One of the characteristics is the recognition, by the large majority of population, that immigration is a necessary supplement to a demographically decreasing working population. The public is not surprised anymore and comes to terms with a culturally heterogeneous society. Extreme expressions of opinion of one view or another are losing popularity and a new political rationality is underway.

Another indicator for the “maturity” is the differentiated system of incoming and granting residence permits. The Austrian government decreed several laws at the turn of the 21st century to differentiate between short-term (seasonal migration, temporary stay) migration and permanent immigration for third country nationals. They introduced additional means that should improve and accelerate the integration process (courses for German language) because immigration is not seen any longer as guest worker migration. Finally, Austria differentiates very clearly between asylum seekers and refugees on the one hand, labour migrants from third countries on the other hand and qualified migrants who are treated in a privileged way. While there was one type of ‘labour migrant’ during the intermediate phase, a panoply of residence and settlement titles has meanwhile been developed.

Figure 9: Foreign population in Austria according to citizenship 2001



Source: Fassmann, Reeger and Sievers 2008.

3. Conclusion

IDEA does not only provide a conceptualization of the migration cycle, but also offers verification on the basis of concrete case studies. The very comprehensive country reports of the “old” immigration countries provide some information about the timing and the structure of immigration, political measures taken and the societal meaning of immigration. To summarize the results, we included Germany and the United Kingdom into this synthesis report in an effort to offer a more general overview and to test the conceptual framework of IDEA.

The crucial question here is the applicability of the migration cycle concept and the main drivers behind it. The answers are divided into points which, on the one hand, evaluate the applicability and points which, on the other, show why it is a useful concept despite certain weak points.

3.1 The cycle concept under criticism

Five points should be mentioned that limit the scope of the concept or that should be clarified more precisely:

- Time frame of the migration cycle concept: The model of the migration cycle concept assumes a general shift from an emigration to an immigration situation in European countries. This concept is fed by the general impression that Europe was mainly an emigration continent in the 19th century. Many prominent authors and the literature of that time thematised overseas migration and neglected the fact that many European countries showed a surplus of immigration.⁴ This was not only true for France but also for Austria and Germany. The rapid industrialization process, the abolition of serfdom in the rural population, urban growth and the dominance of liberal ideas brought along very specific circumstances that are hardly comparable with recent ones. Therefore the issue of which time window the concept of a migration cycle is applicable to merits discussion.
- Longevity of migration regimes: The applicability of the migration cycle concept has to be critically discussed for another reason. The different migration regimes can be interpreted as a result of a long-lasting development of political and demographic factors. This long lasting development leads to a situation where in the differences between the European countries seem to be so significant that a general concept is questionable. For example: The time span of the phases within the migration cycle model varies extremely in the “old” immigration countries. In France, the shift from an emigration to an immigration country had already occurred in the 19th century. In the UK, the shift occurred during the 1950s, when the de-colonization process

⁴ “The importance of emigration in European economic history is suggested by Table 1, which presents the number of intercontinental emigrants from Europe and Japan during the period 1846-1924 (see Massey 1988). Over this early period of industrialization, some 48 million emigrants left the continent of Europe, a figure representing about 12 per cent of the European population at the turn of the century. ... These figures suggest that large-scale emigration was common during Europe's period of industrialization ...” (Massey 2003).

stimulated a return migration. Compared to France and the UK, Germany and Austria are latecomers, and the turn of the migration balance occurred during the 1960s.

- Different policy rationale: A third point has to be taken into account. The different rationality linked to the development of immigration and emigration. The concept of a migration cycle implies that there is some policy rationale behind the shift. That is true for some countries but not for others. In Germany and Austria, the start of the initial phase of the migration cycle model was clearly a strategic decision with some policy rationale behind it. For the decision-makers, the consequences were not completely clear at the moment when the recruitment began but it was a more or less target-oriented strategy to enlarge the national labour market. The immigration of workers from the former colonies to France and Britain occurred as a consequence of a general de-colonization process but the effects on migration were not in the forefront. In Britain and France, the additional work-force was already on the market and it was not necessary to start formal recruitment as it was in Germany and Austria.
- External events: Finally, the applicability of the migration cycle concept is “disturbed” by developments influenced by external events. In reality, the phases of the migration cycles are different both in terms of length and magnitude. External events like the Depression during the 1930s, the effects of the two World Wars on mortality and fertility as well as on migration flows, the consequences of the oil price shocks during the 1970s or the fall of the Iron Curtain and the wars in former Yugoslavia all influenced the development of the phases of the migration cycle and make the real picture more complicated. The migration of asylum seekers cannot be predicted in terms of either size or origin. The empirical figures concerning immigration and emigration – as shown in this paper – demonstrate the short-term effects.

3.2 Useless concept?

After criticising the concept of a migration cycle and the main drivers behind it – as was proposed in this paper – we have to ask if it is ultimately a useless concept. For good reasons the concept is useful but its limits should be clear and pointed out:

- The concept can be used as a blue-print or as a mirror for the development of immigration and emigration. It can be used to reflect and to interpret “real” development against expected developments: Does a country fit into the concept or is it completely different? This is always helpful; otherwise the descriptions would remain idiographic and specific.
- The application of the concept to “real” development clearly shows that France is an exception. It was never a country of mass emigration on the scale of its European neighbours in the 19th century, and it was already a major importer of labour before World War I. The applicability of the migration cycle concept is given for new immigration countries after World War II such as Austria, Germany, Greece or Italy (cf. Fakiolas 1995).
- In analysing the migration history of the “old” immigration countries, it became obvious that, in general, the interplay between economic development on one side and demographic development on the other are the main driving forces. Migration policy reflects the requirements of the labour market and allows for recruitment, immigration

or forcing parts of the labour force to leave the country. This holds especially true for the German-speaking countries, where the national labour market is limited within the territory of the state. In France and Britain, the colonies offered a flexible hinterland for an additional labour force.

- The Austrian example proves the assumption that each stage of the cycle corresponds with certain socio-demographic structures of the host society and specific characteristics of the immigrant population, which in turn display different socio-economic impacts and contribute to different perceptions from the population's point of view. In the initial phase, immigration is male-dominated, with a very narrow age distribution. Migration is conceptualized as temporary; the migrants live near their workplaces and remain, for the most part, "invisible". In the later phases, the migrant population becomes more female, the age distribution becomes flatter and the demographic structure is more similar to that of the resident population. The migrant population becomes more visible; children go to school and occupy public spaces, and the places of residence move to cheap flats in old and inner city districts. Migration issues are picked up by political parties and become a major issue in public elections.
- The concept is useful to demonstrate the linkages between the shift of the migration regime and the historical framing of immigration. As it was pointed out previously: Immigration receiving countries are bound to differ on account of the stage of the migration cycle in which they find themselves today ("age effect") and on account of the influences they received in their formative years ("generation effect"). The historical embedding of the migration cycle seems to be very important. The migration of the Poles in the late 19th century into the Ruhr Area and the guest worker migration to Germany in the mid 1950s was a migration into traditional heavy industries (steel, coal mining, car manufacturing). The labour migration to Austria in the early and mid-1960s coincided with the beginning of the de-industrialization process. The main sectors are now construction, tourism and services. A part of these differences can be explained by structural differences between Austria and Germany but the timing of the transformation from an emigration into an immigration country is decisive, too.
- In the "old" immigration countries, it took decades until an efficient migration control system and explicit integration measures were implemented. This legislation gap seems to be one of the regular characteristics of the migration cycle. This term refers to the time lag between the new immigration situation and the reaction of the political system. Austria only began reformulating legislation four decades after the start of the guest worker migration with the decree of an integration law. The same holds true for Germany. The Immigration Act of 2004 contains, for the first time, regulations on the integration of migrants at a national level.

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