Experiencing immigration: 
Comparative analysis of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland

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Preface

Data and information presented in this volume were collected within IDEA Project, VI EU Framework Programme (‘Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries as New Immigration Destinations in the European Union’). The project has been focused on the change of migration status: from emigration to immigration in the three test-sets of countries, namely: (1) ‘old immigration countries’, ‘old host countries’ represented by Austria and France (2) ‘new immigration countries’, ‘new host countries’ represented by Southern belt of Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain and (3) ‘future immigration countries’, ‘to be immigration/ host countries’, latecomers into ‘continental migratory system’, unwillingly put aside by communist thralldom, Central and Eastern European Countries: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Each country in the project had produced a national report and each, mentioned above group of countries, had produced a synthesis regional report. The Central and Eastern European group of countries is comparatively presented in this volume.

Information on the Czech Republic is based on the IDEA Czech National Report which was written by Dušan Drbohlav, Lenka Lachmanová-Medová, Zdeněk Čermák, Eva Janská, Dita Čermáková and Dagmar Dzúrová.

Information on Poland is based on the IDEA Polish National Report which was written in collaboration with Marta Biernath, Maciej Duszczyk, Agata Görny, Izabela Grabowska-Lusińska, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, Ewa Kępińska, Marta Kindler, Magdalena Lesińska, Marta Mioduszewska, Marek Okólski, Aneta Piekut, Renata Stefańska, Maciej Szczepański, Monika Szulecka, Anna Żylicz.

Information on Hungary is based on the IDEA Hungarian National Report which was written by Ágnes Hárs in collaboration with Anna Balogi, Anikó Bernát, Margit Feischmidt, András Kováts, Pál Nyíri, Ildikó Zakariás.
1 Introduction

Marek Okólski and Izabela Grabowska-Lusińska

International migration in countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is by no means a new phenomenon. In many respects, however, it can be regarded as a novelty worth a deep insight on the part of researchers. It is so if the perspective of countries relieved from communism thraldom would be adopted. From the view-point of objectives of the present report migration in CEE deserves studying also from the perspective of IDEA conceptual framework and its key concept of the European ‘migration cycle’. This in turn might enable the report authors to identify the position of CEE countries in that cycle and make in-depth observations on similarities and differences both within the region and relative to the cycle stylised characteristics.

The concept of ‘migration cycle’ is based on an heuristic assumption that all European nation states proceed from net emigration to net immigration countries, even those which for some time remain ‘latent’ or ‘put aside’ (as e.g. CEE countries, due to the imposition of the communist system on them). In the course of change of the status: from emigration to immigration, countries experience peculiar migration stages: preliminary, take off, expansion and maturity. In the preliminary stage, masses of rural population (or, in more general terms, population living on the subsistence sector of economy) are pushed out and compelled to migration due to a fast growth of productivity coupled with a high rate of natural increase. A large part of redundant population emigrates. In turn, the mature stage involves a steady and sizable presence of immigrants (or their descendants) and a continuous but strictly regulated inflow of foreigners in accordance with the needs of economy. That stage emerges from the two intermediate stages and it develops with declining natural increase, the ageing of population and a growing excess of labour demand.

It is assumed that the main drivers of the change in migration status might generally relate to the demographic, political and economic developments (in both sending and receiving countries) and paradigms of migration and control policies (Fassmann & Reeger 2008). The modernisation that underlies the change of migration status did not occur simultaneously in all countries of the e.g. European continent. On the contrary, there has been observed a specific temporal pattern of the change, with Britain followed by France as pioneering countries. When France and later on Britain and few other countries of Western Europe (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland) turned to imports of labour from other countries, which in most cases happened shortly after the end of the World War II (WWII), Southern European countries, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain became major reservoir of people taking part in migration to western part of Europe. After few decades marked with the radical improvement of economic performance and slowing down of population growth in Southern Europe, countries of that region started to attract more and more people from abroad, first from North Africa and more recently many from CEE. Thus CEE countries are the least developed in Europe in terms of the transition from emigration to immigration status. In this report it is suggested that currently they still may follow the pattern of early stage of the ‘migration cycle’. The report presents a comparative analysis of three CEE case studies: Czech, Hungarian and Polish from the perspective of ‘migration cycle’.

1 Those stylised characteristics reflect to a large degree the historical experience of Western Europe in migration developments.

2 Preliminary work to this synthesis report was done within the concept of three national reports prepared within the IDEA project – Drbohlav, Lachmanová-Medová, Čermák, Janská, Čermáková & Džurová 2009 (on the
We accept a presumption that currently CEE countries may still fit the pattern of early stages of the ‘migration transition/cycle’. Countries of CEE seem to be from many reasons positioned along the path leading from early preliminary stage, which we suggest to call embryonic, through proper preliminary stage to take-off stage. In order to illustrate that point let us mention that in early years of the 21st century Poland still remains a net emigration country whereas Hungary records a small but slowly growing net immigration and net immigration in the Czech Republic has reached high level. According to national statistics (see chapter 2), the share of foreign citizens in the total resident population stands at about 3.8% in the Czech Republic (in 2007), 1.7% in Hungary (in 2007), and only 0.2% in Poland (in 2002). Even more distinct differences might be observed in the share of foreigners in all employed in national economy – 3.6% in the Czech Republic (in 2006), 1.5% in Hungary (in 2007) and 0.1% in Poland (in 2006).

An evident new migratory phenomenon in all three countries, however, which sharply differentiates the present from the communist past, is a continuous inflow of people from other countries that takes a variety of forms but seems increasingly more channelled and responsive to the needs of host country economies. The incoming migrants usually originate from still less developed countries of CEE (mainly Ukraine or Romania) or those located more to the East (mainly Vietnam or China) in whose large parts modern economic reforms are retarded and a considerable part of the population is not absorbed by labour markets.

Having clarified the notion of ‘migration cycle’ and its stages, and having set forth relevant assumptions on the positioning of CEE countries, we will attempt now to describe historical context and both commonalities and specificities of the region.

In the long historical perspective (since mid-19th century) the development of migration situation of countries of Central and Eastern Europe can be divided into three distinctive periods: a) up to 1939; b) 1945-1989; c) since 1990 (with a distinct sub-period starting on May 1st 2004). These periods differ between one another due to many aspects: spatial, demographic, socio-economic, political and geopolitical.

One of the principle differences among the given periods is the net migration pattern of each country that has changed significantly during the time. Whereas in the first two periods the CEE countries were predominately emigration areas, after 45 years of real socialism, the revolutionary changes in those countries in 1989 (associated with such events as the Roundtable in Poland and Opposition Roundtable in Hungary, and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, and symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall), has brought CEE, previously isolated by the Iron Curtain, back into the ‘migration continental system’ (Bonifazi, Okólski, Schoorl & Simon 2008: 9). This means that those countries have started being transit and destination countries for migrating foreigners. Does it mean that the change of migration status might be regarded as an immanent component of the political, economic and social transition or more like as an outcome of this multifaceted process?

In the three final decades of the 19th century and the first 14 years of the 20th century the lands that now constitute the Czech Republic and Hungary and a south-eastern part of

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3 According to Eurostat online data, the share of foreign citizens in the total resident population stands at 2.9% in the Czech Republic, 1.7% in Hungary and only 0.1% in Poland in 2007.

4 Besides foreign employees in the Czech Republic, there is also an important segment of foreign trade license holders (small entrepreneurs) - in 2007 there were some 69,000 of them (mostly Vietnamese retail traders). Hence, in sum the total economically active migrant population represented 5.6 per cent of the total economically active population in the Czech Republic (Drbohlav et al. 2009). No data on foreign trade license holders in the other countries available.

5 Here we intentionally disregard the period 1939-1944 because of a large prevalence of involuntary movements of people in that period, which was a consequence of the war.
present Poland belonged to the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The remainder of present Poland was split between two empires – German and Russian. Following 1918 the geopolitical map has been reshaped - since 1918 Czechoslovakia and Poland have been restored as sovereign political entities and in 1920 Hungary got the territory that was more or less identical with the present one.\(^6\) However, Hungarian state left behind many ethnic Hungarians (more than 30%) living mainly in Romania (in its greatly enlarged territory, specifically in Transylvania) and Czechoslovakia (strictly speaking, in Slovakia) but also in Ukraine, Serbia (Voivodina), whilst the (present) Hungarian territory became more or less ethnically homogenous. Lands that form the present Czech Republic until 1938 constituted a federal state with Slovak lands (and Carpathian Ruthenia) as Czechoslovakia. In turn, independent Poland’s territory strongly differed from the present. It embraced parts of present Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine but not its present northern and western lands that still belonged to Germany. Hungary, the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) and Poland have become ethnically homogeneous only after ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of the WWII.\(^7\)

Migration in the period prior to the WWI in the three countries displayed many similarities. The flows of people stemmed mainly from two factors: relative retardation in European modernisation (the case of all Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and, in case of Central and Eastern Poland, Russian Empire) and multiethnic character of political entities to which those countries belonged. Since the mid-19th century they all experienced massive emigration even though the outflow was controlled. Czechs migrated mainly to metropolitan areas of the monarchy (Vienna), industrial centres of Western Europe (France, Germany) and Northern America, and also to western parts of the Russian Empire. The major destination for Hungarians was USA. In turn, Poles in addition to metropolitan areas such as Berlin, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Moscow, Vienna and Paris, headed in great numbers for both Americas and industrial centres of Germany.

In 1918-1939, in a climate of stricter control of immigration by principal receiving countries and due to the economic crisis of 1929-1933, all three countries experienced a decline in the emigration and some return migration (especially at the time of crisis) or repatriation of fellow countrymen (especially immediately after the end of the war). In the aftermath of the WWI and the Trianon Peace Treaty, typical of Hungary in that period were ethnically-motivated trans-border population movements. The Czech Republic (then Czechoslovakia) and Poland became a host for thousands of refugees from Russia (after 1917) and Germany (after 1933). Still, however, the migration balance continued to be negative. The WWII brought about huge involuntary movements of the population, particularly in Poland. After massive resettlements (mostly forcible, on ethnic grounds) of population and returns of POWs or war fugitives, which ended in 1948, migration during the communist times (until 1989) was heavily controlled. A list of major characteristics common to all three countries in that period includes the following.

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\(^6\) As a consequence of conclusion of Trianon Peace Treaty following the World War I (WWI).

\(^7\) In 1921 almost 31% inhabitants of the Czech lands were ethnic Germans and 1% ethnic Poles (Drbohlav et al. 2009). In 1931 the mother tongue of inhabitants of Poland was in 10.1% Ukrainian, 8.6% Yiddish or Hebrew, 3.8 % Russian, 3.1 % Belarusian and 2.3% German. By 1920 the share of Hungarian nationals was 89.6%, Germans accounted for 6.9% and Slovaks for 1.8 % in Hungary. Other nationals represented 1.5% (Census 1900-2001).

\(^8\) Due to a sudden change of international politics in 1948 (the proclamation of the “cold war”), those movements were stopped but by no means completed in that year. That abrupt discontinuation of population resettlements based on ethnic grounds had a follow-up in various other periods of the post-war history (e.g. massive “family reunion” migration in mid-1950s in Poland).
First, ethnic homogenisation took place. A harsh manifestation of that policy presented ethnic cleansing in 1945-1947. Poland continued it, under the label of repatriation (or family reunion) in the 1950s and 1970s.

Second, despite severe restrictions on emigration, the migration balance continued to be negative. It might be mentioned that the notion of illegal emigration, pertaining to those legitimately travelling abroad who failed to return home in prescribed time, was widely used in that period. Illegal migrants or their relatives were subject to various persecutions or harassments.

Third, the number of emigrants was strongly dependent on internal political cycle. The stronger the political regime, the harder the grip on the outflow (or the opposite). Political upheavals led to massive outflow of people (e.g. linked to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, communist overtake of Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the Prague Spring which lead to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968 or rising of the Solidarity Movement in Poland in 1980 and 1981).

Fourth, occasionally and rather symbolically foreign citizens visited those three countries. A channel common to all CEE countries was international student exchange that gave priority to citizens of the Soviet Union or pro-Soviet countries or compatriots living in other countries. A number of foreign students entered mixed marriages with nationals of a receiving country, which often led to their settlement.

Fifth, pro-communist political asylees from non-communist countries were readily accepted (e.g. Greeks in late 1940s and early 1950s, Chileans after 1973, Palestinians and other Middle East nationals since 1967).

There were also clear differences among the three countries during the socialist period. While Poland displayed a continuous excess of labour supply, the situation in the Czech lands and in Hungary was just the opposite. Shortly after the war the regions of the present Czech Republic, deserted by German ethnic minority (mainly due to post-war deportations), were populated with internal migrants from Slovakia and other parts of Czechia and also with some ‘help’ of the recruited colonists from Bulgaria (who were also present in Hungary). After 1960s the Czech lands were receiving a steady influx of temporary migrant workers from Poland as one of the major suppliers. Vietnam became another important source country of temporary workers, trainees or students; Poles (unlike Czechs and Hungarians) were involved not only in regular migration related to temporary employment (e.g. in Czechoslovakia or Hungary) but also, especially in the 1980s, in petty trade performed under the guise of tourism. Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary belonged to major destinations of Polish petty traders. Circular mobility of this kind of Polish nationals gave rise in the 1980s to a massive phenomenon known as incomplete migration.

The final distinct period in the development of the migration situation in CEE starts with a transition from a socialist economy to market economy. The transition appears to have had a tremendous impact on migration in that part of Europe. However, there has been no universal pattern and mechanism of that transition. Countries of the Central and Eastern Europe are not fully and equally comparable with respect to their economic heritage of the communist system and approaches to the systemic changes. Above all, those countries

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9 Nearly all Germans living in CEE countries were deported to Germany. In the three countries in the focus of this report there were, for instance, “exchanges” of Hungarian and Slovak minority groups between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and Polish, Belarusian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian minority groups between Poland and the Soviet Union.

10 Typically, incomplete migration involved so-called false tourists who were short-term (often on seasonal basis) irregular workers and whose strategy was to transfer within a relatively short time as much as possible of their foreign earnings to a household in the country of origin. Because of much lower costs of living in the home country, this enabled those migrants to substantially increase the purchasing power of their (very low) remuneration in a foreign country (Jaźwińska, Okólski 2001).
followed different models of socialist economy. Hungary and Poland are the examples of countries, where the development of the socialist economy resulted in a kind of free-market and command-type economy amalgam in the 1970s and 1980s\textsuperscript{11}. In contrast, the economy of Czechoslovakia closely followed the classical centrally-planned and directed model of economy (Dorenbos 1999).

The comparison between the three countries is also challenging from the perspective of philosophy of the transition to the market economy: with Hungary’s application of a gradual approach followed by serious transition shock, Poland’s application of a ‘big bang’ (‘shock therapy’) approach and the Czech Republic application of a mélange of both. Nevertheless, the results of the transition process have been equally significant and far-reaching, though not quite the same, in all three countries. Probably, the most important outcome of that change was entering a phase of fast economic growth in the 1990s, intensifying economic co-operation with the West and ultimately in 2004 the accession to the European Union (EU).

It should also be noticed that at dawn of the transition, the three countries were in quite different economic situation. In Hungary and, to lesser extent, the Czech Republic, the final decade of the centrally planned economy could be seen as a period of stagnation whereas in Poland as a period of deep crisis (especially, after the martial law was introduced in 1981), with a rapid decline in real wages, high inflation, reduction of subsidies and imports and decrease in consumption. However, all countries entered the transition period with labour markets in a rather confusing state of full employment, labour misallocations and pseudo labour shortages.

Throughout the transitions from a socialist to a capitalist system, the excess demand for labour and overemployment were replaced by surpluses of labour and shortages of jobs. Consequently, unemployment emerged and grew, and market forces started to determine the mechanisms of selection of workers. Thus, the transition meant the reallocation of labour across enterprises, occupations, sectors and regions (with high regional variance) (Dorenbos 1999), which led at different phases of the transition to the appearance of ‘new spaces’ or ‘new attraction poles’ in the CEE economies. This, in turn, seemed to have given an impetus to labour migration within the region and the inflow of workers from third countries.

The current migration reality, namely since 1990, is our main research subject in this report. What is common for all countries under consideration is that the ‘natural’ all-European ‘migration cycle’ was distorted by artificial migration regimes imposed upon their populations by communist governments. What happened before in the groups of countries, which suppose to be front-runners (‘old immigration countries’: France, Great Britain, Germany, Austria and few other) and their followers (Southern European countries) is crucial to understand why those who spent more than 40 years aside are lagging behind.

The Southern countries have emerged with their ‘immigration attraction’ in 1970s and 1980s, which made the transition from emigration to immigration countries possible but not necessarily led to ethnically differentiated inflow of migrants. That was feasible initially thanks to return migration. In fact, the change of migration status had happened at the end of 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, which overlapped with the commencement of political and structural changes in CEE countries. This means that Central and Eastern Europeans to some extent had fuelled the change of migration status of the Southern Countries. Thus another set of questions might be put here as follows: Who are or will be the migrants whose contribution to the change in the countries of interest in this report (namely the Czech Republic, Hungary

\textsuperscript{11} In Hungary market-oriented reforms were introduced in 1968. In Poland one can find the existence of natural economy, small entrepreneurship and also an early introduction of market-oriented reforms.
and Poland)? Will they be comparable to those observed in ‘old’ and ‘new’ immigration countries of Europe? What will be the likely forms of migration of those persons?12

The characteristics of the performance of various countries in the continental migration panorama has brought the concept of ‘migration status change’ into in-depth attention in the IDEA project and has encouraged us to answer the question about the status of CEE countries. This raises the question on uniformity or peculiarity of migration characteristics of each of the CEE countries taken into consideration, which (as noted earlier) have started becoming new destinations for immigrants.

What is crucial for this report: it is not only comparative description but also explanatory understanding the causation of each country’s contemporary migration transition. We need to assess the importance of a certain set of variables responsible for this process. We need to look at the causes in combination. John Stuart Mill called this type of causation ‘chemical’ because the effect of any condition depends on the presence or absence of other conditions. Thanks to this exercise we may build a substantive knowledge on migration transition of CEE. This is well seen while we look at the dynamic of inflow of immigrants in the certain period of time and one can compare effects of critical moments, general for each of analysed CEE such as communism breakdown in 1989, the accession to the European Union in 2004 and membership in the Schengen Zone since 2007. Also the economic situation of early 1990s can be crucial for different aspects of immigrants’ inflow.

Migration research trends in the countries of CEE seem to some extent converge each other and seem distinctly differ from those of Western Europe, especially in the period of 1948-2004. Up until 1989 the population movements were strongly subordinate to political factor (Okólski 2008). This also means that although the migration research had not been forbidden in the communism times, it was almost impossible to conduct them without data sources and funding which were politically regulated. Since that book deals mostly with post-1989 period we would not concentrate much on the pre-transition period. However it would be good to look, in brief, at the preceding period of 1989 as it may translate research approaches in 1990s. Although countries in question had experienced a lot of emigration and immigration fluxes just after 2nd WW period, there was very little research devoted to those phenomena up until 1980s. Post-1945 period was, for predominantly ideological reasons, a domain of historians (Iglicka 2007). Only recently, in the period of systemic transition, the migration studies started encompassing other disciplines: sociology, political sciences, demography, law and also catching retrospectives of the past.

Since the political upheaval in 1989 the situation has changed. A new political, economic and social reality framed the new situation in the migration research. Krystyna Iglicka even argues that the research had been influenced by certain national paradigms and ‘hidden’ national agendas on the one hand, and ‘hidden’ international agendas supported by the foreign financial aid on the other hand (2007: 12). Those national paradigms had been shaped by migration histories of each country. For instance in Poland the national paradigms of 1990s and 2000s have been shaped by anathema of emigration.

The era of systemic transition in the CEE can be also divided into phases in the field of migration research: early 1990s - a phase of explanatory studies; second half of 1990s phase of more sophisticated studies and third, last phase of solid, complex research: post-EU enlargement (Kicinger & Weinar 2007).

Early 1990s is the phase of explanatory studies leading to ‘grasping the migration picture’. It was mostly the period of monitoring migration movements and new developments, mostly on demand of international organisations (Council of Europe, OECD, IOM), who, to some extent, reflected the fears of Western governments of sudden influx of Central and

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12 In dealing with those questions we will refer to two other comparative reports prepared within the framework of IDEA (see Arango et al. 2009 and Fassmann, Reeger 2008).
Eastern Europeans, enhanced by rapid political, social and economic changes in their countries. International organisations encouraged and supported CEE researchers to develop new areas of migration research. For example International Organisation on Migration in 1993 funded research project in Poland to study the new phenomena of transit migration and latter (together with Hungary and Ukraine) irregular migration.

In mid-1990s the era of more sophisticated studies had started, the era of in-depth inquiries into causes and consequences of on-going migration movements. This had also brought totally new research approaches, such as ethno survey, mostly applied in the Polish conditions (Jaźwinska, Łukowski & Okólski 1997) and enhanced studies on irregular migration based on Delphi method mostly applied in the Czech Republic. The ethno survey research approach had helped to discover an emigration phenomenon of the systemic transition, which in fact turned into migration theory, developed as ‘incomplete migration’ (Jaźwinska & Okólski 2001) and its special ‘face’: seasonal migrations (Kaczmarczyk & Łukowski 2004; Kępińska 2008). The second half of 1990s brought also advanced studies on immigration in CEE countries. The research conducted in Poland revealed the phenomenon of ‘shuttle mobility’ from former Soviet Republics, especially from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. The period had also brought an inflow of rather exotic foreigners for this part of Europe: Vietnamese and Chinese. As Iglicka (2007) argues ‘their arrival takes all forms of inflow, from illegal entry, temporary stay and arranged marriages to the setting-up a business and permanent settlement’ (2007: 17). Second half of 1990s is also time for commencement of studies of refugees and repatriates. This period in fact brought in general terms in CEE countries opening balance publications, regular collecting of statistical data and dedicated studies capturing both macro and microsocial perspectives both in terms of in- and outflows.

The post-EU-enlargement phase has brought more advanced approaches but also new openings in migration research in Central and Eastern European countries. The countries in question converged more in research in terms of research on inflow, immigration (and IDEA project is a very good example of it) and differentiated in terms of research on outflow, emigration. This happened because of rapid and dynamic post-accession population movements which have been taking place in fact only from Poland. Though, this phenomenon has preoccupied Polish researchers with questions whether the post-accession emigration from Poland differs somehow from those of former waves (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009). However, Agnieszka Fihel, Pawel Kaczmarczyk and Marek Okólski (2006) made an effort to look into mobility of ‘new Europeans’ (all countries of CEE) in last three years, capturing also pre-accession period. Their analyses included all countries of CEE regions but Polish case was analysed most fully. The study is of particular importance because the authors not only presented the available and limited data sources but also referred the situation to the migration theories and concepts. The study encompasses economic, social, demographic and political perspectives.

The accession of CEE countries to the EU have brought new research opportunities mostly relating to the consequences and impacts of both outflows and inflows on labour market and society and studies of selected forms of migrations and groups of migrants, e.g. high skilled.

Migration research in Hungary has principally been confined to important migration occurrences experienced as a consequence mainly of historical events or periods. Following WWII emigration research has been limited and strictly controlled in Hungary, even the

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13 Triangulation of multi-techniques such as: monographic, descriptive study, quantitative survey and in-depth interviews both in sending and receiving locations. However, the method was re-adjusted to the Polish conditions, only sending local units had been studied.

14 The approach adapted in the study was modelled on the project concerned migrations of Mexicans to the USA (Massey. et al. 1987).
statistical report of the Central Statistical Office on Hungarian emigration during and following the 1956 revolution was published 35 years later (KSH 1991). Retrospective research on the emigration prior the transition was also scarce (e.g. Puskas 1996). Fully in line with the description of Iglicka (2007) cited above national paradigms were essential in the early phase of post-transition Hungarian migration research. On the turn of the democratic transition huge refugee inflows of ethnic Hungarians from Romania defined Hungarian migration research. Mushrooming publications discussed the new refugee regime and emerging foreign population that were collected in edited books (e.g. Sik 1992, Adelmann, Sik & Tessényi 1994, Sik, Tóth & Fullerton 1995). That was accompanied by large scale naturalisation and its political connotations (Tóth 1997). The understanding of the occurred migration and the established regime was the next step of research summarized among others by Sik, Tóth & Fullerton (1997). The early intensive drives of the increasing migration have been vanished; and migration research became more sophisticated. Main sources of migration to Hungary until present were ethnic Hungarians from the adjacent countries, principally from Romania. In addition to the Eastern European strong co-ethnic return migrant population in the neighbouring countries Hungary has also a vital and distinctive Asian – Chinese – transnational migrant community. The differences in the basic migration pattern of the two immigrant population are evident and strongly influence the migration routes, effects and outcomes in Hungary. The circular character of both the ethnic and the transnational Chinese migration has been described. Studies on various migrant groups like Chinese (Nyíri 2002, 2007), ethnic Hungarians (Gödri & Tóth 2005; Fox 2007, Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox & Grancea 2006) explained the migration patterns, increasing relevance of networks and the immigrants role on the Hungarian labour market. The crucial role of change in the push factors of emigration from Romania over time was extensively discussed in the literature (Bodó 1996, Kiss 2008). Issues like illegal migration (Juhász & Szaitz 2007) and the special role of market places of informal labour exchange (Sik 2006) were also essential part of the research. Political relevance of liberalisation of the access of the ethnic Hungarians to the Hungarian labour market and the enlargement process of the EU raised the relevant research on economic drives of migration and migration expectations to Hungary (Örkény 2003, Hárs 2004, 2008). Maturity of the 2 decades of migration raised also the integration of the migrant population, a comprehensive research has been devoted to the schooling of foreign children (Feischmidt & Nyíri 2006). Important influence on migration research has been exercised by various sources and research founds. As summarized in the introduction of the Hungarian country report (Hárs et al 2009) the puzzle of the migration development of the past two decades turned to be a rather marginal topic for Hungary. Research and data collection was considered to be a field of study with minor relevance, due to the limited size of migration. The research project of the IDEA offered a chance to raise the questions that were recently set aside and rejected in Hungary following the early enthusiasm connected to migration. By means of the approach and methodology of the IDEA research the somewhat outdated understanding of migration flows and character in Hungary has been challenged and reinterpreted.

As in the Polish and Hungarian case, Czech migration research before 1989 has been almost non-existent due to political sensitiveness of the topic. From the beginning of 1990s there has been a lack of interest on the public and administrative sides, small experience in the given scientific/research fields (in both theoretical and practical levels) and absence of detailed and reliable migration data. All this contributed to a fact that research into international in the Czech Republic has been rather limited in 1990s. In contrast Polish and

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15 Although that is beyond the scope of our discussion, it has to be mentioned that existing emigration publishers extensively published research on Hungarian emigration and in the 1980s largely supported the publication of the dissidents as well.
Hungarian reality, Czech migration research had not been influenced by any national paradigms or ‘hidden agendas’ (cp Iglicka 2007).

Exceptional early studies focused primarily upon three topics – transit migration movements (e.g. IOM 1994), real and potential emigration towards the West (Drobohlav 1993, Marešová, Drobohlav & Lhotská 1996) and re-emigration of Czech compatriots from Ukraine (e.g. Valášková 1992, Brouček, Hrníčko, Uhřek & Valášková 1992, Brouček, Hrníčko, Uhřek & Valášková 1993, Janská & Drobohlav 1999), Belarus (Uhřek, Valášková & Brouček 1997) and Kazakhstan (Valášková 1998). In the second half of the 1990s more general migration studies appeared which above other aspects tackled the relation between migration and transformation (Drobohlav 1996, Marešová 1999, Horáková 1999). More attention started being paid to refugees (Poradna pro integraci 1998, Drobohlav 1999).

Since the late 1990s, with the growing numbers of immigrants in the Czech Republic studies analysing integration/adaptation process of migrants (especially their economic integration) appeared (Drobohlav, Lupták, Janská & Šelepová 1999, Drobohlav, Lupták, Janská & Bohuslavová 1999, Drobohlav, Lupták, Janská & Bohuslavová 1999). Simultaneously, research on ethnological aspects of migrants’ integration started (Černík 2000, Maroušek 2000, or Vindiš 2000). Nevertheless, most of these studies were rather descriptive in their character and were not leaned on profound conceptual or theoretical framework. Also, as early as mid-1990s irregular migrants became a new study topic (along with their growing importance in the Czech economy) (e.g. Kroupa, Horáková, Šmolcnop, Nesvadvbová, Rudolf & Štěpánek 1997, Drobohlav 1997).

In the new millennium, migration research has been activated – more research centers and specialist from various social science fields have become involved. Also, a broader variety of topics (including transnationalism – Szaló 2007, ethnic economies – Nekorjak 2006, Roma migration – Uhřek 2007, integration patterns of various immigrant groups – Uhřek 2003, Šišková 2001, or integration of migrant youth and children – Drobohlav, Černík & Dzúrová 2005) stared being researched into. The current era brings about a more sophisticated research in terms of methods, sample size and sampling methods, and links to migration concepts and theories (Leontyieva & Vojtková 2007, Rákokzyová, Trbola, Vyhlidal & Kofroň 2007, Drobohlav 2008, Drobohlav & Dzúrová 2007).

Finally, it has to be emphasised that migration research in the CEE countries was usually orientated towards national contexts. Only rarely it was put into broader CEE context, and if so, usually only particular aspects (e.g. brain drain, or real/potential emigration) have been compared (for more complex CEE comparison see Wallace 1998 or IOM 2004). Due to all above mentioned facts this synthesis report represents a unique study because it primarily concentrates upon a complex and direct comparison of immigration patterns among the three CEE countries.

The further chapters of this report inquire into various aspects of CEE migration in the period of their political and economic transition. The four main parts that follow deal with the following issues.

Part 2 describes and discusses data sources, categories and definitions of migrants, main trends and main structure of migrations in CEE and their perspectives for comparisons. The data used contain retrospective information, enabling us to give a detailed description of the flows and stocks in comparative perspective. The chapter considers general limitations and advantages of the use of data on migration.

Part 3 focuses on the determinants and factors of migration in the CEE region with special attention to the demand for foreign labour and the determinants of irregularity, including the influence of the underground economy. The chapter also considers other structural (e.g. demographic situation) and contextual factors.
Part 4 evaluates the development of migration policies in the countries under question in terms of periodicity and stages, institutional structures, selected policies (admission, labour market, repatriation, naturalisation, asylum, integration and neighbourhood).

Part 5 considers migration impacts on and integration outcomes in the CEE countries.

Finally, in conclusions we try to evaluate the key approach of the IDEA project, namely the conceptual framework of this study. Subsequently, it gives us an overview of the main conclusions which may be derived from the analysis, especially convergences and divergences among the countries in question are tackled. In addition, conclusions include policy recommendations related to all three countries.
2 Immigrant flows and stocks in Central and Eastern Europe – the Czech, Hungarian and Polish experience

Ágnes Hárs

2.1 Definition and statistical deficiency
Migration is a new and developing feature of the post-communist Central and Eastern European region (CEE). To describe the migration flows and the migrant population in question it is unavoidable to clarify what we mean by migrants, how we can understand the term and evaluate the statistics used. In sum, we have to define who the migrants are whom we want to measure. Statistics have substantial deficiencies, and in consequence, we have to clarify the group of migrants we can measure and be aware that some relevant part of migration can not be captured by statistics.

The composition and characteristics of migrant population differ by country. Temporary, transit or commuter migrants as well as irregulars constitute a large part of migrant population in the Central and Eastern European countries. This population may stay beyond the scope of available statistics. Being confined to the statistical coverage of migrants, we need to emphasize the weight of the definition and description. A narrower or broader definition of “immigrants” based on ‘statistical facts’ or the ‘immigrant realities’ would certainly influence the analyses of immigrant population in CEE countries. Immigration and return migration is also covered by the definition that is applied in some of the countries in CEE, especially in Poland. Different kinds of immigrants should not be omitted due statistical deficiency and we should be very precise about statistical coverage.

2.2 Availability, quality and relevance of data sources
The problem of definition and measurement of migration is general and well known (cf. Poulain, Perrin & Singleton (2006), Fassmann, Reeger & Sievers 2009, or outcomes of the PROMINSTAT project16). (i) Data on international migration generally refer mainly to regular migration. (ii) Migration data comes from different data sources which cover different groups and are not comparable and hardly standardised within the country. (iii) Sometimes, data from the same source is not comparable due to the changes of definitions and/or data collection over time (based usually on administrative sources and defined by changing laws or data collection regulations). (iii) Data are not easily comparable due to country features of data collection and statistics.

The countries of the Central and Eastern European region have encountered the difficulty to define and measure new phenomenon and develop statistics while migration patterns were changing considerably. The statistics were challenged by the transition character, new categories like circular migration or large share of irregular migration. In addition, regional characteristics cover various national peculiarities and differences. Definition and measurement of migrants are strongly connected to regulations of both development of national regulations on migration and adjustment to the EU enlargement process.

In the three countries in question, migrants are basically understood as foreign citizens staying for a given purpose for some period in the country. Foreign born population might be seen as an alternative and relevant way to measure migrant population, however, this concept is not used in the CEE countries. The minimum length of stay that constitutes foreigners to be included in flow and stock statistics may also differ across countries and over time. According to some definitions, nationals returning are also immigrants and in some cases they are also

16For outcomes of the PROMINSTAT project see www.prominstat.eu
covered by immigration (flow) data. Emigration data in the three CEE countries suffer from the general problem of systematic underestimation and it is much lower than the real situation. This fact badly influences net migration data since emigration is fully unrealistic; return migration of nationals is also missing or unreliable.

To sum up, the transition character of the CEE countries, their continuous adaptation to new EU regulations, and the development of the relevance of migration data added to the general deficiency of migration statistics. In the communist period, statistics registered emigration and immigration of citizens and foreigners over well controlled borders, and data on contemporary migration are hardly comparable. Consequently, the time horizon of the data is limited given that new phenomena and characteristics of migration and corresponding migration statistics are available since the democratic transition of the region had taken place.

Data sources and quality of data used for statistics are different in the three countries of CEE. To some extent in connection with the relevance of migration in the particular country, migration data is available and comprehensive, but with quality deficiency. The Czech statistics on migration has been improving, in coincidence with the expansion of migration, while official statistics (in relation to immigration) in Poland are of poor quality, and in many instances, their range is considered inadequate. In Hungary, data was rich at the early period of strong immigration in the 1990s and quality has somewhat worsened over time.17

Nevertheless, to quantify the number of migrants we use various data sources that cover different segments of migrants and give various – and somewhat limited – information on migrant groups covered. The definitions of migrants and the statistics aiming at these groups are mostly based on administrative registration data (of the Alien Police) with the limitation of the secondary statistical utilization.18 Labour migration data comes mostly from the Ministry of Labour. Survey type data (e.g. Labour Force Survey) face the problem of small sample size due to the small scale of migration and sampling methods insufficient to catch a considerable share of migrant population. There is some inconsistency in the data: administrative data are strongly connected with the aim of the data collection and the regulations beyond that. EU enlargement considerably changed statistics, changing definitions (changing categories prior and following the enlargement, data coverage of work permit statistics related to the regulation of the free movement of labour, etc.). Moreover, irregular migration is mostly hidden for all statistical data sources.

Statistical data concerning international migration (flows and stocks) comes basically from four types of sources: (1) residence permits database, (2) population register, (3) population census, and (4) work permits database on employment of migrants. Some data covering specific aspects may come from additional sources (e.g. trade licence register in the Czech Republic) or from research surveys.

17 The Polish report (Górny et al. 2009) underlines that migration statistics “reflect “artefact” rather than real phenomena. Immigration artefacts are immigration figures that use definitions of migration that hardly capture actual inflows to Poland or of a foreigner’s residence in Poland.” As for Hungary, the Hungarian country report underlines that the reason of worsening quality of data collection is some disinterest of the responsible bodies, supposing the marginal relevance of migration over time, following the lively migration flows and interest in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, worsening quality and extent of statistics is not exceptional. For example, following the large migration flows of the early 20th century data collection was stopped in the war period and the following political situation and never has been revitalized due to moderate flows and interest in collecting detailed data. The Czech statistics developed, on the other hand, with slightly more policy interest in migration and covers a wide range of foreign population in the migration statistics. For comparison the 2007 (half year) data will be shown in Figure 2.1.

18 Since the primary purpose of administrative data is registration according to the administrative purpose, detailed statistical data very much depends on the focus of the authorities’ data collection; consequently important socio-demographic, labour market, or qualification data is not systematically collected.
(1) Foreign resident population based on records of issued residence permits (by the Alien Police or Office for Foreigners in each country) is the most common data on international migration. As for the Czech data, since 1993 (dissolution of Czechoslovakia) there has been relatively consistent information available about registered foreigners (stocks). Migration flows statistics produced by the Czech Statistical Office used to cover only those migrants whose place of permanent residence was changed. In 2001 an important change in the definition of population (following the UN definition) and, consequently, in the definition of an immigrant took place - the definition has been extended. Since 2001, foreigners have been counted as immigrants not only if changing place of permanent residence, but also already after 1 year of residence. Subsequently, the international migration flow data is incompatible before and after 2001. The Czech methodology of flow statistics is also hardly comparable to data of other countries since coverage of statistics is significantly wider than that in other CEE countries. Hungarian foreign resident population comprises foreign citizens having a residence permit, immigration permit or a resettlement permit with some changes over time. In practice, the residence permit statistics (flows and stocks) comprise foreigners staying over a year while data on shorter stay are not reported for the purpose of statistics. As for Poland, the register of cases concerning permits to settle covers applications, decisions and issues of permits to settle and register of cases concerning residence permits for a fixed (specified) period covers applications, decisions and issues of residence permits for a specified period. Data do not permit to say what is the stock (or flow) of the migrant resident population at a given time.

(2) Population register get the data on foreigners from the Alien Police database. In case of the Czechs the Information System of Registration of Inhabitants (ISEO)\(^{19}\) of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (not openly available for the public or researchers but several data is given to the Czech Statistical Office). It was gradually interconnected and since 2005 they closely cooperate. Hungarian data of Central Population Register (CPR) covers resident population, prior to 2003 only refugees and those with immigration permit, since 2004 those with settlement permit, and following 1st May 2004 only part of the EU (EEA) citizens (if they stay with residence permit). Following July 2007 foreigners with the right of free movement registered to stay over 3 months.\(^{20}\) In Poland data comes from the Local Offices; a person who arrives in Poland is obliged to register in a local administrative unit as a ‘temporary or permanent resident’ (but oftentimes they fail to register). Such registration creates an entry in the central population register and consequently appears in official statistics. There are no official data on the share of foreigners in the Register.\(^{21}\) Those who are registered for longer than three months (either for temporary or

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\(^{19}\) The ISEO registers Czech citizens and foreigners (EU citizens and third country nationals) on visa/permits for more than 3 months. However, EU-citizens in general do not have the obligation to have a residence permit, hence, not all residing EU citizens are recorded there.

\(^{20}\) The latter Hungarian population register data following July 2007 refers to similar population as the Czech statistics following 2001 offers and will make some comparisons possible.

\(^{21}\) The available administrative official statistics on emigration from Poland and immigration into Poland comprise individuals who either cancel their permanent residency in Poland (emigration) or acquire permanent residency in Poland (immigration). These statistics suggest, for example, a total of 35,480 emigrants from Poland and 14,995 immigrants into Poland in 2007, and do not distinguish between citizenships (Polish and non-Polish). Therefore, return migrants may be captured as immigrants (in the case if they were previously classified as emigrants, i.e. cancelled their permanent residency in Poland) or not (if they did not cancel their residency in Poland – this concerns the great majority of recent emigration from Poland). The number of registered emigrants increased dramatically in 2006 (by more than 100 per cent with respect to 2005, while in 2005 and 2004 there was no increase with respect to previous years) – this may be attributed to tax purposes (de-registration in Poland in order not to pay taxes in Poland after legal changes), and does not reflect real migratory phenomenon. This in turn supposes a larger number of potential return migrants which may be captured in immigrant statistics (2007
permanent stay) are submitted automatically to the General Electronic System of Population Registration (PESEL) where one may find, among other basic socio-demographic characteristics, also information on citizenship and exact information on documents related to conditions of stay of a foreigner (if registered). However, the data from PESEL is not available for analysis (such statistics would be dubious for numerous reasons, one of them being that a person leaving Poland does not lose his PESEL). Moreover, many foreigners fail to register, so the data source does not supply complete information on the foreign population in Poland.

(3) Census gives detailed cross-section information on the national and foreign population at a given time, and it includes foreign and foreign-born citizens. Prior to 2001, however, Census data of new immigrant CEE countries on migration are poor or missing, and in consequence comparison is not possible. Even the 2001 census has some deficiency in data coverage. The Czech Census included foreigners with permanent residence permits as well as with visas for a period exceeding 90 days, nevertheless only 60 per cent of those meant to be counted were in fact enumerated (cp. Drbohlav & Lachmanová 2008). Similarly, the Hungarian census of 2001 covers foreign citizens residing in Hungary for more than three months and covers resident population, i.e. those who actually lived and could be contacted at a given address regardless of whether they were registered there or not. Considerable immigrant groups were obviously missing, mainly the less qualified immigrants failed to be interviewed. The 2002 population census in Poland comprises persons permanently resident who were either present or absent less than two months, or absent due to stay abroad, and persons resident temporarily (for more than 2 months) and having permanent residence somewhere else in Poland.

(4) Data on work permits are collected by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in all the three countries and cover foreigners according to the effective regulations of the employment of foreigners.

Based on the above data, basic migration trends and characteristics of the CEE countries will be discussed in the following sections.

2.3 Migration flows
In most cases the immigration data covers foreign citizens but in some cases the data comprises both migration inflow of foreigners as well as nationals, e.g. in case of Czech data. Due to the deficiency of the emigration data, net migration flow data would be somewhat misleading. Because of that fact only inflow data will be used to describe migration flows (see Figure 2.1). A continuous and slowly increasing inflow of long-term immigration could be observed in each country. In Hungary a sudden inflow of foreign citizens, mainly from Romania in the early 1990s was followed by a drop and moderate steady state inflow, similar to the Czech or Polish data, over the 1990s. Following the year 2000, immigration to the Czech Republic mirrors rapid increase, partly due to a change in statistics (foreigners with visas/permits over 90 days staying at least for 1 year in the country were newly included) but partly due to fast acceleration in immigration.\(^{22}\) Polish and Hungarian data reflect the regulation following 2000 and the enlargement of the EU and the changing rules of registration of EU citizens that likely underestimates migration based on registration.

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\(^{22}\) For comparison: a similar data coverage of Hungarian migration of those over 90 days would result in jump of immigration data in 2007 as it is shown in Figure 2.1 (based on population register data as indicated in subsection 2.2 above).
Return migration of nationals is of most interest in the case of Poland, where emigration in the entire period of 1990s and 2000s and especially in the EU post-accession period was the largest, while the Czech and Hungarian emigration was among the lowest over CEE\textsuperscript{23}. The emigration case of Poland is of particular importance and differs Poland from other CEE countries presented in this book as being the most dynamic and the highest in scale and very differentiated in its structure and patterns both in pre- and post-accession periods. Despite of the lack of comprehensive data some important trend on the emigration and return migration of Poles will be shown below. (The other two countries with low emigration experience and poor data availability will not be discussed in this respect.)

There was a considerable emigration form Poland with sharply increasing character. While in the period of systemic transition short-term moves from Poland predominated, post-accession time started blooming with extensions of stays abroad (Figure 2.2.).

\textsuperscript{23} According to emigration potential survey data or the immigration office data of the UK, the main destination of the CEE post-accession emigration proves the evidence.
Figure 2.2 Emigrants from Poland staying abroad between 2-12 months and longer than 12 months, in ’000

Source: calculation from data of Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2008 based on the Polish Labour Force Survey data.

Jed another effort to count the scale of the post-accession outflow from Poland (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2009: 74) is shown in chart 2.3. As a staring point it took a stock of temporary emigrants being abroad more than two months: on the 20th May 2002 (census day) 786,000 were abroad; on 31st December 2004 1000,000; on 31st December 2006 1950,000. Herewith, net increase of temporary emigrants in 2005 and 2006 was 950,000 (1950,000-1000,000= 950,000). A net increase of temporary emigrants in the period from 20th of May 2002 till 31st of December 2004 was 1000,000 – 786,000 = 214,000, within it: till 30th of April 2004 55 per cent of 214,000 = 118,000 and since May 1st 2004: 214,000 – 118,000 = 96,000. This means that net emigration in the period 1.05.2004-31.12.2006 was 55,000. That is, total net post-accession outflow from Poland is 1100,000 (950,000 + 96,000 + 55,000 = 1101,000)
Public statistics of Poland suffers from lack of data on return migration of Polish people. Although census of population data seems to be the best source of information on return migration, it has also a lot of deficiencies. But the analysis of data from 1989-2002 shows that inflow of immigrants to Poland had been mostly determined by incoming Poles but also those having dual citizenship, their share established 81.5 per cent of the flow (Fihel 2009). Moreover, annually published data based on electronic register PESEL also, to some extent, confirms this finding which unfortunately cannot be directly proved. But there are some circumstances which may sustain this hypotheses. The trend showing an inflow of immigrants as divided into country of previous residence, indicates that that they are mostly return migrants, for example in 2006 throughout last five years the number of incomers from the UK had increased 547 per cent, from Germany 48 per cent and from Ireland 5175 per cent (Kępińska 2007). In the case of Poland having the biggest post-accession outflow in the CEE region, the return flows seem to play an importance in the migration statistics. In spite of the lack of (reliable) data some indication (presumptive evidence of Polish CSO) of the scale of return migration of Poles may be found in the official statistics on immigration – for example, the number (and share) of ‘immigrants’ coming from the UK – the main post-accession emigration destination for Poles – increased in 2006 and 2007, in comparison to previous years (the official figures are strongly underestimated, however). Some estimates may be also provided by the results of the LFS ad hoc module conducted in the second quarter of 2008. These results suggest that nationals returning to Poland constituted at least 78.5 per cent of the total population of immigrants (Grabowska-Lusińska et al. 2009).

2.4 Stock of migrant population

Migration trend will be pictured by the continuously increasing stock of migrant population. (Unfortunately, data series on Polish migration stock is missing - see Figure 2.4). Different statistics mirror diverse migration trends, although a gradual increase is obvious in both countries where data was available. The Czech data cover foreign permanent residents and also long-term resident foreigners (staying longer than 3 months). Migration has been accelerating according to both data. The Hungarian data cover only foreign permanent residents (somewhat looser definition applied than in case of the Czech permanent resident population).
Continuous increase in the stock of migrant population although without any acceleration is the trend in Hungary (cp. left hand panel of Figure 2.4 on stock of foreigners). In the Czech Republic the stock of foreigners experienced a fast increase. The share of foreign population compared to national population reached nearly 4 per cent in 2007 and has about doubled since the millennium. However, the coverage of statistics has changed; that makes a comparison to data prior 2001 impossible. The effect or indifference of the statistical change on fast increasing migration data 2001 has not been specified. Whatever discrepancy in the statistics over time exists, however, the increase was essential, the Czech data show a fast increase and speed up in migration. To sum up, the recent years, especially following the accession to the EU, constitute a new period in migration of CEE with different speed and increase of migration.

Note: Czech Republic: foreigners with permanent residence permits (until 2006: permanent residence gained after 10 years of residence, however shorter for family members; since 2006 after 5 years). Foreigners with long-term residence (prior to 2000 it means foreigners with permits for a stay longer than 180 days, since 2000 it generally means foreigners with visas for the period exceeding 90 days and with long-term residence permits - issued after 1 year). Hungary: Settlement permit: prior 2002 after 5 years, following 2002 after 3 years of stay (with residence and subsistence, shorter for family reason) and for up to 1 year (drop in Hungarian data between 2000 and 2001 due to data correction). Poland: census data of 2002 only.

Figure 2.4 Migration stock in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 1993-2007

2.5 Geographic characteristics of immigrants
Geographic origins of immigrants in CEE countries are assigned mainly to different neighbouring and/or former Post-Soviet countries. Some long distance migrants from Asian sending countries (China and Vietnam) constitute also important migrant groups in these countries. In addition, citizens from some developed EU 15 countries and the USA form an important fraction of immigrant population in the region (cp Figure 2.5).
The main sending country for the Czech Republic is Ukraine, with an extensively increasing inflow. Russia and Moldova (other countries in the Post-Soviet region) send a
smaller share of immigrants, however increasing over time. Vietnamese form a considerable size of Asian community together with Chinese, and recently also Mongolians. Due to the common recent history, the share of Slovaks among immigrants is considerable, although decreasing. Some similarities are obvious when looking at Hungary. The main immigrant source is the neighbouring Romania (with the majority of immigrants being ethnic Hungarians). This flow, however, shows a decreasing share, while nearly all the immigration of other sending neighbouring region shows some increase compared to the previous decade of mid-1990s and mid-2000s. The important Asian communities consist mainly of Chinese and a small number of Vietnamese, and are increasing slightly. In Poland the largest share of immigrants are also the Ukrainians, at an increasing share, and others from the neighbouring regions (Byelorussians or Russians). Vietnamese represent the Asian migrant community.

2.6 Demographic characteristics of migrant population
The age profile of the migrant population is rather young in the Czech Republic and Hungary and elder in Poland in view of the data of the last Census and also the 2007 population register. Especially the latter shows age differences and a high share of elder age (40-64) migrants in Poland while in the Czech Republic and Hungary the share of young migrants of 25-36 is considerable. According to the age profile the Czech and Hungarian migrant population reminds a young migrant population. (Cp. Figure 2.6)

![Figure 2.6](image_url)

**Note:** Census data for the Czech Republic and Hungary refers to the year 2001, for Poland it refers to 2002. Register data refers to 2007 in all three countries.

**Figure 2.6** Breakdown of total and foreign population by age groups according to the last census and 2007 register data, in per cent
Source: own elaboration based on Census and population and migrant data, Eurostat on-line database.

The share of women is by and large equal to the share of men among migrants in Hungary and Poland, while in the Czech Republic the share of women among foreign citizens is considerably lower than that of men. The shares of women significantly differ by age groups: in elder age groups (over 65) the share of women is high while in the active age groups (25-64) the share of immigrant men is higher than in other age groups. The Czech migrant population has the character of the “traditional labour migrant population” with a high share of men. Especially the 2007 population register data show these characteristics of migration (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Share of women in the migrant population according to the last census and 2007 register data, in per cent

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<th>0-14</th>
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<th>25-39</th>
<th>40-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Total</th>
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*Note: Census data for the Czech Republic and Hungary refers to the year 2001, for Poland it refers to 2002. Register data refers to 2007 in all three countries. Source: own elaboration based on Census and population and migrant data, Eurostat on-line database.*

2.7 Main purposes of migration

The purpose of migration is mainly economic: work or other economic activity and connected family reunification. In 2006 nearly 40 per cent of the foreign stock in the Czech Republic stayed with the purpose of work, an additional 8 per cent with business licence. In Hungary a high share (50-60 per cent) of the new and renewed resident permits in 2002-2006 were given for the purpose of employment; the share of self employment, entrepreneurship fluctuated around 1-10 per cent, and family reasons were around 13-18 per cent. The share of permits issued with study as purpose of stay ranged from 10 to 15 per cent. The main purpose of immigration to Poland is different, according to ad hoc LFS module of the Polish Central Statistical Office (which has a lot of deficiencies, with the primary being the definition of a migrant which captures post-war reallocation of individuals born outside of the present borders of Poland) - in LFS ad hoc module, 62 per cent of migrants indicated family as the main reason for coming to Poland; 31 per cent studies; and every third job-related reasons. As far as return migrants are concerned, every fifth return migrant declared having returned from work abroad because the time span planned for migration ended. Nearly the same share of people came back when their contract expired. 16 per cent missed family while abroad and decided to return. About 10 per cent came back after seasonal job expired (14 per cent for those who return during last five years). 4 per cent returned after finishing studies abroad.

Looking more in details at the employment of foreigners on work permit basis, labour migration is at an increase in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. The number of work permits is sensitive to labour market developments but work permit regulations also impact the trend.24. Legal labour migration is still at a very low level in Poland. In sum, labour migration in CEE is on the way to use intensively foreign labour to supplement native labour, in particular branches and jobs (see Figure 2.7).

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24 Hungarian work permit data fail to cover the EE 15 citizens who need neither permits nor registration.
In addition to the legal employment, there is sizeable irregular migration of foreigners in CEE countries. Employment of foreigners is considered significant although estimations on the size and share of irregular migrants and irregular foreign labourers significantly differ. Irregular labour migrants come from the same sending regions as the legal ones (from economically less developed countries, for the most part), for short and long-term stays and take mostly labour intensive, demanding, and poorly paid jobs. Irregular migrants mostly work in branches and jobs where most legally registered lower qualified migrants also work. Irregular petty trade across the border (mainly in Poland and to some extent in Hungary), has been an additional economic feature in the region; its relevance is decreasing over time.

The estimated numbers vary from 17,000 to more than 300,000 of irregular/illegal immigrants in the Czech Republic (see Drbohlav et al. 2009 for references). What seems to be realistic though and also supported by data from sending countries is that overall numbers of undocumented migrants in the Czech Republic might be closer to the higher edge of the estimated numbers. Hungarian estimations are careful about the size of irregular labour. It ranges around 100,000, about the size of the legally registered foreigners. The Polish reliable estimations range from 80,000-200,000 which is substantially (depending on the source) more than legal employment (cp Appendix 2 in Górny et al. 2009).

On the Eastern border of the EU many asylum seekers (expecting the acknowledgement of their legal status based on humanitarian causes or due to being victims of civil conflicts) apply for shelter. Asylum seekers often find a first destination in CEE. In some cases asylum seekers are, however, “masked economic migrants” who apply for asylum to legalize their stay if needed. Thus, they are connected to the irregular immigration that has an important, although unknown, size in the region. There is no data or estimates on the size of those asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected and who do not go back to their countries. These people possibly stay or leave for other countries. The numbers of asylum seekers in the given countries are not very high. In time, the number is quite stable in Poland, decreasing in the Czech Republic and since 2004 slightly increasing in Hungary (see Figure 2.8).
2.8 Summary

Migration statistics, with all the deficiencies of the data sources and inconsistencies of data, prove the emerging character of migration in the Central and Eastern European New Immigration Countries. Migration data (and the nature of migration) collected under communism is hardly comparable with the recent migration of the transition period. Consequently, the time horizon of the data is limited given that new phenomena and characteristics of migration and the corresponding migration statistics are available since the democratic transition of the region. Data sources suffer from a lot of deficiencies that are particularly connected to the transition character of the CEE countries, the continuous adaptation to the new European Union regulations and also the different relevance of migration in various countries.

According to statistics, there is a continuous and slowly increasing inflow of long-term immigration over the 1990s and constantly increasing stock of immigrants (excluding Poland). Particularly in the Czech Republic, migration is clearly accelerating whereas Hungary but especially Poland are still before this acceleration phase. Just Poland is typical of strong emigration, with a high share of emigration and return migration of nationals and low level of foreign immigrants and immigrant stock as well as labour migration.

The main purpose of migration is labour or economic activity or trade licence related reasons. An overwhelming majority of immigrants come from a couple of source countries, namely from neighbouring less developed countries (mainly from Ukraine to the Czech Republic or to Poland, and from Romania to Hungary). Another important source region is Asia, with migration from Vietnam mainly to the Czech Republic and also to Poland, and from China primarily to Hungary (but to the other countries as well). In Poland, the legal labour migration is based mainly on employment of highly qualified persons, managers etc. from the most developed countries. In addition to the legal employment, irregular employment is sizable but estimates range. It seems that the activities of irregular migrants are similar to low level jobs of legal migrants in particular countries. The future of migration trend depends, to a large extent, on economic factors (mostly on the labour market situation in the countries concerned) as well as on migration and integration policies of the countries. Differences of various factors across the given three countries explain the differences of the present stage of migration cycle as it is mirrored in statistics. This will be discussed in details in the following chapters of the report.
3 Determinants of migration

Dušan Drbohlav

Following the concept of migration transition from an emigration to immigration country, we can distinguish several migration determinants (drivers) which influence a country’s transition from an emigration phase to immigration phase. As Fassmann and Reeger (2008) put it, these migration drivers can be understood as independent variables steering migration development of a country. For the CEE countries, several migration drivers (or migration determinants) that influenced the countries’ post-1989 transition to immigration destination areas have been identified. Basically, we can find migration drivers of two types – structural and contextual ones. Whereas structural migration drivers represent direct components of a country’s structures (such as economic, demographic), contextual drivers represent various aspects/characteristics of the context in which a country is set and migration takes place.

Primarily, it has to be emphasised that geopolitics matters. Namely, there are two events of crucial importance for fostering the countries’ transition to an immigration stage. First, breakdown of the communist regime in 1989 which among other things opened borders and liberalised migration regimes. Second, the accession of the given countries to the EU in 2004 had a huge impact on migration policy design and conditions of residence of immigrants. Furthermore, there are other geopolitical aspects tied to migration - these are historically built country specific realities. Poland has been exhibiting its national interests via maintaining special, close and friendly relationships with eastern neighbouring countries (Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus) which are excluded from most western institutions (Görny et al. 2009). Due to the historical development (as sketched below), contemporary Hungary has a large pool of co-ethnics residing in countries bordering on Hungary and, at the same time, also serving as dominant source of Hungarian immigration. These ethnic patterns have had an important impact upon the migratory situation and policies of contemporary Hungary (Hárs 2009). The Czech Republic has also very special geopolitical links - to Slovakia. More than 70 years of common history within one Czechoslovak state as well as a significant cultural and linguistic proximity have been the key factors behind a high level of liberalization of migration admissions and labour policy towards Slovakia between 1993 and 2004 (Drbohlav et al. 2009).

3.1. Structural factors
3.1.1. Economic factors
3.1.1.1. Economic development and its characteristic features
In contrast to what was predicted in the West in 1990s (Fassman & Hintermann 1997), migrants from Central and Eastern Europe did not attempt massive movements to Western Europe. Major reasons (see e.g. Wallace, Stola 2001, Zlotnik 1999) for containing of an overwhelming proportion of the region’s newfound international mobility within the region itself included:
- anticipatory controls put in place in member countries of the Schengen agreement area;
- the cost-benefit calculations made by individual migrants, who often indicated that the potentially higher economic benefits associated with travelling to the West from Eastern Europe were not large enough to offset the related greater costs (and risks), and

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25 For example, Poland had successfully delayed the date of introducing visas for eastern neighbouring countries’ citizens, which is clear evidence that not only EU requirements, but also national interests, shape migration policy (Kicinger 2005).
- the existence or rapid development of migration networks in Eastern Europe and a nexus of mutual understanding between migrants with a common post-communist reality.

As a result, a new international migration space emerged in that part of the world, complete with its own sending and receiving countries, specific categories of migrants and specific dynamics and directions of flows (see Okólski 2004, Wallace & Stola 2001).

The Czech Republic, as the most important destination country in the CEE region, attracting by far the biggest numbers of long-term and settlement migrants, along with Poland and Hungary, became a migration pole and a magnet for foreigners – especially those desperately trying to escape (by using various strategies) impoverishment in their home countries.

The main goal of this section is to detect economy related factors that are important for explaining the immigration to the countries in question. Below there is a list of possible and real labour market deficiencies that may function as important (“pull”) factors attracting foreign labour force. In fact, many of them (or their roots) originated long time before during the communist era and in a form of “heritage inertia” (just typical of the CEE post-communist world) have been burdening newly established societies. Reality is rather dynamic and, thus, in some countries or over time some of the given factors have been importantly changing. It is a very simplified picture, somehow only rather indicating possible impact whilst the role of other factors is pretty obvious – see more in table: where you can find if at all and if yes, to which extent the given factors might be found important in the countries of question:
### Table 3.1 Labour market deficiencies of CEEs economies under transition attracting foreign labour force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflexible labour market policy – various disadvantaged groups on the labour market (women with children, youth and elderly, handicapped) and their problematic incorporation into the labour market.</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low motivation to work (not flexible labour contract possibilities/schemes, not enough good quality of re-qualification courses, generous social subsidies, low minimal wage)</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small share of university graduated persons</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational systems versus labour market needs (mismatch between the labour market demand and the supply of apprenticeship and study disciplines and of training programmes, low permeability of educational programs at all levels)</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High taxes put on labour, in general, and income, in particular</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low level of knowledge and skills attained (including foreign languages abilities and entrepreneurial skills) (e.g. a cooperation between educational institutions and potential “destination companies/firms” is more or less lacking)</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices of undeclared work (a customary behaviour, due to the pursuit of quick, high and untaxed profit, and as a result of insufficient control)</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited occupational and geographical (spatial) mobility</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>xx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: xx - important, x – to some extent important, 0 - no importance in terms of attracting foreign labour force*

Source: own elaboration.

To sum up, one can see how complex the picture is. Obviously, one cannot study the international migration issue in general, and the immigration issue in particular, without taking into account broad socioeconomic conditions in destination countries. Thus, in the context of the given countries, of course, one cannot omit the complex structure of the domestic labour market with all the necessary related aspects (including relevant policies). What does the situation look like in the given countries in terms of the development of economies vis-à-vis their migration patterns?

While seeking to assess (very briefly and simply) the relations between the economic situation and migration development in all the given countries, one needs to consider a wide set of variables that come into the play. Some of the variables are valid for all three countries, some variables/factors are rather unique and are typical of only one of the countries. Among all the internal (indigenous) and external (exogenous) impacting factors which come into play, the most important are those related to the systemic transition from centrally planned economies of pre-1989 to modern economies of the European market. It is in the context of these factors that one needs to assess the economy-migration relationships.

After a short period of negative growth following the downfall of the communist regime, since the beginning of 1990s\(^\text{26}\) up until 1997, Poland and the Czech Republic

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\(^{26}\) Of all the transition countries of Eastern Europe, Poland became the first to introduce a system of “shock therapy” for the economy to restore the consumer market equilibrium.
experienced high economic growth, while prolonged stagnation occurred in Hungary until 1997 (in terms of GDP growth). An economic downturn in the late of 1990s hit Poland and the Czech Republic and lasted to the beginning of the 2000s\(^{27}\). The Czech Republic faced deterioration of macroeconomic characteristics while serious problems at a micro-economic level were apparent as well. It was also reflected in a decrease of real income and of the demand for labour, in more restrictive policies and, consequently, in a decrease of opportunities for economic migrants to operate in the country. In contrast, at the end of the 1990s, coinciding with the economic upturn, better economic climate and easing of labour market situation, the employment of legal foreign labour was evidently on the rise in Hungary.

Figure 3.1.a Change in GDP in the Czech Republic, Hungary & Poland
Figure 3.1.b Change in employment in the Czech Republic, Hungary & Poland
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2000 (a); Employment in Europe 2001 (b).

Following 2000 economic development coincided with massive inflow of labour immigrants only in the Czech Republic, where the economy needed new labour force especially in sectors based on manual work.\(^{28}\)

This was not the case of Poland at all – immigration did not increase dramatically. While it is true that the increase in the flow of immigrants observed in the first half of 1990s can be related to the economic growth of this period, the immigrants were mostly identified as transit immigrants who were not necessarily eager to take up employment in Poland. The analysis of the economic transition of Poland also shows that the first period had been related mostly to reallocations of domestic labour force. At that time, immigrants present in Poland positioned themselves in the labour market in occupations and sectors where Poland had evidently no resources: highly educated managers in international companies or where the Polish people wanted to fulfil their ‘simple’ consumption: petty trade, open air markets, ethnic gastronomy.

The immigration in Hungary started with a large inflow of refugees, which was huge even in international standards, and composed of ethnic Hungarians\(^{29}\). In addition, economic migrants from ethnic Hungarian communities of the neighbouring countries with strong

\(^{27}\) During the 2001-2002 period the world economy as a whole experienced a slowdown, resulting in a decline in external demand dynamics.

\(^{28}\) The Czech Republic had a high level of participation rate over 71 per cent by the second half of 1990s with modest unemployment on average. The other two countries had considerably lower level of participation rate: in Hungary participation rate approached 60 per cent with modest unemployment by 2000, and in Poland it was 66 per cent with a high level of unemployment over 16 per cent in 2000.

\(^{29}\) Around 130 thousand immigrants were naturalized during the period 1989-2005 in Hungary (Hárs 2009).
migration networks started coming to the country, in legal and irregular form. In Hungary the transition shock resulted in restructuring of the economy and sizeable losses in labour demanding branches over the 1990s. As a consequence, a huge drop of employment accompanied the transition. The level of employment remained low even after the transition shock was over by 1998. Economic growth was not translated into sizeable demand for additional labour; demand in peculiar labour intensive branches occurred (construction, hotel and catering, private services), partly formal, partly irregular. The overall (officially recorded) immigration was modest in comparison to the Czech Republic.

The Hungarian labour market and its development was not attracting foreigners in masses - economic growth occurred without job creation, hence, no strong immigration “pull” factors came into play. We can speak about a sort of “jobless economic growth” (Hárs 2009). The Hungarian labour market with its low level of employment and considerable low-wage and unskilled labour reserves is not ready to attract considerable amount of low level unskilled or semi-skilled labour migrants. On the other hand, a shortage of skilled manual labour; mainly of assembler workers occurred in the early 2000s. This demand has been extensively met by labour migrants. As a matter of fact, the immigrant labour market based on work permits is very much concentrated in this sector of skilled or assembler type of labour, and also in few mainly low qualified jobs. Since the mid-2000s economic slowdown accompanied by a drop in vacancies kept labour migration at the previously modest level in Hungary.

A positive improvement of the economic situation after the accession of the countries to the EU was translated into even more intensive mushrooming of immigrants into the Czech Republic (skilled and unskilled labour force gravitated to the country driven especially by successful industrial production -e.g. car industry- and construction) while in Hungary and Poland a sort of stagnation of immigration can be observed (measured via overall employment of foreigners). In the case of Poland, the accession speeded up outflows of Polish workers into some of the EU15 countries. However, it was the positive economic development of the last several years that was behind the reduction of this Polish outflow (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008).

The analysis conducted in the IDEA Polish report (Górny et al. 2009) proves that, generally speaking, the economic situation may enhance immigration, but in order to observe any massive effects, a sine qua non condition needs to be fulfilled: supply and demand for foreign labour need to meet up (in time) and act coherently and need to be supported by migration policy developments (in terms of attracting immigrants). In the case of Poland this condition has been very hard to meet. The demand and supply factors did not meet, also due to ineffective migration policy, until 2006. It is only then that, simultaneously, the number of vacancies in the labour market increased rapidly (mainly in manufacturing, construction and agriculture sectors), prompting higher demand for labour, and a new migration policy instrument – declaration of intent of employment of a foreigner – had been introduced, facilitating employment of migrants; at the same time, foreign labour force (mostly from neighbouring countries) was ready to come and work in Poland. However, even this synergy was not enough to trigger massive immigration; the demand factor broke down before immigration became massive and institutionalized.

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30 Hungarian economy has the job structure that refers to a more productive economy. Low-wage small enterprises or self-employed jobs are missing or have a character of provisory, non-increasing family base. Other enterprises highly rely on multinational firms with limited freedom of activity (Laki 1998, GKM 2007). Hönekopp, Menz & Tamas (2006) gives similar example for Sweden explaining relative low immigration despite the liberal immigration regime towards the EU 8.

31 There is a considerable irregular migration, however, that will be discussed in the following subchapters.
Recently, one may observe some symptoms of dualism in the labour market in Poland. One of them is the fact that regardless of the prevalence of a high rate of unemployment in some periods (e.g. 17.6 per cent in 2005), the inflow of immigrants has been taking place at a low but stable scale and has not dramatically increased throughout the period of growth of the Polish business cycle (which started in 2003 and lasted until mid-2008). It is even more visible at local labour markets where factors determining inflow are different from those determining the economic situation in the labour market – migration networks, spatial proximity, migration traditions, etc. This means that Poland has started experiencing the symptoms of dualism in the labour market, with a secondary sector that has constant demand for foreign labour force emerging; this demand is not directly determined by economic factors, albeit it is a sign of the level of development of an economy.

What is worth pinpointing here is that there is another feature that have accompanied (especially in the 1990s) the relationship between the economy and migration in Poland and, to some extent, in Hungary. Some significance (which has steadily decreased over time) could be ascribed to imports of cheap consumer goods and/or purchases made by foreign transporters of goods that were in short supply in their home countries\(^{32}\): in less developed regions of Poland these two factors helped control the cost of living or else propelled local, small-scale economic activity. In Hungary one can mention Chinese markets and bazaars in Budapest or some other cities or towns in this context.

What needs to be pointed out on the Polish example is that there is no direct and straightforward relation between the economic situation (described by the economic cycle) in Poland and inflow of immigrants and outflow of emigrants (cf. Górny et al. 2009). The reason is, probably, that the supply and demand sides for foreign labour on the Polish labour market have not met yet. The immigration level is rather very low and has not yet crystallized into specific patterns. On the other hand, it seems that the direct relationship between the economic situation (at a macro level) and immigration has been proved in the Czech Republic (possibly the demand has met the supply side in one time). As for this question, Hungary stays somewhere in between Poland and the Czech Republic. Regarding the discussed relationships – see figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 characterizing the development of immigration vis-à-vis selected economic variables (GDP, vacancies, unemployment rate), migration policy orientation and predominating attitudes towards foreigners. However, one has to keep in mind that all depends on the kind of characteristics used in the analysis (e.g., irregular labour migrants were not included). Also, for example, so important irregular labour migrants were not taken into account.

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\(^{32}\) Petty trade and open-air trade markets (e.g. Jarmark Europa at the centre of Warsaw and Tuszyn nearby Lodz) enhanced migrants to import cheap consumer goods.
Notes:
1) All the characteristics are related to the year 1996 (starting point of our analysis) because of pragmatic reasons – availability of data. However, 1996 was more or less a final stage of a rapid post-1989 economic boom and of very liberal economic policies that enabled mushrooming of economic immigrants.
2) General approach was to relate all annual parameters to one reference point (situation in 1996). Hence, 1996 was taken as 100%, thus, any given parameter expresses a development vis-à-vis the 1996 level.
3) Employment of foreigners represents a total number of economically active foreigners in the Czech Republic. (1996=188,745 in absolute terms)
4) Stock of foreigners includes all foreigners with long-term and permanent permits/visas. (1996= 199,152 in absolute terms)
5) Vacancies are designed as annual average of vacant positions reported to labour offices. (1996=98,700 in absolute terms)
6) Unemployment rate was counted annual average of the general rate of unemployment. (1996=3.9%)
7) GDP represents the sum of values added by all branches of activities which are considered productive in the system of national accounts (including market and non-market services). Calculations are made at current prices and results are then converted into constant prices (of the year 2000). (1996=2,116,000 mil. CZK in absolute terms)
8) Opinion on foreigners is represented by opinion on Post-Soviets and Vietnamese within representative public opinion polls (Question: “How would you characterize your relationship to the following population groups that live in the Czech Republic …?” Respondents could choose one of the following categories: very good, rather good, not good - not bad, rather bad, very bad. We used an average of “very good” and “rather good” answers for both groups (see table 25). A suitable and comparable time-line was available only until 2001 (see more in section 3.1.1.). (1996=11.5%)
9) Specificity of constructing our “migration policy index” resides in a rather impressionistic way of measuring. It was not possible to relate the nature of migration policy to individual particular years. Hence, we evaluated it by periods which were delineated in the section 2.5. (1993-1998, 1999-2002, 2003 on). The 1993-1998 period represented 100% and the two other periods were evaluated (compared with the 1993-1998 situation) according to a nature of individual selected important policy measures which came into force in the given periods. Changes followed logic of liberal (increase of the index) versus restrictive (decrease of the index) directions of the policy (for characterization of various periods see more in section 2.5.). (1993-1998=100)

Figure 3.2 Development of selected variables in the Czech Republic, 1996-2007
Source: Drbohlav et al. 2009
Notes:

*Opinions on foreigners*: This index is based on results of annual opinion polls conducted by Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) and it was calculated as an average percentage of people describing their attitude towards people of various nationalities as positive (“liking”).

*Foreigners-stocks*: Foreigners employed in the national economy (Central Statistical Office)

*Employment of foreigners*: work permits (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy)

*GDP*: growth of gross domestic product (Central Statistical Office)

*Unemployment*: Changes of unemployment rates (Central Statistical Office)

*Vacancies*: Total number of vacant posts estimated on the basis of the annual survey (Central Statistical Office ‘Labour Demand Survey’)

**Figure 3.3.** Development of immigration to Poland vis-à-vis other selected characteristics*, 1996-2007, opinion on foreigners 1998-2007; in per cent; 1996=100

Source: own elaboration based on various data sources.
3.1.1.2 Labour market shortages and the role of migrants

Within this section we will try to describe the main labour shortages on the markets of the countries in question. However, as there are serious data limitations we have to use other supplementary data series, namely the structure of foreign employment as it indirectly indicates the real demand on the labour market. We deal with migrants’ involvement in the domestic labour markets, namely with foreign employees. Their numbers, however, are in general terms rather low in Hungary and very low in Poland. Furthermore, it may be and it is the case that existing data portray only a small fraction of the labour immigration phenomenon. Workers for low-skilled jobs often may be employed in an unregistered way, and thus cannot be captured by any existing statistics (for more on irregular employment see section 3.1.1.3.).

The Czech Republic

The Czech labour market has recently suffered from labour shortages. This fact springs from a very good shape of the whole economy that was spurred forward mainly by booming construction and some industrial branches (until 2008). In the last several years there has been an ever-increasing demand for labour force (registered vacancies in the Czech Republic grew,

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33 Due to the somewhat different business cycle in Hungary the base year of the Hungarian chart is 2000.
for example, from 50,000 in the fourth quarter of 2005 to 141,000 in the fourth quarter of 2007). The largest shortages were (according to registered vacancies) in manual type occupations. More specifically, the most demanded occupations on the Czech labour market (as of the fourth quarter of 2007) were machinery workers (23,900 vacancies), unqualified labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing (19,740 vacancies), assemblers (17,054 vacancies) or building and related trades workers (14,142 vacancies). However, a large number of vacancies was also available for e.g., science and engineering associate professionals (6,291 vacancies), personal service workers (7,677 vacancies), or legal, social, cultural and related associate professionals (5,237 vacancies) (Integrovaný portal MPSV ČR 2009).

Rather a massive inflow of primarily economic migrants is directed to the country (cf. Drbohlav et al. 2009); when simplifying the whole picture, currently, some 60 per cent of registered immigrants are economic ones whereas the rest are mostly those whose migration is tied to family reunification or formation. Foreigners fulfil some gaps on the current Czech labour market. It concerns mainly the largest groups of economically active foreigners who are represented by citizens of the following four countries: Slovakia, Ukraine, Vietnam and Poland. Their share among all economically active foreigners has been more or less stable since the second half of the 1990s and has ranged around 80% (Slovaks hold the dominant position - their proportion on total figures oscillated between 50 and 60% with a gradual decline after 2004). The most numerous group of foreigners-employees work in manufacturing (39%), construction (22%), real estate and renting (15%) and wholesale and retail trade; repairs (8%) (out of the whole number of 240,242 as of December 2007, see Český statistický úřad 2008b). Just the latter branch is by far the most popular for foreigners – holders of trade licenses (45% out of 85,409 - numbers of licenses issued to foreigners). Generally speaking, most migrants are employed on the secondary labour market (that has already been established) while taking non-attractive, low-paid, manually, not intellectually demanding jobs. There is over-qualification in some branches and professions indicated (for example, a representative survey from 2007 found that 10% of males and 14% of females with university education work in manual jobs - see Rátkoczyová, Trbola, Vyhlídal & Kofroň 2007). The majority of districts where migrants are importantly represented among economically active population have rather low unemployment rates. Despite the fact that in-depth economic analyses are missing, it could mean that foreign labour force could be complementary/(supplementary) rather than substitutive (Horáková 2006, Drbohlav 2004).

**Hungary**

Labour migration represents the most important type of immigration to Hungary (it was 57.4 per cent in 2006 – Hárs 2009). A work permit mode represents the most important channel via which legal foreign labour force comes to the country. The increase in the number of work permits in the last decade was coinciding with the change of the structure of the foreign labour. Employment in the manufacturing was common in the legal employment in construction or trade, hotel and catering. Legal employment in agriculture is modest.

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34 The 7, 8 and 9 ISCO code.
35 Their position in the Czech labour market was based on specific legal regulations (“freer regime”) which followed the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and have lasted until 2004.
36 Representative sample of employers who officially employed a foreigner in the Czech Republic was researched into.
37 The previously high share of work permits in the field of culture, education and health care was reduced due to the fact that work permit obligation in these fields has been abolished or obligation for those persons applied for work permits was no more necessary (Hárs 2009).
similar to the other branches not mentioned here. Signs of some employment in business have recently been emerging.

In contrast to the residence permits and census data, the qualification of work permit holders is relatively low, but with large differences across nationality groups. At the end of 2007, 42 per cent of the work permits issued were given in elementary (non-agricultural) occupations, of which over three quarters of the work permits went to Romanian citizens. 80 per cent of the work permits of the Ukrainian citizens were also issued for elementary occupations. The second important group of occupations was machine operators and assemblers. In this category, nearly two thirds of the work permits were given to Slovak citizens (and another 16 per cent was elementary occupations). The share of work permits for craft and related occupations was altogether 10 per cent (mostly Romanian, Serbian and Slovak workers received them). The Chinese obtained work permits mainly in trade and services (Hárs 2009). In another perspective, out of 52,248 work permits issued to foreigners (as of December 31, 2007), 40 per cent represented unskilled services (Romanians, Ukrainians and Slovaks) and 22 per cent were tied to manual jobs in manufacturing (mainly Slovaks) (Hárs 2009). About 4 per cent altogether went to jobs for managers and non-manual technical jobs (in fact, reserved for representatives of the most developed countries).

According to regular labour force forecasting survey (legal employment, survey in 2006, Survey of National Employment Service) and vis-à-vis domestic population, the most important branch where foreigners are employed is construction (nearly 7 per cent among the total employees). The second in importance are various branches of manufacturing industries (about 3.5 per cent of total number of employees). Within services and tourism one can find 2 per cent of foreign employees and within heath care, transport, agriculture and trade the share is around 1% per cent. According to the survey, typical occupations where foreigners are employed are the following ones: unskilled occupations in construction, semi-skilled jobs in manufacturing (machine operators, assembly line worker in precision engineering and also in textile industry, etc.) and health care jobs (mainly nurses, Hárs 2009).

Following the enlargement of the EU in 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania, Hungary partially opened its labour market to the new EU members. Despite this, skilled labour that had easy access to the Hungarian labour market did not flow in masses. Hence, next year the partial limitation of access to the Hungarian labour market was abolished. The immigrant labour market based on work permits remained very much concentrated in few (mainly low qualified) jobs and nationals mainly of adjacent countries.

Poland

Clearly, labour shortages do affect only some sectors of the Polish economy and they have appeared only since the end of 2005 (as documented on the survey of National Bank of Poland). This number increased dramatically, reaching almost 15 per cent in the third quarter of 2007 (Górny et al. 2009). The largest shortages have recently been documented in construction (over 30 per cent of enterprises), followed by manufacturing and transport.

Though labour immigration to Poland has still been quite low, some specific segments of the Polish labour market have been prone to the employment of foreign labour force. According to official statistics of registered employment of foreigners, we can see their concentration in position such as executive officers, experts, specialists or skilled labourers. Moreover, there has been an increase in the proportion of highly-skilled individuals among officially employed foreigners. The dominant role of highly qualified foreign workers in

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38 Educational level of Romanian or Ukrainian citizens is low (apprentice school or less). EU15 citizens employed on work permit basis, on the contrary, are rather highly qualified. Some other migrant groups are diverse: there are partly lower partly higher educated labour migrants among them.
Poland has also been confirmed by an employers’ representative survey\(^{39}\) (MPLM see Grabowska-Lusińska & Żylicz 2008). About 30 per cent of companies employing foreigners stated that foreigners’ qualifications are one of the main reasons for employing a non-Polish citizen, along with the lack of suitably qualified Polish workers. Consequently, the majority of those employers employ foreigners in managerial or specialist positions (Górny et al. 2009). Hence, we can argue that foreigners are complementary (rather than substitutive) to the Polish labour force\(^{40}\) (Grabowska-Lusińska & Żylicz 2008).

According to the 2002 Census, the most important sectors employing foreigners were trade (26 per cent of all employed foreigners), educational sector (18 per cent), and manufacturing (12 per cent). The MPLM (employers’) survey data also confirmed the high share of employment in trade and education. On the other hand, demand for low-skilled labourers is visible only in some sectors (such as agriculture and construction) in the declarations of employers with regard to a potential, anticipated demand (only during the last two years significant shortages for both skilled and low-skilled labour were observed, partly due to the cumulative outflow of labour after the EU enlargement of 2004 and the lack of availability of vocational school graduates) (Górny et al. 2009).

In fact, recently two groups of immigrants - those from the West (mainly the EU and the USA) and from countries of the former Soviet Union - dominate in Poland. “Western” immigrants tend to be concentrated in manufacturing and financial services while citizens of the former USSR are employed in such sectors as education, trade and manufacturing (Górny et al. 2009, Kępńska 2003, 2007, Grabowska-Lusińska & Żylicz 2008).

Importantly, the accession of Poland to the EU accompanied with free access to the labour markets of the United Kingdom and some other countries enhanced the outflow of Polish workers abroad. Consequently, in less than two years considerable labour deficits in certain regions and economic sectors or occupations have been revealed (e.g. some large towns lost from 10 to 15 per cent of their workforce of 20 to 39 years of age, while the outflow from certain rural areas was even stronger) (Okolski & Mioduszewska 2008). Labour shortages on the Polish market became most visible in construction sector\(^{41}\), trade and seasonal agriculture (horticulture), together with some highly specialised professions (such as physicians, anaesthesiologists and radiologists) (Górny et al. 2009).

The relation between Polish emigration and (increased) immigration of foreigners is a very recent phenomenon to formulate any far-reaching conclusions. However, it seems that the crowding-out of the Polish labour market was encouraging for foreign immigrants to Poland. The more so, because the emerging labour deficits were accompanied by a favourable economic climate (a growing phase of the business cycle) increasing wage rates in Poland (Kaczmarczyk & Okolski 2008).\(^{42}\) Moreover, the Polish accession to the EU has stimulated a growth in infrastructural and other direct investments which in turn have created many new jobs. As a result, the labour shortages have been deepened (Górny et al. 2009).

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\(^{39}\) Representative survey with employers based on registration number sampling was conducted within the MPLM (Migration Policy and Labour Market) project (see Grabowska-Lusińska & Żylicz 2008).

\(^{40}\) The majority of jobs now taken by foreigners are newly created, or else those formerly occupied by Poles who left of their own will. This refers to the two main reasons behind growing labour shortages – economic growth and massive out-migration. This type of labour immigration can be described as ‘supplementary’ rather than substitutive.

\(^{41}\) In 2007, more than a third of companies in the construction sector expressed their difficulties in hiring new workers, though three years earlier less than 10 per cent of them expressed such problems (Kaczmarczyk & Okolski 2008).

\(^{42}\) However, the increase in the level of wages was primarily caused by a favourable economic climate (positive phase of the business cycle), and not by the outflow of workers.
3.1.1.3 Shadow economy

In all the three countries, irregular migrants represent one of the segments of a „grey economy”. Nevertheless, most of those who are involved in generally defined “undeclared work” and/or other closely related activities (breaking existing laws and rules in the economy) are nationals. Undeclared work (and the grey economy as such) in the countries in question became widespread during the socialist economic system and established itself as an integral part of the socialist economic culture. As a matter of fact, the populations of the former socialist countries have become very tolerant to the informal economy and do not consider it as a “bad thing”43. Irrational and opaque economic environment along with insufficient legal regulation prolonged a tradition of undeclared work under new democratic economic circumstances and conditions (see e.g. Renooy, Ivarsson, van der Wusten-Gritsai & Meijer 2004; Fassmann 2008).

Bednarski, Krynska, Pater and Walewski (2008) and Kus (2006) explain reasons that are behind Polish informal economy, nevertheless, some of their arguments have broader validity, indeed. Among the causes of current unregistered employment in Poland (including employment of foreigners), one must consider societal acceptance (higher for irregular individuals, lower for illegal companies), insufficient income from registered (official) sources, high non-salary costs of work (taxes, insurance, other burdens), hectic administration procedures and avoidance of minimum labour standards (such as minimum wage, minimum working hours, health and safety provisions). But also traditional transnational networks, especially in the border regions (circular mobility of petty traders and seasonal or occasional workers) play an important role (Górny et al. 2009).

Obviously, informal economy and irregular native labour market (with its undeclared work) is an evident magnet for irregular migration (Reyneri 1998) as also stressed by Arango et al. (2009). The two – native and foreign - informal markets to large extent overlap and therefore, below we will characterize them together while perhaps pinpointing both some of the similar features and specificities pertaining to individual countries. Generally, it was estimated that the total size of undeclared work (as percentage of GDP) in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was 9-10 per cent44, 14 and 18 per cent45, respectively, at the turn of 20/21st Cent (see Renooy et al. 2004).

The Czech Republic

Apparently, undeclared work in the Czech Republic is mostly assigned to sectors with a higher share of manual work and lower wages, where competitiveness and profit are highly dependent on the cost level (often utilizing low-skilled, seasonal, or casual work performed in an environment that cannot easily be controlled), and in sectors which suffer from organizational problems, instability of individual activities where low profit does not enable capital investment (Renooy et al. 2004, Fassmann 2008). Typical sectors with a high occurrence of undeclared work in the Czech Republic are wholesale and retail trade, repairs, construction, manufacturing industry, agriculture and hotel and restaurants (Fassmann 2008 – based on data from 1998). As Fassmann (2008) further elaborates, by far the most important...

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43 This fact is supported by results of several public opinion polls carried out in Hungary. For example, in the late 1990s, 59 per cent of the total respondents, and 67 per cent of the entrepreneurs responding, agreed that “the hidden economy is part of our everyday life” (HCSO 1998), and accepted it as part of their coping strategy. There is high inertia of these opinions.

44 It concerned about 5-6 per cent of the labour force. Other estimates put the share of the “shadow economy” in GDP to about 8-12 per cent or 16 per cent depending on the method of calculation used (Fassmann 2007).

45 From another perspective, according to surveys of the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS 2005) conducted in 1996, 1998 and 2004 between January and September, around 2.5 million, 1.4 million and 1.3 million workers, respectively, were employed in the shadow economy (in 2004, constituting over 9 per cent of the total working population).
sectors are represented by wholesale and retail trade – areas where payments are mostly done with cash, and also in construction where false records with overestimation of costs are a typical phenomenon. Thus, the grey economy seems to be a logical consequence of a possibility to create „black funds“. Besides being visible in some sectors, the grey/informal economy, however, penetrates the whole Czech economy. Chiefly small companies and individual small businessmen are involved in the activities of the informal economy. The overall situation on the Czech grey/informal market corresponds to a situation that one can find in the EU. The “grey market” in the Czech Republic is, to large extent, occupied by domestic labour force (estimates say about some 1.5 million workers), although this problem is being often connected to foreign labour force (Fassmann 2008). It is estimated that the overall number of irregular/illegal migrants in the country is not negligible but no convincing estimate has been put forward. The estimated numbers vary from 17,000 to more than 300,000 of irregular/illegal immigrants in the Czech Republic (see e.g. Drbohlav & Lachmanová 2008b, Intermundia 2005, Fassmann 2006, Horáková 2005).

As concerns some basic features of migrant involvement in the irregular labour market, Drbohlav and Lachmanová (2008a) show in a Delphi survey that irregular economic activities performed by migrants 46 are linked to strong migration “pull” factors such as an established lobby of intermediary agents (clients), a high demand for irregular foreign labour and the fact that irregular employment of nationals is widespread and tolerated. Also, the procedure of obtaining a work permit is complicated and burdened by needless bureaucracy. Furthermore, corruption, which is another phenomenon generally disapproved of but nevertheless deeply rooted, also appeared as one of the important explanatory factors. Secondly, the estimated employment structure of illegal foreign labour within this survey more or less confirms what has already been indicated in relation to the activities of domestic labour force. Construction was indicated as the most significant area in which the illegal foreign workforce is active. The other important sectors, amongst which there is not as much of a difference in the frequency of occurrence, were (according to the experts of the survey): hospitality and accommodation services; domestic services; agriculture; and wholesale/retail. These are followed by the less emphasized textile and food processing industries. All these sectors have common characteristics, i.e., low wages, high demands for worker flexibility and a low level of attractiveness for the domestic workforce, and are traditional employers of illegal migrants in other countries that attract migration (see e.g. de Tapia 2003, Castles & Miller 2003). Experts further indicated that Ukrainians followed by Vietnamese and representatives of other post-soviet countries dominate among migrants involved in the Czech informal economy (Drbohlav & Lachmanová 2008a). Regarding spatial patterns, many of the regions where significant illegal economic activity on the part of migrants was identified also have a high rate of legally employed foreigners and also contain the largest Czech cities, from the perspective of both population as well as importance. This relationship between the territorial distribution of legal and illegal migrants has been confirmed in other countries (see e.g. Jandl & Kraler 2006, de Tapia 2003).

46 One may mention especially: 1) the type of activity whereby a migrant possesses a residence permit as well as a trade license but, in fact, works for someone else as an employee and is thus not self-employed (i.e., “disguised employment” or in the Czech context so called “Švarc System”) 2) a migrant performs a job through an intermediary agent, in Czech context known as “client”. This type of economic relationship is referred to as a “client system” (cf. e.g., Černík 2006, Nekorjak 2006, Čermáková & Nekorjak 2009), violating rules of an acquired visa/permit (this applies to visa for a period exceeding 90 days or long term visa), e.g., change of profession or region, etc., illegal employment while holding only a tourist visa or after a tourist visa has expired (Drbohlav & Lachmanová 2008a).
Poland
In general, construction, agriculture, trade, care and domestic services together with hotels and restaurants are thought to be the sectors with the highest incidence of illegal work in Poland. Logically, these are the sectors where most short-term visitors (who came for work purposes) from countries East from Poland have sought employment (Stola 1997, CASE & Millward-Brown SMG/KRC 2008, Kicinger & Kloc-Nowak 2008).

In terms of migrants’ irregular employment, it is important to stress the role of Polish households as they serve as one of the most important sources of demand for foreign irregular labour (Grabowska-Lusińska & Żylicz 2008). Irregular migrants take up employment in domestic service sectors – women are usually employed in household services such as cleaning, cooking, caretaking of children and the elderly, men are usually employed in home maintenance and improvements sector. However, other economic sectors (as mentioned above) are also important “employers” of irregular migrants (namely construction, agriculture, to lesser extent, wholesale and retail trade in open-air markets or bars and restaurants) (Bednarski et al. 2008).

Nevertheless, the extent of irregular migrant labour in Polish households is most probably of limited size (from the general point of view) as a recent representative household survey of the CMR (PBS 2007 see Grabowska-Lusińska & Żylicz 2008) indicated that only about 80,000 Polish households (about 6% of all Polish households) have employed in last two years foreign workers - on both regular and irregular bases. However, it is not easy to calculate the probable number of unregistered migrants employed in households, not only due to the fact that one migrant worker can work in more than one household (Grabowska-Lusińska & Żylicz 2008). As for the extent of irregular migrant labour in other sectors, construction sites are thought to employ about 150,000 irregular migrant workers during the prime construction season (according to opinions of representatives of employers’ organizations, industrial chambers or trade unions in Kus 2006). Mainly small and medium size sub-contracting construction companies employ irregular migrant workers whose recruitment is often based on migrant networks. Migrants who do unregistered work on construction sites can be characterized as tourist visas overstayers coming from Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Belarus. Interestingly, Ukrainians and Belarusians are also legally employed in construction, but, on the other hand, there are citizens of Armenia, Kazakhstan and Romania who supply just the irregular segment of construction site workers (Kus 2006, Górny et al. 2009).

Hungary
In Hungary, according to everyday observations and “experts estimations” based on labour inspectorates’ and other authorities’ information it is obvious that, in general, irregular labour is present in construction, agriculture and also domestic services (such as servants, cleaning, or taking care of elderly people). The informal labour of natives and foreign labour markets overlap; sometimes they compete but more likely informal migrant labour complements the native labour. The irregular labour market of natives is extensive in Hungary. Comparing the level of declared employment recorded in the National Pension Insurance Directorate database with the level of gainful employment revealed by the Labour Force Survey estimated the scale of undeclared labour as being approximately between 17 and 18 per cent of the declared labour in 2004, varying between 10 per cent in white collar jobs, to 50 per cent in construction and personal services and 56per cent in various forms of agricultural labour (Köllő 2008).

47 In Poland, they also constitute the largest demand site for foreign labour in general (Grabowska-Lusińska & Żylicz 2008 in Górny et al. 2009).
Considering the high share of the underground economy, it is very likely that inactivity measured by formal statistics contains a sizeable unmeasured labour market in Hungary. The underground economy encourages a shift of employees from low income formal jobs to inactive status through channels like early retirement, possibility of disability pension or a generous maternity leave system. Indirect evidence for this might be that even when unemployment was at its highest (in the early 1990s) there was no sign of it causing social or political unrest. It was supposed that domestic and underground economy acted as a welfare and subsistence buffer (Sik 2006).

A special form of informal labour market, the “top of the iceberg”, is the open-air day-labour market. That is a mixed labour and goods market of nationals and foreigners. Almost every major Hungarian city has at least one open-air informal market of goods and labour. The open-air labour markets were analyzed between 1995 and 2004 (Sik 2006). As was revealed, the informal labour market places have been seasonal with the peak months in the spring and summer. Most of them were concentrated in Budapest and its vicinity. Typical jobs on offer were unskilled jobs in construction, and a typical employee is a male from Romania who is paid a low wage. The dominant groups are nationals (at a smaller extent Romas) and ethnic Romanians and Romas from Romania, along with ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania (the latter group has various networks to find jobs, hence, they are underrepresented on the open-air markets). Finally, it has been documented that those with Romanian or Roma ethnic backgrounds have a significant wage disadvantage compared to ethnic Hungarians, however, their share in the open-air markets has been on the increase (Sik 2006).

3.1.2 Demographic factors

When (besides Cyprus and Malta) post-communist countries of CEE joined the EU (May 2004), their demographic situation differed from the “old” EU15 countries in terms of mortality (higher in CEE countries) and fertility (lower in CEE countries). But also, there are differences in migration regimes. The origins of these differences lie in the history of CEE countries, especially in their social, political and economic transformations that took place in the 1990s (Monnier 2004). What is the current position of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland vis-à-vis this polarized picture? And what are the future population prospects and the role of migration in relation to population ageing?

In line with the previous development, mortality trends in the new members from CEE are lagging seriously behind those in the EU15 (for example, in 2006 life expectancy at birth for males was in the Czech Republic 73.5, in Poland 70.9, and in Hungary 69.2, whereas in EU15 it was 76.0 as early as in 2002 (EUROSTAT 2009). As for fertility, it is currently very low in CEE but the same is true for South European countries or, for example, Germany (in 2006, the total fertility rate in Poland amounted to 1.27, in the Czech Republic 1.33, and in Hungary 1.34; a shift over time has been apparent especially in Poland -- the given figures in 1995 amounted to 1.62, 1.28 and 1.57, respectively (EUROSTAT 2009). The third key parameter that is logically to be introduced here is international migration. In this comparative report, migration stands rather as “dependent variable” but it may be also treated as an “independent” one. When measuring migration via the net migration characteristic one can see important differences in the current situation, however, bearing in mind varied definitions of migration characteristics among countries (for more on this see chapter 2 or outcomes of

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48 Anyways, hypotheses of the future development of fertility and mortality within the EUROPOP2008 prognosis is based on a convergence principle of demographic characteristics that should reach similar parameters in 2150 following an assumption of decreasing socioeconomic and cultural diversities among individual countries (Rychtaříková 2008).
the PROMINSTAT project\textsuperscript{49}). Whereas Poland is typical of long-lasting negative net migration, Hungary is characteristic of long-lasting slight gains (about 15,000 in 2007) and in the Czech Republic net migration climbed up to almost 84,000 in 2007 (the fourth highest figure after Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom in the EU that year) (EUROSTAT 2009).

Demographic development of the last several years bears some clear trends common for the entire EU - a long-term downturns in fertility, and consequently, population ageing. Fertility rates are now below replacement level in nearly all EU countries. Accordingly, natural population growth rates are small or even decreasing, while the proportion of elderly population grows along with declining proportion of the working-age population (Grant et al. 2004). What is striking about the current period in the developed world is that the convergence of low fertility rates, rising life expectancy, and high immigration leads to unprecedented demographic transformation (Tietelbaum 2001).

One can point out that this post-industrial demographic stage reflects the new life style and behavioural patterns (like individualism, hedonism, finding a creative job and loosening bonds with partners and relatives). Such de-standardization of traditional patterns has found its materialization in the so-called Europe’s second demographic transition (see more in van de Kaa 1997, Lesthaeghe 2000\textsuperscript{50}). With such a development (by the way, long before the current global economic crisis started) many were afraid of not maintaining full employment, economic growth and social cohesion in Europe.

All three countries in question (to different extent, of course) have suffered from several demographic problems that have been sketched above. As a matter of fact, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland enter this era pending on “historical heritage” of their demographic structures and on the speed with which new demographic patterns have been crystallizing (of course, also in close relation to ongoing social and economic transformations). As indicated, the main problems spring from ageing, loosing population and putting the burden on economically active segments of population. According to the current EUROSTAT population projection, serious population losses will hit Hungary and Poland\textsuperscript{51} in the near future (Hungary will probably shrink from 10.045 mil to 9.651 between 2008 and 2030, whereas Poland from 38.116 mil. to 36.975 mil. in the same period\textsuperscript{52}). In the same time, the Czech Republic is to grow from 10.381 to 10.420. However, the latter country will join the former ones in 2060 when all the countries will significantly decrease its population (EUROSTAT 2009).\textsuperscript{53}

The seriousness of the problem of demographic ageing and its potential impact upon economy is indicated in table 3.2 where the projected old-age dependency ratio is presented (see more in notes table 3.2). A significant change is going to be visible already in the first decade (between 2010 and 2020 – however, the parameters are still lower than is the EU 27 average) whilst in 2060 the ratio of persons aged 65+ to the number of persons aged 15-64 will grow almost four times in the case of Poland, and almost three times in the Czech

\textsuperscript{49} For more on PROMINSTAT project see www.prominstat.eu  
\textsuperscript{50} As Lesthaeghe (2000) clearly characterizes some 1) more general transition’s features: the prolongation of education and the “democratization” of access to higher education, the emergence of a more libertarian culture with greater tolerance for alternative life styles, the expansion of the welfare state, the intergenerational transmission of family instability, growing labour market flexibility, and 2) more specific settings: cycles characterized by weakened economic opportunities for new cohorts, unfavourable housing conditions, rising consumerism, mechanisms of social diffusion, more idiosyncratic or culture specific factors.  
\textsuperscript{51} For population forecast of Poland see also Matysiak & Nowok 2007.  
\textsuperscript{52} In fact, in the both countries population losses have already been reported.  
\textsuperscript{53} The population development of the whole EU27 is to grow from 497.5 in 2008 to 519.9 in 2030 and, then, it is to drop to 505.7 in 2060 (see EUROSTAT 2009).
Republic and a bit less also in Hungary\textsuperscript{54}. Nevertheless, in all three countries the share will be higher than that representing the EU 27 average.

Table 3.2 Projected old-age dependency ratio for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (in \%), 2010-2060

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>2050</th>
<th>2060</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>21.83</td>
<td>31.07</td>
<td>35.71</td>
<td>42.71</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>61.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>30.31</td>
<td>34.06</td>
<td>40.11</td>
<td>50.83</td>
<td>57.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>18.98</td>
<td>27.19</td>
<td>35.98</td>
<td>41.29</td>
<td>55.69</td>
<td>68.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>25.90</td>
<td>31.05</td>
<td>38.04</td>
<td>45.36</td>
<td>50.42</td>
<td>53.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The indicator is defined as the projected number of persons aged 65 and over expressed as a percentage of the projected numbers of persons aged between 15 and 64.


It seems evident that in contrast to historical patterns when migration was not the most important process for shaping demographic situation while only mitigating or substituting losses due to natural development, now and even more in the future, its role is significantly increasing. However, as the replacement migration concept (United Nations Secretariat 2000) clearly shows, immigration as such cannot stop demographic ageing (see also Bijak, Kupiszewska, Kupiszewski 2008, Grant et al. 2004, Lutz, Scherbov 2002, Burcin, Drbohlav, Kučera 2005). Obviously, the new challenges that one has to face due to declining and ageing populations will require objective, in-depth and comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies, programs and strategies.

Besides many possible measures stimulating higher fertility, maximum labour force participation, investments in human capital and increasing productivity etc. (see e.g., Bijak, Kupiszewska, Kupiszewski 2008) and also selective immigration (mainly attracting migrants to fulfil gaps on the labour market) seem to be the alternatives that can partly contribute to improving the whole situation. All in all, the demographic situation has become an important factor that triggers immigration. Chiefly through the growing demand (as a direct mechanism) and various recruitment policies (as indirect ones) the weakening pool of domestic human resources might be saturated.

These are the challenges that the given countries have been facing and experiencing nowadays and even should expect to an even larger extent in the future. Accordingly, the Czech Republic was the first among the countries in question to launch and implement programs for recruiting foreign labour force – as early as 2003 (the first one) and, then, 2009 (the second one.). Poland and Hungary have also recently started with such activities, at least in a form of proclamation and debates (see more in section on migration policy – Chapter 4).

3.2. Contextual factors

3.2.1. Historical background

Turning back to the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the onset of industrialization and urbanization brought significant changes in the population development also in CEE. Growing natural increase hand in hand with freeing the workforce from agricultural production gradually resulted in over-population which led to a rise in emigration (in the course of time emigration from rural areas was accompanied by emigrants leaving big cities too). Moreover, open opportunities and demand for labour force in the New World and in some European industrial centres (to limited extent also in some Eastern European “remote” rural areas) contributed to a

\textsuperscript{54} Another indication as to how the ageing in the given countries will be progressing is a growing number of seniors older than 65. This share will grow between 2008 and 2060 in the Czech Republic from 14.6 to 33.4\%, in Hungary from 16.2 to 31.9\% and in Poland from 13.5 to 36.2\% (see EUROSTAT data in Rychtaříková 2008).
“harmonization of the demand and the supply” and, accordingly, led to intensifying emigration. Thus, all the three countries in question sent masses of their populations abroad (Nugent 1995). The US quota system of the 1920s severely cut the emigration flows. Moreover, migration control and defence of European countries’ labour markets were introduced due to the economic crisis of that time. Also, passport regulations were set up and contributed to stricter migration controls. Though some of the emigrants returned back, this emigration era (and experience) has marked the future migratory development of the given countries on until the very beginning of the 1990s.

The Czech Republic
In late 1918 the independent Czechoslovak Republic was founded, composed of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia55, Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. As to the nationality structure, out of 10 million inhabitants of the Czech lands (in 1921) there were 67.7 per cent of Czechs, 30.6 per cent of Germans and 1 per cent of Poles. Other minorities were Jews and Slovaks. Nine years later, the census showed that there were about 300,000 people born abroad (2.9 % of the population). A majority of these were, however, persons born in the regions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Emigration from the Czech lands went down rapidly after WWI. Between 1920 and 1924, approximately 110,000 moved abroad (mainly to the USA, France and Germany) while from 1925-1929 it was a mere 45,00056. The key factor was, as already mentioned, the tightening of immigration policy in the USA and some other countries. In total figures, about 230,000 residents left the Czech lands during the period from 1920 to 1939, the net migration exhibited a loss of some 88,000 persons (Srb 2004).

On the other hand, the net migration was greatly influenced by the foundation of the independent Czechoslovak state, which foremost manifested itself in a re-emigration wave in the first half of the 1920s when more than 40,000 compatriots returned home from the USA and about 100,000 from Austria. Similarly, the subsequent immigration flows did not have a primarily economic overtone. After WWI the Czechoslovak Republic (Czechoslovakia) allowed entry of Russian emigrants, whose numbers are estimated at 20,000. Politically motivated immigrants were arriving also in the 1930s after the onset of Nazism in Germany.

Massive population movements in the aftermath of WW 2nd had impacts not only on the whole Europe, but also very significantly on Czechoslovakia. Although exact data for Czechoslovakia is not available, it is estimated that over 5 million people were on the move, including about 4 million only in the Czech lands (Horáková 2000). During the years 1945-1947 some 2,820,000 Germans were transferred and expelled from Czechoslovakia to Germany or Austria in three, organised as well as spontaneous, waves, most of them were from the Czech lands, especially border regions. Additionally, some 90,000 Hungarians returned to Hungary from Slovakia, while about 50,000 persons were forcefully displaced from Czechoslovakia to Ukraine and other parts of the former USSR (Horáková 2000). The depopulated Sudeten/border regions were after that settled by returning migrants of Czech or Slovak origin (during the period 1945-1950 about 220,000 persons, including 40,000 of those who came from the Volhynia region). The ethnically selective policy of the post-war Czechoslovakia was the cause of ongoing emigration of some 150,000 ethnic Germans to Germany during the period 1950-1990. Thus, the Czech lands became ethnically homogeneous country with prevailing Slavic background, where 94% of the population were Czechs.

55 Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia will be referred to as Czech lands – a unit that is more or less comparable to the present-day Czech Republic.
56 The data on foreign migration during the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic from 1918 to 1939 is based on registration records of the issuance of emigration passports and police files.
International migration movements in Czechoslovakia were very specific during the communist era. Conforming with the governing regime, which in many aspects isolated pro-Soviet block countries from the rest of the world, meant that movements were far from "natural". Migration activities and trends were limited to illegal/undocumented emigration. There was no explicit immigration policy, except for asylum channel which was adjusted to the definition of asylum based on socialist rules in 1960 (Baršová, Barša 2005).

Migration movements of Czechoslovak citizens were organized through so called „visa“ policy, when via visas selected Czechoslovakian citizens (financial and political reasons came into the play) were allowed to travel to non-socialistic countries. Generally, it was unlawful to leave the country (even for a short time period) without an official permission, which, however, was almost impossible to get - thus “illegal” movements were the only way of emigration. Illegal emigrants lost automatically Czech/Slovak citizenship and usually were sentenced to several years in prison.

Between 1945 and 1989 period, two waves of emigration tended to follow radical political changes and their aftermath – the rise to power of the communists in 1948 and the Soviet army's occupation in 1968. Vaculík (2002) indicates that from 1948 till 1953 44,000 fled and between 1968-1972 some 127,00057 people left due to political changes. The 1970s and 1980s were also characterised by illegal emigration. Political reasons for emigration were often interwound with economic motives as people wanted to find countries with higher standards of living. Most of these emigrants belonged to the young segments of the population (average age about 35 years), many travelled with their families and importantly most were economically active (skilled or semiskilled labour force) (Drbohlav 1994). The Czech lands lost approximately some 420,000 - 440,000 people between 1948 and 1990 (Kučera 1994), or, according to Andrle (1993 according to Horáková 2000) totally 500,000 (hence, including the legal ones).

The former Czechoslovakia has also experienced permanent type of immigration. It was strictly regulated and relatively low. It mainly consisted of immigration for family reasons (reunification or marriage). The immigrants came principally from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as from Greece (following a wave of Greek refugees) and France. In ethnic terms, many of them were of Czech or Slovak origin. Furthermore, the centre in Moscow and the representatives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia directed a migration flow of Greek civilians and pro-communist partisans to Czechoslovakia, where they obtained asylum. The total number of them reached about 14,000 (Otčenášek 2003). These refugees left the northern regions of Greece after the loss in the civil war (in 1949) under the assumption that they would return to Greece soon. However, they mostly settled permanently in the Czech lands, chiefly in Northern Moravia.

In 1946 and 1947, about 12,000 Bulgarian agricultural workers immigrated and settled in depopulated areas of the former Sudetenland. Another group of around 4,000 Bulgarians (not included in the official statistics due to their specificity) arrived in Czechoslovakia in 1957 (Horáková 2000). The resettlement program of abandoned areas of the former Sudetenland also included a semi-conducted (“internal”) immigration of Slovaks and the Slovakian Roma people in the 1940s and 1950s. The liberalization of political life in the period of the 1960s (the period preceding the so called “Prague spring”) resulted in a rise in immigration, when approximately 19,000 foreign nationals immigrated to Czechoslovakia.

Immigration rose once again during the period of so-called “normalization” from 1970 to 1979, when the total number of immigrants to Czechoslovakia reached nearly 50,000.

Since the 1970s Czechoslovak Parliament has started discussing the problem of the lack of labour force (the extensively developing economy was typical of labour shortages).

57 On the other hand, there is another estimate indicating that some 162,000 Czechoslovak citizens fled to Australia, Austria and Germany during the years 1968 and 1969 (Horáková 2000).
Consequently, within the framework of intergovernmental agreements signed between Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries - within the so-called “international aid/cooperation” schemes mainly temporary workers and trainees from Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, Angola, and North Korea came (Boušková 1998). Moreover, cooperation with Poland has had a long tradition in the field of employment since the early 1960s, especially in the border regions. Due to labour shortages of domestic resources in borderland areas, the Polish citizens were importantly represented in a number of factories (for example, the textile and glass industries in northern Bohemia, metallurgy, and mining in North Moravia)\(^{58}\). Other important long-term cooperation existed with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Intergovernmental agreements were focused primarily on professional training of Vietnamese citizens. For example, based on the Agreement of 1979, a total of 8,700 Vietnamese pupils and 23,300 trainees and participants of training arrived in Czechoslovakia. In addition, the employment of Vietnamese citizens also occurred based on the Agreement of 1980. The highest number of such workers was recorded at the end of 1983 (27,100 persons). The citizens of Cuba were the third major group employed in Czechoslovakia based on intergovernmental agreements. In the period from 1978 to 1989, about 23,160 Cuban citizens were accepted (zdroj). This immigration, similar to many other projects during the communist era, was tightly regulated. Very often the immigrants were segregated. They were not very visible and were confined to operate only within certain factories and/or locations (Drbohlav 2004). Just at the dawn of the new post-revolutionary era, most of the former workers returned to their native countries (e.g. out of more than 27,000 immigrants who stayed in the country at the very end of 1990 about 23,000 were Vietnamese, however, only about 1,300 Vietnamese stayed in April 1993 – Boušková 1998).

**Poland**

Poland’s migration history is full of discontinuities caused by the fact that Poland as a geopolitical entity (though as a USSR-satellite state) was established as late as at Yalta. Hence, taking a long time perspective in describing migration history would not be fully possible (Górny et al. 2009).

Just after WWII (between 1945 and 1947), along with many other massive movements in Europe, the return of masses of German war prisoners from Poland to Germany occurred. On the other hand, based on official statistics, between 1946 and 1948 nearly 1.5 million people, almost all of them Polish nationals, immigrated to Poland; about as many as had immigrated already in 1945. Majority of these immigrants were either persons who were (usually forcibly) displaced during the war or those who resettled from the pre-war Polish territories that were annexed by the USSR during its policies of ethnic cleansing. Some of these immigrants were also former Polish emigrants (together with their foreign spouses) who had resided mainly in France, Belgium and Germany (Okólski 1998; Pilch 1984).

Poland also became a country of massive outflows of ethnic Germans, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Also, majority of ethnic Jews who, as former citizens of Poland were expelled (officially, “repatriated”) by Soviet authorities, chose to emigrate to Israel (Palestine), the USA or other countries in the West. All in all, ethnic diversity of the country was diminished.

In late 1940s and 1950s, further immigration took place. It is estimated that about 2 million (Hut 2007) to 2.5 million ethnic Poles (Kozłowski 2006) resettled\(^{59}\) in Poland thanks

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\(^{58}\) The highest number of Polish citizens working on a long term-basis in our territory has been recorded in 1974 (20,825 persons).

\(^{59}\) Resettlement law in Poland has been founded on the ideological concept that people of Polish origin or descent – especially those who were the victims (the descendents of victims) of persecution because of their nationality or other political reasons – should have a legally privileged opportunity to settle in their fatherland. It
to, among other things, generous administrative assistance. There were two distinct repatriation waves (1944-1954 and 1955-1959, respectively). They were comprised of immigrants mainly from the neighbouring republics of the USSR (Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania and Russia), but also some came from the West (Hut 2002). Since 1960s (until the mid-1990s), official repatriation to Poland was practically impossible although the Nationality Act of 1962 included conditions for repatriation. However, it was not possible to exercise these legal rules in practice. Hence, resettlement in Poland (based on family ties) was almost exclusively reserved for close relatives of repatriates who had returned to Poland at the time of the first two waves of repatriation (Hut 2002).

As in other socialist countries, with the onset of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain in 1948 “standard” immigration to Poland became practically impossible. During the socialist period approximately two to three thousand immigrants came annually to Poland. Majority of them were Polish nationals. The handful of foreigners recorded as immigrants were mostly citizens of the USSR and other socialist countries who married Polish nationals outside of Poland where the Poles were “posted” to study at one of several prestigious socialist academic institutions. Also, there were some foreign students from other communist countries (notably the USSR, Bulgaria and Vietnam) studying in Poland who later married a Polish citizen and decided to stay. Finally, several thousands of political (pro-communist) refugees were accepted in Poland. More specifically, about 13,000 of Greek refugees settled in Poland between 1948 and 1956 (similar pattern as in the Czech case). Their return to Greece was made possible only after 1974, however, by that time many became assimilated in Poland, mainly due to inter-ethnic marriages with Poles. A few of Greek refugees have returned back home (Wojecki 1989).

Not only immigration was reduced to minimum but other type of inflows of people from abroad decreased significantly (e.g., inflow of foreign students). Namely the number of foreign tourists was rather marginal - a majority of them arrived from neighbouring communist countries, or from the USA (people of Polish descent coming mainly for family visitations) (Górný et al. 2009).

It is important to point out that during the period of communist rule most previously established migration networks (and family migratory chains) were disrupted due to heavily controlled and limited international mobility. Tourist journeys were austerely rationed, emigration was entirely subject to the discretion of central ruling elites, and a consistent no-immigration policy was followed (Okólski 1998).

At the end of 1980s some 20,000 foreign citizens were permanent residents of Poland. Half of them were employed. A large majority of them (more than 80 per cent from ex-USSR) were spouses of a Polish citizen who arrived in Poland for family reasons or as students. Another relatively significant group were immigrants from Middle East countries, often pro-communist rebels. In principle, as already mentioned, there was no labour migration to Poland. Rare and numerically insignificant exceptions comprised project-tied employment, mainly in construction.\(^\text{60}\)

In 1989 the migration scene in Poland became dramatically different. It was mainly attributable to the political changes in the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria and other countries of Eastern Europe that granted people freedom to travel abroad. Due to previously concluded (though until 1989 inactive in practice) agreements, Poland was one of only a few countries where they could easily be admitted. The inflow of foreigners – in particular those

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\(^\text{60}\) For example, some 3,500 Soviet workers involved in erecting the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw in 1952-1955; in the 1970s few cases with the involvement of a Swedish company (Skanska AB) and some other foreign subcontractors, mainly luxury hotels; usually no more than 100 foreign workers per project (zdroj).
from the former communist countries – saw instantaneous growth, and quickly the numbers of
people entering Poland for a short visit grew to tens of millions a year. Thus the year 1989
marks a clear turning point in Poland’s immigration history (Górny et al. 2009, Grzymała-

**Hungary**

In the early 20th century the Kingdom of Hungary as part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
was a multi-ethnic country, much different to the nation states of Western Europe of that
time. As a result of the peace treaties concluding WWI, the territory of Hungary changed
considerably and got the present shape. It lost a substantial part of its territory and population.
Compared with the former size, the population of Hungary following the peace treaty (called
by the place it has been signed 'Trianon Treaty) was reduced from 20.8 million to 7 million
and its land area decreased by 72%. That has had a substantial effect upon Hungary’s later
history (including the migration history) until today. Especially because there was a
significant Hungarian minority of about 3,318,000 in total (based on the 1910 census see
Census 1900-2001) living in the neighbouring states (due to the fact that the territory of the
former Kingdom of Hungary was assigned to these states). According to the 1910 census data,
half of this minority lived in Transylvania (Romania), 27% in Upper Hungary (Slovakia),
13% in Vojvodina (Serbia), 5.5% in Transcarpathia (Ukraine) and the rest in Croatia,
Slovenia and Burgenland (Austria) (Census 1900-2001). Considering the post-Trianon
territory of Hungary a considerable number of non-Hungarian nationalities lived in and
remained within the new frontiers. According to the 1910 Census 11.6% of the population in
this territory spoke one of the minority languages as mother language (Germans – 7.3% and
Slovaks – 2.2% highly dominated see Census 1900-2001).

The share and number of non-Hungarian nationalities decreased in the next decades,
although the total population increased within the present (post-Trianon) territory. The main
reasons of this process were spontaneous population movements across the border,
assimilation and the ethnic policy of the state and some migratory movements. The country
has become more ethnically homogeneous. Minorities made up 7% in 1941 (census results
based on the spoken language variable).

Further ethnic homogenization came about after WWII. Following the decree of the
Potsdam Conference, about 200,000 Germans were deported from Hungary to Germany. In
addition, under the forced exchange of population between Czechoslovakia and Hungary,
about 73,000 Slovaks left Hungary for Czechoslovakia. The houses of those expelled from
Hungary were resettled by ethnic Hungarians expelled from the neighbouring countries. Also,
a considerable number of persons (about between 80,000 and 100,000) fled voluntarily from
the neighbouring countries to Hungary immediately after the war. Altogether, in 1947 there
were about 247,000 “new-comers” registered - they were those who moved to Hungary from
1938 to 1947 (including mutual exchanges of population). To sum up, the forced and

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61 According to the census of 1910, the largest ethnic group were Hungarians that was approximately half of the
entire population. Hungary was not a unique case with its considerable minorities and ethnic consequences in the
Eastern part of Europe of that time (see e.g. Brubaker 1995).

62 The share of Hungarian minorities was 30% in Slovakia (885,000 persons), 32% in Transylvania, Romania
(1,662,000 in persons), 28% in Vojvodina, Serbia (420,000 persons), 30% in Transcarpathia, Ukraine (183,000),
3.5% in Croatia (121,000 persons), 1.6% in Slovenia (20,800 persons) and 9% in Burgenland, Austria (26,200
persons) (Census 1900-2001).

63 The census did not record the respondents' ethnicity before 1941 but only collected information on language
(whether it was "native language" or "most frequently spoken language") and religion, thus the presented census
data on ethnic groups in the Kingdom of Hungary are actually the data on speakers of various languages, which
may not correspond exactly to the ethnic composition.

64 Data are limited and sources partial and/or unreliable on this period of migration (Bencsik 2002).
spontaneous population movement and emigration from Hungary was compensated by forced and spontaneous immigration flows (Valuch 2003). It is estimated that some 300,000 members of the Hungarian minorities were involved (Münz 1992, 1995, Dövényi –Vukovich 1994. After these extensive population movements, Hungary became an ethnically almost homogeneous country. On the other hand, an ethnically mixed population with considerable Hungarian minorities emerged in the surrounding countries.

During the four decades of Communist regime Hungary was a closed country, with limited and state-controlled inward and outward migration. There was practically no immigration into Hungary, except for two politically motivated ones (cf. Czech and Polish section), i.e. groups of Greek and Chilean communists were given asylum in the early 1950s and 1970s, respectively. In addition, in the 1980s some students (from COMECON or COMECON-supported countries) and a few foreign workers (e.g. from Cuba, China, Mongolia, or Poland) entered Hungary. Concerning emigration the Hungarian border was also heavily guarded except the aftermath of the failed revolution (1956-1957) when about “net 200,000 persons” left the country. There was a continuous moderate (registered) emigration from Hungary between 1958 and 1989 (some 4,300 persons a year), by contrast, immigration was much smaller (some 1,900 persons a year).

From the mid-1980s on, immigration was on continuous increase. The overwhelming majority of immigrants were ethnic Hungarians fleeing from the still communist Romania. Majority of the Romanian immigrants were in the very first phase intelligentsia and dissidents, this has, however, changed in time and a wide range of immigrant population arrived later (Regényi & Törzsök 1998, Kiss 2007). The early immigration of the 1980s was refugee driven with a high share of ethnic Hungarians (Kiss 2007, Szőke 1992). Most of the immigrants were ethnic Hungarians, although the statistics register them by citizenship as ‘foreign citizens’ and no official registration on the ethnicity is available. Because of the ambivalent and indeterminate governmental stance, ethnicity does not play a crucial role in the legal status of immigrants (for ethnic Hungarians the ethnic nationality has been uncertain and context-dependent - Brubaker 1998).

To sum up, the very end of the 1980s and the early 1990s with all crucial and robust political and social changes was evidently a turning point in the history of the Hungarian migration to a positive net immigration pattern (soon climbing to more than 20,000) and this trend proved to be permanent. Large share of immigrants became naturalized. As a result, Hungary is still an ethnically homogenous country (in 2001 census there were only 1.4% of minorities based on spoken language or 2.5% based on nationality categorization). On the other hand, large ethnic Hungarian minorities beyond the borders of Hungary have emerged as an important source of immigration and have had a major influence on current migration politics and policy (e.g. instead of a conceptually “pure” labour migration, ethnicity plays a crucial role in engendering, patterning and regulating migration flows - Brubaker 1998).

3.2.2 Migrant social networks
Establishing social networks (among various players on a migratory field) and their functioning as an important trigger but even more as a “tool of maintenance” of migration flows cannot be ignored. Also, migration networks are very important or even crucial when

65 Following the Civil War in Greece several thousand pro-communist refugees and their children arrived to Hungary. Most of them returned home in several waves but the younger generation remained and assimilated. According to Greek organizations between 4,000 and 5,000 is the current size of the assimilated Greek community in Hungary. Similarly, after 1973 between 1,000 and 1,500 Chilean communist refugees were accepted who later assimilated in Hungary or left for a third country (Hars 2009).

66 More precise data on this foreign labour force are rare and not reliable.

67 In 1989 also a mass of East Germans left the GDR and stayed on their way towards Austria or the BRD in Hungary. However, they had no impact on the Hungarian migration system.
newly arrived migrants start adopting into a new host society, via such networks migrants may get many useful pieces of information and economic, social and psychological assistance and support (see e.g. Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1998).

Generally, one has to point out that during the communist era in fact, in all the three countries most previously established migration networks and family- or community-specific migratory chains were disrupted as a result of strictly controlled international population movements. Tourist journeys were austerely rationed, emigration was entirely subject to the discretion of central ruling elites, and a consistent no-immigration policy was followed (Okólski 1998).

The legal framework regarding foreigners’ access to the labour market prior to the fall of the communist regime was, to a large extent, based on bilateral agreements between CEE countries and other states being USSR satellites. That was important in the Czech Republic and to some extent in Hungary. The agreements provided rules for admitting foreigners to the labour markets mainly as temporary workers or trainees (often specialised in engineering, heavy industry and technical sciences). The employment or traineeships of foreigners were defined in terms of time limit and place, and were to be finished according to the rules of the exchange. It is worth noting that the paths of accessing the labour market in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary within the framework of socialist kinship sometimes became embryos for further inflows of immigrants from chosen countries68, as it was the case Vietnamese in Poland69 and the Czech Republic (Górný et al. 2009; Drbohlav et al. 2009). A lot of Asians who had came as short-term foreign workers, trainees or students decided to stay or come back later on as entrepreneurs involved in retail and wholesale trade as well as in ethnic small businesses. Consequences of these inflows still remain visible on the labour markets in the CEE countries described, although the patterns of economic activity performed by these ethnic groups are completely different from the ones observed in the pre-1989 period. They turned to sectors where self-employment or running one’s own business are the most common ways of earning a living. What is also specific, newcomers from Vietnam or China usually work for their settled co-ethnics who are more familiar with the CEE labour markets.

On the contrary, the ethnic ties of the ethnic Hungarians (living in adjacent countries) were the key factor behind their migration to and subsequent life in Hungary. It concerns both legal and irregular migration, or rather migrants’ irregular economic activities. As a consequence, a prosperous undocumented labour market for migrants has developed in Hungary. As tourists foreigners were allowed to stay for 30 days and they could work illegally; that was for most of the labour migrants the practice. After 30 days many returned home and came back; in order to legalize their stay in this way. The short distance, common language, family ties and developing networks helped to maintain the practice of undocumented circular migration (Bodó 1996, Fox 2005, Oláh 1993).

68 It became despite the numbers of those who continued in staying after the break of 1989 were rather very small (see national reports).

69 One quite unique circumstance that stimulated foreign inflow into Poland turned out to be the existence of a small albeit coherent community of Vietnamese citizens from northern Vietnam (from Ha Noi itself and various provinces around the capital) who, in years past, studied in Poland thanks to student exchange programmes. Many of them either settled after marrying a Polish partner or, upon their return to Vietnam, maintained cultural links with Poland and engaged in economic co-operation (mainly trade) between the two countries. The coincidence of the transition in Poland with the Vietnamese liberalisation that began in communist Vietnam in 1986 had a great impact on the economic activity of Vietnamese society, stimulating its entrepreneurship. In the case of Vietnamese in Poland, we observe that family reunion and marriage migration characterise their more stable forms of migration, in particular settlement. In addition, Vietnamese are generally accompanied by relatives from Vietnam. It can be argued, however, that the Vietnamese settlement patterns are unique in Poland. Other groups of temporary migrants more closely resemble the pattern observed among Ukrainian settlement migrants, where marriage with a Pole constitutes the main factor transforming “circular migration” into “immigration” and settlement in Poland.
In Poland, there has been a movement of Ukrainians and Belarusians from their mother countries to Poland and a tacit tolerance of its irregularity. It is, on one hand, enhanced by traditional transnational networks, especially in the border regions (circular mobility of petty traders and seasonal or occasional workers), and, on the other hand, by widespread development of “grey economy” and concomitant clandestine employment in Poland. Unregistered work is mostly performed in small and medium size sub-contracting companies, within the sub-sector of individual, detached, semi-detached, and apartment housing, infrastructure and industrial construction. Workers are mostly recruited on the basis of migrant networks (overstaying tourist visas) and generally come from Ukraine and, to a lesser extent from Belarus (Górny et al. 2009).

One can only add that also in the Czech Republic, social networks play their important role in shaping what is going on regarding migrants and their positions on the informal Czech labour market (e.g. Drbohlav 2008). Mostly Post-Soviet irregular economic migrants often get information via and also travel and consequently work in the Czech Republic with their family members or friends and acquaintances (Drbohlav 1997). Moreover, those who have stayed in the Czech Republic for some time tend to invite/attract their relatives and friends to join them (Drbohlav 1997, Drbohlav, Lupták, Janská & Bohuslavová 1999, Drbohlav, Lupták, Janská & Šelepová 1999).

What the facts presented in this chapter have revealed is that migrants have already created sizable social networks in all the three countries. They have been developed, on one hand, due mainly to historical economic and ethnic patterns and, on the other hand, due to instrumental migration policies and practices and, in fact, also majority population attitudes. Unambiguously, the networks are important migratory factor stimulating other movements (in legal/regular and irregular/illegal forms) or easing adaptation and integration processes has been proved. What seems to be more than obvious is that their role is to further increase in the future.

3.2.3 Migration policies
The main goal of this subchapter is to discuss migration policies of the CEE countries as a possibly important determinant/factor that stands behind immigration.

All the given countries suffer, quite logically, from little experience of international migration issues since all the three countries were isolated during the communist era for more than forty years and had very limited immigration flows. Accordingly, this “shortcoming” is mirrored in their migration policies. Especially Poland and Hungary, but to some extent, also the Czech Republic, still lack long-term, consistent and well-constructed migration policies. A robust migration policy doctrine, systematically developed and structured is missing. It is reflected not only in not adequate legal and institutional frameworks, but also in state authorities’ piecemeal planning and incomplete understanding of migration processes. It is the result of not only the above mentioned “history deficit” but during the deep transition/transformation processes governments had other matters to deal with and international migration was not a priority on the agenda. In harmony with what has been mentioned, the migration has not been a matter of particular interest to any important political party and has figured only in a very limited way in debates within labour unions, the media or even within the general public.

Nevertheless, the Czech Republic is somehow exceptional to the trends sketched above. Though much of what has been mentioned is relevant too, the Czech Republic has already built a sort of a more solid and functional institutional and “ideological” frameworks that shifted and have further been shifting migration policy issues ahead as compared to Poland and Hungary (Drbohlav, Horáková & Janská 2005, Drbohlav et al. 2009).
For all the countries the accession to the EU in 2004 (accompanied by mandatory fulfilment of all the legislative, institutional and organizational demands) became an important factor, exerting a strong creative influence that helped, at least to some extent, encourage the development of migration policy issues (see e.g. Geddes 2003; Iglicka 2003; Kicinger 2005; Weinar 2006, Drbohlav et al. 2009).

Apparently and logically, the migration policy formation has been changing in the course of time. In a very simplified way, one can characterize the individual stages of such development as a transition from the institutionalization, through stabilization to consolidation. Though timing is to some extent different in individual countries, one can generalize and put the institutionalization period from the end of 1989 to early 1990s, the stabilization (accompanied by the harmonization with the EU standards) between the mid of the 1990s to 2004 and the consolidation since 2004 on (see more Chapter 4).

One can see, however, the given development also from another perspective that suits more our main goal that is to be fulfilled in this chapter. It is a dichotomy between liberal and restrictive migration policies and practices and its transformation over time, between proclamations, legal instruments and, on the other hand, their implementation in practice.

Obviously, migration policies typical of all the three countries in the 1990s (at least in the first half of this period) were very liberal, though proclaiming restrictions (security was a political priority of that time). Some restrictive measurements did exist, but they were not applied in the practice too much. A sort of “non-policy policies” enabled immigrants to come easily to the destination country and operate there. This was characteristic especially of the reality of the Czech Republic. Moreover, tolerance of “irregularity” in the post-communist countries (by the public and in fact, by institutional structures as well) contributed to a rapid increase of irregular migrants in all the three countries, be it long-term economic migrants in the Czech Republic, pendular, short-term migrants in Poland or ethnic Hungarians in Hungary. The reasons behind toleration of this “irregularity” reside in: 1) inherited attitudes from the communism, 2) pragmatic behaviour - awareness of the necessity of foreign labor presence in order to the proper functioning of the receiving economy, thus, the state may have turned a blind eye to foreign labourers’ unregistered presence on the given labour market, 3) a sort of a special “preferential treatment” of some country nationals – e.g. Ukrainians in Poland, or ethnic Romanians in Hungary. All in all, there was an indisputable difference between the anticipated and actual outcomes of the effects of state’s policies (Kicinger 2005).

There is another common feature that accompanies migration policy patterns in all three countries. That is the so called discretionary power which is tied to migration policy decision making – officials can often create their own standards of assessment (see Górny et al. 2009; Hárs 2009; Drbohlav et al. 2009).

There is a second dichotomy in play, that between reactive and pro-active approaches. The 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s were typical of reactive mode of policy making in all the given countries (a typical example is mandatory harmonization with the EU acquis communitaire). In the Czech Republic as early as 2003, in Poland in 2006, the change of paradigm of the access of foreigners to the labour market occurred and migration policy has started to respond to the needs of the economy. Whereas the effect of the Czech program to recruit qualified foreign labour force has not been important yet, allowance to work in Poland without work permit requirements for seasonal workers from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and Belarus brought an important impact upon Polish labour migration (see Górny et al. 2009, Drbohlav et al. 2009 or Chapter 4).

Accession of the countries in question to the Schengen Agreement might possibly be another important policy factor influencing migration patterns. This has been documented in

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70 Significant and persistent mismatches exist between officially stated policy objectives and the actual results (policy outcomes) - see the gap hypothesis (Cornelius, Martin & Hollifield 2004, but also Huntington 2005).
the Polish case. As circular migration is very sensitive to changes in migration legislation and/or economic opportunities in the country, after Polish accession to the Schengen Zone (December 2007) some circular migrants decided to overstay illegally in Poland, while some decided to return to their countries of origin for good. Policies also importantly shape the entire picture of ethnic immigration/compatriots. In the Czech Republic and Poland, just these immigrants, however modest in volume, experienced preferential treatment (it tackles long-term or settlement migrants above all). There is a different situation in Hungary. Except the very early period, the ethnic Hungarians were provided neither with legal nor with institutional framework to integrate into the labour market. As a consequence, a prosperous undocumented labour market saturated by masses of these immigrants has developed. On the other hand, Hungarian naturalization policy has been more open towards ethnic Hungarians, primarily in the beginning of 1990s (Kovács & Tóth 2007). Nevertheless, as Fox (2007) argued national affinities were not the labour migrants’ objective; rather the means to realize their economic goals.

Below, there are several examples showing us how immigrants are flexible and how effectively make use of various loopholes in legislation of the given countries. In other words, how migratory legislation may also become an important migratory factor shaping qualitative and quantitative parameters of migratory patterns:

1) For several months in 2001 many economic migrants entered the asylum seeker channel since as asylum seekers they could immediately start working legally on the Czech labour market (straight after submitting the application). As a corollary, the number of asylum applications in the Czech Republic jumped from 8,788 in 2000 to 18,094 a year later. Soon, however, this situation was changed by the 2001 Asylum Act amendment that allowed asylum seekers to work only after one year has elapsed from the date of the application submission (Drbohlav et al. 2009).

2) In the Czech Republic many de facto employees have been making use of a trade license channel. Instead of running their business they work as classical employees (so called "hidden employment"). The reason is that it is a much easier procedure for a foreigner to get a trade license as compared to gaining a work permit.

3) To avoid the risk of detecting irregular employment and to make use of loopholes of complicated procedure tied to work permits in Hungary, the labour certificate for casual workers as measure introduced to enable nationals to work was extended for foreigners, with effect from August 2005. Certificates are obtained, but only used in the ‘emergency case’ of inspection. To sum up, the certificate may be used by immigrants as a safety device, in order to hide irregular employment.

4) In Poland, migrants from Eastern neighbouring non EU countries treat the new instrument related to foreigners’ access to the labour market in Poland, namely the employer’s declarations on intention to employ a foreigner. This declaration may constitute a basis for consuls to issue a visa. For many foreigners, as experts71 in migration control admit, such a declaration is usually a facilitation of entering Poland or, since the end of 2007, the Schengen zone. Thus, the instrument intended to be a “ticket” to the labour market and, to some extent, a measure aimed at decreasing undocumented seasonal employment of foreigners, became, in fact, a “ticket” to the territory of Poland. Apart from random controls (contact with potential employers of foreigners) carried out before a visa is granted, there are no control measures afterwards. Foreigners granted visas on the basis of employers’ declarations enter Poland and often do not start working legally for the employers “waiting” for them, but become undocumented foreign workers at other workplaces or even in other countries. Moreover,

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71 For instance, experts interviewed on the purpose of IDEA Project
declarations became a subject of exchange. According to experts and migrants\textsuperscript{72}, declarations are easy to buy or to forge, which creates sham basis of further visa procedure.

5) Another example relates to mixed marriages, especially in Poland. False marriages constitute a way of accelerating the procedure of obtaining long-term residence permits or legal status. Although instruments aimed at controlling and preventing this phenomenon have been implemented, it is rather very difficult to combat and prevent this phenomenon absolutely. However, till 1998 situation was much more dramatic, since Polish citizenship was granted to a foreigner, becoming a spouse of a Polish citizen, almost automatically, ex officio. The consequences could be observed, for example, in the statistics showing the significantly increased number of marriages between Vietnamese woman and Polish citizens. Currently, the legal rules for marrying a foreigner are more complex and control measures, aimed at countering marriages of convenience, introduced. Still, they are assessed as not effective or even senseless.

6) Another example showing how migrants can make use of legal gaps or just act within the imperfect law is the way migrants used to perform their jobs as “board members” in Poland (and to some extent also in the Czech Republic – see Drbohlav 2004). Since up till the beginning of 2002 foreigners being board members did not need a work permit in order to perform their work in Poland, many foreigners, for instance coming from Vietnam, were registered as board members, but in practice they often worked as hired labour. Thus, in fact, foreigners being fictitiously documented as board members, worked in Poland illegally, if they were involved as employees on the labour market in Poland. In 2002 this situation changed, and the work permit requirement became valid in the case of board members, too. The effect of the change can be observed in statistics on work permits in Poland.

Finally, it must be pointed out that in none of the given countries social subsidies/benefits of the welfare states have served as a migratory “pull” factor that would potentially lure immigrants to these countries.

3.2.4 Attitudes of the public towards immigrants
Attitudes of majority population towards foreigners, or rather, in a broader context the whole atmosphere that revolves around foreigners, migrants, migration issues, may be a factor influencing size and some important structural parameters of migration flows. Indeed, motives summarized as “good attitudes towards migrants” (we mean here attitudes materialized not only in an institutionalised form via migration policy instruments but mainly those that are felt in the atmosphere of the whole society) can be often found when researching into migratory attractiveness of individual countries. The problem is, however, that due to an extreme complexity of migration motivation, in reality, the direct and “easy” relationship between migration issues and “good or bad attitudes” towards foreigners/immigrants is not so simple. Just this factor is often outstripped by many others that in particular situation are considered as key factors that determine the final decision. In the same vein, otherwise openly expressed intolerance to foreigners/immigrants by majority society is suppressed by pragmatic acceptance of economic advantages that spring from foreigners/immigrants. Anyways, it is worth analysing the situation in the given field particularly in CEE countries where, moreover, it is still, to large extent, a new research topic.

Very often when measuring attitudes towards migrants one makes use of a concept of xenophobia. Xenophobia can be simply defined as a fear of strangers. It is a phenomenon which has accompanied the mankind literary since its birth. Studying this process in relation to migration and integration is of great importance. Firstly, vox populi is a not-to-omit determinant influencing the design of migration policies. Secondly, attitudes of the recipient

\textsuperscript{72} Interviews conducted within the IDEA and other CMR projects.
societies (for example expressed via public opinion polls) play a crucial role in (un)successful outcomes of the integration process (Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003).

From the comparative perspective, we have a unique opportunity to directly compare results of a representative public opinion poll which was held simultaneously in 2005 in all countries in question (including Slovakia) under the CEORG cooperation, using the same questions and scientific approach. The findings imply that the extent and patterns of xenophobia seem to be to a large extent quite similar in the Visegrad countries. However, some minor exceptions did occur. Attitudes towards immigration might be documented on the distribution of answers to the question: “Do you think that anyone who wishes to come and live in country should be allowed to do so?”. The majority of the respondents opposed the enquired idea (“rather not” and “definitely not” answered 76% of the Hungarian respondents, 72% of the Czech respondents and 64% of the Slovak respondents. On the contrary, only 31% of the Polish respondents opposed the idea (Hárs 2009). However, we get a more unified picture when looking at the distribution of answers to the question “Does your country need immigrants?” Here, the similarity of answers is rather striking – about four out of five respondents in each country thought that immigrants were rather or definitely not needed. The definitely rejecting answer was most numerous in Hungary (40% of respondents whilst only 23% in Poland, 28% in the Czech Republic and 31% in Slovakia) while, on the other hand, the share of rather or definitely supportive answer was the highest in the Czech Republic (23% of respondents compared to 19% in Poland, 17% in Slovakia and 16% in Hungary) (Hárs 2009).

Looking more deeply into various countries and their national public opinion polls, we can learn several important national specificities. As was documented by Drbohlav et al. (2009), regarding Czech majority’s attitudes towards foreigners/immigrants and their integration there is a sort of a general positive shift from less to more tolerant attitudes in time. Such improvement is not straight-lined at all, and includes some contradictions. For example, it has been shown that a rather positive development of attitudes towards selected ethnic/national immigrant groups over time does not correspond to a rather strengthening trend of pushing foreigners to a full adjustment to Czech culture/society (a sort of “assimilative expectations”). Moreover, the well-known culture-distance hypothesis (e.g., Ward, Bochner & Furnham 2001) cannot be fully accepted in the Czech Republic when analyzing the attitudes towards selected ethnic/national immigrant groups - for a long time (since the beginning of the 1990s until recently). Vietnamese (having rather very different culture from what is practiced in the Czech Republic) have been until recently more popular than (culturally quite close) Post-Soviets among Czechs. The negative perception of Post-Soviets (springing from the Soviet army occupation of the country in 1968) suppressed, at least for some time, possibly intervening “cultural factors”. Importantly, it has also been shown that public opinion is sensitive to external economic conditions. Accordingly, the trend of positive changes in attitudes/perceptions of the Czech society over time was significantly influenced and “disturbed” by drop-offs in 1999/2000 that came in the aftermath of the serious 1997/1998 economic and social problems hitting the whole society.

The development of public attitudes towards foreigners has been to some extent different in Poland. These attitudes have evolved from almost unequivocally highly favourable towards all nationalities to far less favourable and strongly differentiated with respect to migrants’ nationalities. The highest level of sympathy and tolerance was notable towards the westerners; the lowest level towards Romanians (in popular perception – Gypsies), “Russians” (including Ukrainians and Belarusians) and Jews (not Israelis) (Górny et al. 2009). However, no extreme feelings and behaviours towards any ethnic or national group were exhibited.
The condition of Poland’s economy seems to be the primary factor affecting social acceptance levels and perceptions of immigrants\(^{23}\).

In Hungary, the general openness at the beginning of 1990s suddenly shifted towards xenophobia, and then a more open manifestation of it came about around the Millennium, followed by a consolidation of these figures to the more stable situation today. (In a more detail, the xenophobic attitude varied from 15% surveyed in 1992, within a few years this figure almost tripled to 40% and after a small backing period raised to 43% in the new Millennium reaching a top, then fall back again and fluctuated at around 25-30\(^{\circ}\)).

In 2007 – just like the years before – the least refused group (in terms of let to be come in Hungary as immigrants) were third country Hungarian nationals. Arabs suffer the strongest rejection, closely followed by Chinese and Russians, and Romanians. What is important is that like in the Czech Republic (and, from another perspective also in Poland), the public pinion polls in Hungary signalize (with some logical delay in time) worsening of the attitudes of the majority population towards foreigners in the aftermath of the serious economic problems (see more Hárs 2009).

To sum up, xenophobia is typical of the all given countries. Generally, perhaps a little bit more xenophobic seem to be Hungarians vis-à-vis Poles and Czechs. However, the level and “orientation” of the so called xenophobic attitudes depend on how the question is formulated, or, what particular aspect of migratory issue (or migratory type) is asked for. Thus, in this respect, one can find sometimes results that may differ (and, to some extent, contradict what has already been found). Again, it only proves how the issue is complex and how it is difficult to interpret results and to draw any conclusions.

We found that a factor of a cultural distance matters (except, to some extent, the Czech Republic - where in relation to Post-Soviets “political motives” suppressed it for some time). What seems to be clear but not elaborated upon here (see Górny et al. 2009, Drbohlav et al. 2009, Hárs 2009) that the level of xenophobia among domestic population differs depending on age, gender, educational level and some other important variables. What is interesting and perhaps worth elaborating upon in future studies is a different path through which the level of xenophobia has been developing over time in individual countries. Whereas in Poland and Hungary these attitudes have evolved from rather highly favourable to far less favourable, in the Czech Republic it went rather in the opposite direction (measured via attitudes to individual selected ethnic/citizenship groups).

\(^{23}\) However, this conclusion stems from an analysis based on a relatively short time series. It would be useful for further studies to address whether social acceptance for foreigners heeds to cyclical fluctuations (Wilkes, Guppy & Farris 2008).

\(^{74}\) The xenophobic attitude was measured via the following question: “What would you say? Your country (1) should admit all refugees, (2) should not admit refugees at all, (3) some refugees should be admitted, some refugees should not or (4) do not know”?

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Introduction

This chapter sets itself a couple of main objectives. The first is to analyse the current state and process of development of migration policies in three CEE countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in a comparative perspective. Besides pointing out the main similarities and differences, another task is to examine the external and internal factors influencing formation of migration policy at the national level. The emphasis will be put on the main root causes and breaking points of its development, particularly the role of the EU which has had a powerful impact on the policymaking process in the new member states. The thesis is as follows: despite the fact that all the countries examined are placed in early stages of migration cycle, migration policy has developed actively towards maturity. Although there are some similarities among them, each of these countries should be placed at a different stage taking into account the level of the development of migration policy. The Czech Republic is, in many respects, the regional leader on the way towards maturity.

Migration policy could be described, for the purpose of this text, as a system of legal regulations and a state’s practices towards foreigners (potential and real immigrants) together with its normative substantiation and executive apparatus. Taking it into account, migration policy analysis is complex and multi-dimensional. It requires examining not only a present state of legislation regulating a status of foreigners; more important is to understand the logic of the process of policy development, its grass roots and the way in which migration as a social issue has been politicised – included into a political system.

What does mature migration policy mean today? Following a traditional approach, the general characteristics of the ideal model of policy should be the following: well planned (based on a widely accepted migration doctrine as its stable normative base), well organized (supported by an appropriate bureaucratic structure which should ensure its successful implementation) and, what is the greatest challenge, efficient (final outcomes of migration policy should be as close as possible to earlier indicated goals). However, it is difficult to reach this ideal, especially in the case of the countries with very limited experience of migration policy development. It seems reasonable to assume that the minimum condition of maturity of migration policy is that it corresponds well to the actual state of affairs and the demand for a state’s intervention in regulating migration flows is met sufficiently.

The main stimuli of foreigners’ inflows remain, nevertheless, national labour market and the demand for foreign workforce (the one officially declared by employers and the one rooted in shadow economy). However, the role of the state in managing migration flows is undoubtedly a crucial one. More restrictive or liberal rules of entry, stay and system of work permits do have a significant impact on encouraging or discouraging potential immigrants to come and settle. There are many different factors which are considered important in the process of formation of migration policy. Among them are, on the one hand, universal norms based on historical traditions, commonly accepted values and the rule of law and, on the other, pragmatic objectives originating from the national economy’s needs, demographic trends as well as geopolitical situation including mutual interstate relations. Moreover, there is a variety of stakeholders influencing, in a more or less powerful way, a general course and particular activities of policymakers, e.g. employers, trade unions, political parties, NGOs and
other interest groups such as human rights and immigrants’ organizations. Public opinion could also have a very significant impact on migration policy. However it is not the case of the countries examined, where migration is not an issue widely present in the media or public debates.

As it was already mentioned, in order to be executed effectively, migration policy requires at least a general strategy, clear decision-making procedures and an adequate administrative apparatus. An important phase of migration policy development is its politisation and institutionalisation. Politisation means the process when migration becomes a subject of political concern; it is included into a political agenda and a decision-making process. One of its outcomes should be a debate around migration and a clearly formulated migration doctrine as a general strategy of the state’s interests concerning international migration flows. Moreover, politisation should be accompanied and supported by an adequate institutionalization process. Institutionalisation includes both dimensions: normative (formulation of a system of legal provisions aiming at the regulation of immigration) and the executive one (building of the more or less centralized administration structure).

What is similar in all of Central European countries is a lack of tradition of migration policy. They all have been traditional countries of emigration with little experience of regulating inflows of immigrants. The fact of geopolitical changes in the region after the Iron Curtain’s fall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, together with new the migration reality which occurred afterwards, required from states in the CEE region regulatory initiatives towards foreigners. In this sense, migration policy developed not as a state’s reaction to mass immigration but, first and foremost, as a result of geopolitical changes and the democratic transition in the region.

Migration policy is, in fact, a set of several closely overlapping policies such as admission policy, access to labour market for foreigners, policy towards irregulars, policies related to issues of integration, naturalization and asylum or policy towards Diaspora. For the purpose of the following analysis selected policies will be examined separately; however strict mutual interrelations between them must be always kept in mind.

4.1 Periodisation of the development of migration policies
A few serious obstacles occur during framing of the periods of migration policy development in the case of the countries examined. In the first place, it is difficult to point out exactly the starting and final points of particular phases. Conventionally, it is accepted that the moment of transformation and democratization of political system should be considered as a breaking point. However, it has to be taken into account that immigration itself as well as a normative and institutional system of its regulation had been developed much earlier than 1989. Nevertheless, this date is treated symbolically as a new beginning in the history of the region and also as a turning point in the history of migration.

In the case of each of the three countries, the process of migration policy formation had many similar stages which could be overall described as institutionalization, stabilization and consolidation\(^75\). The time of particular phases differs from country to country, but - with little generalization – it could be summarized as follows:

- late 1990s – 2004: consolidation and harmonization to EU standards
- 2004 up to now: stabilization of the migration regime.

\(^75\)See also appendix 4.1. as a summary of development of migration and integration policies in all three countries.
1989 – early 1990s: institutionalization

For the CEE region, the years just after 1989 were a time of dynamic and profound transformation of the legal and political system into the democratic one. The states’ governments were forced to react to the new geopolitical situation; the regional system of power and interstate relations needed to be re-established. The Czech Republic and Slovakia came through process of disintegration of federation which was finally completed in 1993. Poland and Hungary bordered new states and all countries in the region experienced economic and political transformation together with the necessity of recreating national identities. This period could be described as a time of shift from rather open and liberal conditions of entry towards more and more restrictive and as a time of building technical, legal and normative borders.

Although in Western countries migration policy had been developing for decades, in the case of Central European countries there was not any tradition or any model ready to implement. It was the time of the opening of the borders after the decades of isolation and restrictive exit policy of the communist regime. As a consequence, a variety of immigration patterns and flows emerged from temporary labour migration, ethnic migration, asylum seekers and refugees to irregular migration, mostly in East-East and East-West directions. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were undergoing transformation from countries of emigration into emigration-immigration countries. This fact had a direct impact on the states’ activation in the migration policy field. Due to refugee crises mass inflows of asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia (in case of all countries) and from Chechnya (especially to Poland) occurred. It marked a turning point in the development of the institutional and legal system dealing with immigration, especially in the field of asylum system. All of the countries examined became, at that time, an integral part of the international asylum regime based on the Geneva Convention (and a bit later of the EU asylum system). The binding law at that time preserved a highly centralized and discretionary character of the immigration system, which was criticized by experts, international institutions (especially UNHCR) and NGOs. Internally, immigration was in the domain of policing authorities (Ministry of Interior, Border guard Service, Police) which were the main bodies liable for controlling and managing of immigration.

In the early 1990s immigration was viewed only through security and control perspective, albeit being quite liberal. The most important priority at that time was to improve border control system as well as to develop legislation on admission and residence statuses adequate to the new migratory situation. Moreover, in the case of Central Europe, especially due to the unique geopolitical location and the time of transition, the issue of flows of foreigners came together with broader discussions on just regained national sovereignty, foreign policy and interregional relations. In this period agreement with Schengen countries on the visa-free movement and readmission procedures came into force and regulated the flows between Central and Western Europe. Individual countries implemented then new alien laws introducing more restrictive conditions of stay and settlement than those binding in the past.

Late 1990s – 2004: consolidation and harmonization with EU standards

In the 1990s “operational efficiency” had a priority over legal certainty. This delay in final formation of complete legislation could be explained in two ways. The first is rather obvious—all the countries were undergoing serious transformation and other priorities than the immigration issue were to be regulated in the first place. The second is that the system, which was rather flexible and discretionary, was more functional at that time of intensive transitory movements, uncertain situation in the East, and of development of state’s legal structure. This
situation could not, however, last long and policymakers had to react to major challenges related to the changing migratory situation.

The late nineties were the time of stabilization of the legal system on immigration and asylum. The legal system regulating the rules of entry and stay became more detailed and less discretionary. The introduced changes made policy stricter and more systematic. The countries implemented new Acts on Aliens or amended old ones according to guiding principles widely accepted at the European level. The policymakers then were focused on controlling - stricter criteria of detention and expulsion were introduced. The matter of admission of foreigners to the labour market and the system of work permits were also better regulated. It was, on the one hand, a result of the beginning of harmonization with restrictive requirements of the EU, and on the other a reaction to the worsening economic situation, increasing unemployment rate and a growing number of irregular foreign workers. The process of stabilization of institutional system also took place. The new bodies - more oriented towards managing labour migration - were set up, which reflected going beyond the dominant paradigm of treating immigration exclusively as a matter of security and control. It must be noticed, however, that this process was noticeable in the Czech Republic much earlier than in other countries in the region.

2004 up to now: stabilization

At the turn of the 21st century along with joining the EU (1st of May 2004) and the Schengen area (21st of December 2007), all three countries became an integral part of the European migration regime possessing equal rights in the policy making system at the EU level and the chance to influence its further development. The process of the accession to the EU constituted a crucial milestone in migration policy development in the case of all countries (Geddes 2003, Iglicka 2003, Weinar 2006). Member states have been obliged to implement *acquis communautaire* (binding legal acts adopted at the EU level) on free movement, immigration and asylum. Common visa policy and differentiation of legal treatment of EU citizens and their family members and third-country nationals were, among others, new aspects in national migration policies. As Geddes (2003: 173) described it “the CEECs have thus been placed on a steep learning curve and must look towards practices and ideas in EU member states”. Among all, being a part of the EU requires accepting the superior position of the EU legislation over the national one.

Membership of the EU undoubtedly has had, in every sense, a powerful impact on the stabilisation of migration policies of the countries analysed in all dimensions – normative and legal basis, institutional apparatus and practical activities. Although the main objectives of the EU such as combating illegal migration, harmonization of asylum regime, strict external borders control became priorities for new member states much earlier than 2004, the process of harmonization stimulated implementation of the more active, more systematic and standardized as well as all-embracing model of migration policy. As a result, new member states were forced to change the law and develop an appropriate institutional system. Additionally, policymakers were obliged to define national viewpoints on immigration through direct and active participation in the debate regarding migration policy at the European level.

4.2 Admission policy

Each country – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – was a part of the socialist bloc, where state borders were controlled strictly, and, what is more important, any travel documents allowing exit (passport or visas) or entry (visas, if required) into the territory of these countries were issued on a restrictive basis preserving the idea of the Iron Curtain. As a consequence, the inflows to these countries were very scarce and, excluding a few exceptions
related mainly to political reasons, almost impossible due to the strict control over internal and external mobility of people in the territories of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Thus, despite the lack of objective legal barriers, the practice of travelling during the communist regime did not contribute to the significant increase in the numbers of immigrants in the countries described. Nevertheless, there were a few categories of foreigners who could enjoy some facilitations in crossing the borders on the way to either Hungary or Poland and the Czech Republic.

**Policies of admission after 1989**

While in the post war decades in the communist regime, both outflow and inflow were controlled strictly and the physical borders constituted a real obstacle, in the years following 1989 the term “border control” changed its meaning, since such a control became more a formality and there was a shift in the focus of authorities responsible for securing the border from preventing “others” against entrance to preventing only undesirable “others” from coming. However, it was to change along with the Europeanisation process.

After the year 1989 – the fall of the Iron Curtain and the beginning of political, economic and social transitions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – the visa-free regimes stemming from agreements signed between the former communist countries were maintained, which meant, for the CEE countries described, the opening of the “gates” for citizens of other, usually less developed, countries in Europe and Asia. At the same time, while the CEE countries were undergoing multidimensional transition and diverting their attention to Western Europe, the issue of free movement between the former communist bloc and Western European countries was becoming more and more important.

The above-mentioned aspirations led, as in the Polish case, to the signing of agreements allowing for facilitated cross-border mobility as well as for relevant management of flows having illegal or partly legal character. Such a policy was rather aimed at enabling free movement of these countries' own citizens to the wealthier destinations. Nevertheless, the general trend after the fall of the Iron Curtain can be characterised as the increase in the opportunities for visa-free movement, which facilitated not only the mobility from and to the East of these countries, but also travelling to the West. Still, such a trend did not last long, because the need for the increased security and then especially the Europeanisation process influenced that direction and indicated clear priorities in admission policy: no barriers for the European Union citizens and restricted conditions of admission for non-EU citizens.

**Visa policies and practices**

Visa policies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were primarily based on the agreements signed during the communist regime with other countries included in the socialist bloc. However, the above-mentioned security concerns changed the visa requirements in these countries. Subsequently, along with the process of the harmonisation of the states’ law with the EU requirements in the pre-accession period, visa requirements had to be introduced or reintroduced. The course of this process was slightly different in the countries described due to the significance of the threats related to illegal border crossing, undocumented foreign labour and residence, or the negotiation process as well as due to the states' willingness to maintain or reduce facilitations of entry for foreigners from certain groups of countries.

In Hungary visa requirement for Chinese citizens was abolished in 1989, and due to the fear of increasing Chinese community it was reintroduced in 1992. In general, however, the authorities of Hungary decided to reintroduce the visa obligation in 2003, therefore almost at the same time as in the Polish case, when the visa requirement became obliging for the

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76 One of the examples of such agreements is the agreement between Poland and the Schengen countries on visa-free movement and readmission procedures signed by Poland in 1991.
citizens of the most important source countries neighbouring Poland to the East namely Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Belarus of Poland. Earlier, however, in 1997 visa regime was reintroduced by Polish authorities in case of other countries, previously not bound by the visa obligation. In the Czech Republic authorities decided to restrict entry polices and introduce visa obligation around the year 2000, when new law on aliens came into force. The sequence of visa introduction for citizens of given countries could be treated not only as a response to increasing security threats and external pressure from the EU countries, but also as an expression of national interests, which could be both the protection of the labour markets or the facilitation of foreigners' (from selected countries) entry into the country and the participation in the labour market.

It is worth noting that despite the introduction of visa requirements into the admission policy for foreigners, the procedures of obtaining the visa were, at first, relatively simple and did not constitute a serious obstacle for those who wanted to enter the territories of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. However, with the time being, the procedures were made stricter and, for instance, more proofs were required in order to submit and to be granted a visa. Still, in comparison to the procedures based on the Schengen rules, the practices of getting a visa, or previously other documents authorising the entry such as a tourist voucher or an invitation, were quite liberal. This was undoubtedly used, or even abused, by foreigners from countries neighbouring those states, who could use tourist visa or entry to the territory of a given country, which was then followed by undocumented employment or illegal petty trade.

**Impact of Europeanisation**

In general, admission policy seemed to be very liberal for a short time after the collapse of the communist regime in those countries. However, despite some restrictions put into immigration law, it seem that the quite liberal conditions of entry were offered by the Czech Republic and Poland longer, till 2000 and (for chosen categories of foreigners) 2003, respectively. In Hungary the restrictions, especially for certain categories o foreigners, were put into the admission policy much earlier. Along with the accession to the European Union (1st of May 2004) and the entrance into the Schengen area (21st of December 2007) the admission policy, and especially the visa policy, was dependant on the EU regulations which became superior. In this field of migration policy, the impact of Europeanisation is highly visible. The liberal rules of entering (and exiting) the countries were usually conditioned by the lack of precise legislation on the one hand, and the willingness to maintain “open” borders on the other. Restricting admission policy was, in turn, justified by the limitations of the labour market demand for workers as well as security reasons, especially the danger of irregular or illegal flows of foreigners onto or through the territories of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Securitization seemed to play an important role in shaping admission policies in the 1990s in each of these countries, however, in Poland this impact was more visible in the first half of this decade, while in the Czech Republic rather in the second one. Later on these were rather the EU requirements that shaped admission policy for foreigners in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. The EU directives also shape the exceptional rules for certain categories of foreigners such as students, scientists and researchers, artists and highly skilled workers in general. The EU regulations have undoubtedly influenced also the policies for admitting family members within the framework of family reunification.

Needless to say that one of the most important rules of admission policy is based on the division of foreigners according to their citizenship, namely the division into EU citizens and non-EU citizens. The first group and members of their families enjoy the freedom of movement within the EU and the Schengen area. The second group is obliged to possess special travel documents and different categories of visas (either unified or national) in order
to be admitted to these territories. Moreover, for the purpose of assuring accordance between the declared and the actual motives of immigrants, the states’ authorities can reject admission, even if a foreigner has undergone successfully the whole procedure for obtaining a visa. Such restrictions concerning admitting foreigners started, in fact, before the membership of these three CEE countries in the EU and the Schengen area. However, due to the international requirements their execution has become less discretionary.

**Privileges**

In each country there have been policies aimed at offering some privileges to certain groups of foreigners. In the case of the Czech Republic the privileged group of foreigners were the citizens of Slovakia, which is quite easy to understand taking into account the geopolitical past of these countries. Since 1993, after the split of Czechoslovakia, Slovaks were supposed to fulfil the requirements more or less similar to those which the EU citizens are supposed to meet within the EU currently, on the basis of special regime, including, for instance, no work permit obligation. Thus, their access to the territory and the labour market in the Czech Republic was definitely much wider than the access of foreigners coming from other countries. It can be stated that the legal approach towards Slovaks in the Czech Republic was even more liberal than the law towards Ukrainians in Poland, who have constituted a very privileged group for a long time. Usually, privileges concerning the conditions of entry were accompanied by some facilitations in the access to the labour market (see 4.3 for details). In the Hungarian case, the privileged group of foreigners was coming from the neighbouring countries, to the largest extent from Romania, but also Ukraine, Slovakia, Serbia. However, these foreigners were in fact of Hungarian origin. Nevertheless, in Hungarian policy aimed at ethnic Hungarians with ambivalence and indeterminate governmental stance, ethnicity does not play a crucial role in the legal status of immigrants itself, although it can play an important role for the ways of treatment, i.e. shorter waiting period for the applicant of Hungarian origin (for ethnic Hungarians the ethnic nationality has been uncertain and context-dependent – Brubaker 1998). Facilitating the entry of foreigners in Hungary was always ambiguous focused on policy of co-ethnics.

Tightening of border control measures along with the improvement in the visa issuing procedures were characteristic of admission policies in each of the countries described. On the other hand, each country has tried to preserve national interests in unified European procedures concerning admission of third country nationals. And thus, either due to the labour market needs or to ethnic proximity, there have been facilitations in policies of admission for selected categories of foreigners such as citizens of neighbouring countries, especially those with, as in the case of Hungary and Poland, of the same ethnic origin.

4.3 Policy of admission to the labour market

Although Hungary and Poland have never been regarded as very attractive destinations for economic migrants, the policies of admitting foreigners to the labour market seem to express a very cautious attitude towards foreign labour in all the three countries (including the Czech Republic). To confirm this statement it should be noted that the labour markets there are protected through the application of the labour market test (natives first) and work permit systems. With the time passing next exceptions were introduced to the general rules of applying the above-mentioned instruments, and, what is also very important, new instruments were created. The course of these processes differs in the CEE described countries. The extent to which the policymakers in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland respected the labour market needs while deciding about the width of the legal channel for economic migrants is also different. This, in fact, reflects the activeness or passiveness of migration policies concerning access to the labour market. The Czech Republic seems to be exceptional in many
aspects. It was the first to introduce programmes aimed at encouraging foreign highly skilled workers and offer them, and their families, easier access to permanent residence permit. Thus, it was probably the first in the CEE region as far as active polices aimed at recruitment and economic integration of foreign workers are concerned.

Protection of the labour market
After opening of the borders, the labour markets of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were reserved for natives only, and foreigners were admitted as workers exclusively in particular cases: when native workers could not fill vacant positions and foreigners’ presence on the labour market did not constitute a threat to national interests. Such selectiveness was achieved through labour market tests and, later on, systems of work permits. It is worth mentioning that, as in Hungary for instance, the labour market test constituted a formality, bureaucratic procedure, which could fuel in fact the irregular entry. Interestingly, the tradition of the labour market test has been quite long. For instance, in Czechoslovakia it was included in the law on foreigners’ access to the labour market as early as in the 1920s, however it was abolished after the second World War. Only in favourable circumstances on the labour market or in case of the inability to fill a vacancy with a native worker, a foreigner could get a special permission (Drbohlav et al. 2009: 10).

As it was noted above, the labour markets in these three CEE countries have never been considered as very attractive by foreigners, and this is why the restrictiveness of policy of admitting foreigners to the labour market could be interpreted as, to some extent, irrelevant. In attempts of assessing this policy, one should also take into account such factors as high unemployment or high inactivity rates, e.g. in Hungary, and possible fear of wage dumping in special segments of the economy. Nevertheless, the economies of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have always tried to prevent mass inflows of foreign workers. In the sense of legal employment, they have rather achieved this aim. However, the legal channel for foreign workers could shape channels for the alternative forms of appearance on the labour market, namely illegal or semi-legal forms of employment. For instance, the experience or awareness of the complexity and cost (in terms of finances and time) of the process of obtaining a work permit for foreigner, could make some employers resign from taking part in this process and choose another, much less complicated option – employing a foreigner (entering the country with easily accessible invitation or visa) without any contract and registration.

Current access – policies and practices
In each of these three CEE countries foreigners can work as employees or self-employed, or run their own business. The required title allowing for the job performance has been the work permit or – name depending on the country – trade licence. In every country the procedure of obtaining a work permit was considered as too complex, too expensive and time-consuming. At least in Poland this has changed in recent years, which was reasoned by a few factors. Among others, there were attempts to make the procedure of employing foreigners quicker and cheaper. This was partly aimed at decreasing the incentives for illegal employment of foreigners while increasing the legal opportunities. This change was also caused, as in the Polish case, by the labour market needs, shortages in particular sectors, and, last but not least, pressure from employers dissatisfied with the existing rules for hiring foreigners.

The rules of employing foreigners or permitting for their self-employment, one's own businesses, were an integrated part of migration policy from the very beginning of the development of this policy. With the time passing and better recognition of labour market needs, some professions were accessible for foreigners with required qualifications without work permit obligation. This was, for instance, the case of language teachers (mainly native speakers) or particular specialists in Poland. Thus, liberalisation of the work permit system
was usually related to widening the catalogue of professions that could be performed by foreigners without testing if the labour market allows for admitting a foreigner in a given case. However, such a liberalisation was not a part of development of policies of admitting foreigners to the labour market in the Czech Republic and Hungary.

In the Czech Republic the policy of admitting foreigners to the labour market seems to be the most active\(^{77}\) in comparison to the other CEE countries (in this case – Poland and Hungary). It seems that in Poland the labour market conditions influenced the (narrow) debate on migration policy only in the 21\(^{st}\) century, namely in 2006 when the citizens of the neighbouring non-EU countries gained a right to work in Poland on a short term basis without work permit obligation (at first in agriculture exclusively, but already one year later the scope of sectors was unlimited and later on the time limits were doubled). This law has been liberalised significantly partly due to the large emigration flows. The labour market needs did not shape migration policy before. In Hungary, the relevance of the policy-making to the labour market characteristics and the potential demand for foreign labour has not always been obvious. There have been attempts to react to the labour shortages through promoting foreign labour, but all in all the foreigners' access to the labour market in Hungary seems to remain strict, if compared to migration pressure. Over-regulation of migration policy in the area of admitting foreigners to the labour market is quite important characteristics of Hungarian policy. It is so to a larger extent than in Poland and especially the Czech Republic, where special programmes beyond the simple work permit system have been implemented.

Although not every activity aimed at changing the policy and practice of foreigners' access to the labour market has been successful in the sense that it allowed for the achievement of the set goals, the fact itself that such discussions have taken place and attempts have been made is important.

As in many other European countries, seasonal economic activity of foreigners has often been undertaken within the informal economy. Moreover, there has been quite significant tacit tolerance for undocumented labour, including undocumented work performed by foreigners. The efforts aimed at designing legal schemes concerning seasonal employment, if there were any (e.g. some attempts have been made in Poland), were not fully successful due to the simple fact that employment on the short term basis was still more profitable for both employers and employees when it was organised on an informal basis.

Moreover, the history of policy of admitting foreigners to the labour markets in these CEE countries, at least in Hungary and Poland, has shown that the policy has been developed most often irrespective of the labour market needs. It is worth noting that in Hungary, or instance, the policy of admitting foreigners to the labour market was influenced more by ethnicity arguments than the economic ones, and co-ethnics constituted an important target group of the policy regulating foreigners' access to the labour market. In Poland, the compliance of the policy tools with the economic reality can be observed since as late as 2006, when non-EU citizens from the neighbouring countries were offered facilitated access to agriculture sector in Poland. Employers, who – by the way – strongly supported the idea of liberalising the existing rules of admitting foreigners to the labour market, could submit a declaration on intention to hire a foreigner, and thus they gave a basis for granting a relevant visa and make a foreigner's entrance to the labour market possible without the work permit requirement.

Although there are legal channels for employment of foreigners (coming from non EU countries and performing jobs included in the work permit obligation) in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the closer look at migrants' strategies of economic integration shows that the existing tools are not perfect and can often lead to unregistered or semi-illegal

\(^{77}\) Already in the 1970s the active migration policy approach started to be discussed, however it did not result in real active approach, in fact.
employment of foreigners. Existing kinds of permits can be abused or misused through, for instance, practices like working as an employee but possessing the trade license (as in the case of the Czech Republic), working in different capacity than indicated in the work permit (as in the case of Poland) or working partly legally and partly illegally, which is a known practice in each of these CEE countries. What should be stressed in here is the fact that the above-mentioned practices are often tolerated not only by the society expressing tolerance towards informal employment, but also by the state authorities.

Privileges
There can be distinguished some privileged groups in migration policy towards economic migrants. The privileges were based on either ethnic criterion, or the qualification and educational ones. In the Czech Republic the most privileged group, which is not surprising, were Slovaks. Their access to the labour market was as open, more or less, as it is in the case of the rule of free movement of workers within the European Union. Slovaks extensively exercised their right to work in the Czech Republic without any work permits, which can be easily observed in the statistics of foreigners on the Czech labour market. In the case of Poland and its labour market, the preferences concerning source countries of migrant workers can be seen especially in the recent legislation on the access to the labour market for citizens of non-EU countries neighbouring Poland to the East. The newest legislation, making the possibilities of employment in Poland easier and more beneficial for foreigners in terms of time that they can spend in Poland, includes another source country (Moldova) whose citizens are privileged as far as the seasonal employment in Poland is concerned. It is worth noting in this context that, to some extent, the privileges were the expression of preferences, but at the same time they constituted an attempt to open a legal channel for those who appeared on the labour market illegally. However, while comparing the conditions of foreigners' access to the labour markets in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, Hungary seems to maintain the most restrictive policy, despite the debates on green cards and facilitated entry of seasonal foreign workers that was only partial in the labour market.

Special programmes – a snapshot from the Czech Republic
Policy instruments having the role of facilitating foreigners’ entry and participation in the labour market in the Czech Republic were usually introduced earlier than in the rest of the CEE states described. Moreover, those instruments could be perceived as an expression of relative openness towards foreign workers, especially those with higher qualifications. They can also indicate the activity of the state or, in other words, readiness to take “the responsibility for migration decision-making in its hands” as far as the labour market is concerned. To illustrate this one, the launch in 2003 of a pilot project called “The Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” should be mentioned. Its main goal was to encourage foreign experts, specialists and highly skilled workers to settle with their families in the Czech Republic through offering facilitated conditions of applying for a permanent residence permit: after two and a half years instead of the usual five years. The applicants were supposed for this project were supposed to have at least secondary education and a valid residence and work permit in the Czech Republic. Therefore, applicants were not provided with a job, housing or help with the immigration administrative procedure. The point system with several criteria (e.g. age, education, language skills, and working experience, but no specific occupation/profession requirements were set) was applied in order to select eligible beneficiaries. The number of beneficiaries with certain characteristics was limited by a yearly-set quota. (Drbohlav et al. 2009).

At first, only immigrants from three source countries (Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, and Croatia) could apply. The project, however, was designed as a pilot one, and each year it was
slightly modified through, for instance, widening the list of eligible countries of origin (mostly to Eastern European countries – e.g. Belarus, Moldova or Ukraine), allowing the graduates from the Czech schools (secondary ones and universities) for entering the programme regardless of the graduate's citizenship (no country of origin limitation). Interestingly, if a project participant loses his/her job, he or she could be granted an opportunity of protection period (45 days) on the purpose of finding a job, without losing his/her work permit. It is worth noting that the described pilot project is of a small scale (only 1,228 successful applicants – as of November 3, 2008) and the interest in it was even smaller than the set quotas. It could be reasoned by strict prerequisites (e.g. already having a work permit which is seen as a difficult and time-consuming process), low public awareness, low involvement of employers or low attractiveness of advantages offered (after Drbohlav et al. 2008).

Interestingly, such a programme as the one implemented by the Czech Republic can be seen as facilitating decisions about family migration instead of the individual one, however it does not provide any facilitations for entry or obtaining a work permit. It just offers some privileges or guaranties which will help the highly skilled settle in the country. Widening the categories of foreigners allowed to participate in the project was, to some extent, a reaction to little interests in the programme from the addressed groups. Nevertheless, the fact that the Czech Republic tried to attract highly skilled workers in that way is very significant. To strengthen the statement claiming that the Czech Republic seems to be the most proactive in the policy of admitting foreigners to the labour market, another project – the Green Card system – introduced on the 1st of January, 2009 in the Czech Republic, should be mentioned.

**Impact of Europeanisation**

Similarly to admission policy for foreigners, the labour market access policy was influenced by the Europeanisation process – conditions of access for EU citizens differed from those of non-EU nationals. However, in policies addressing economic activity of foreigners each state was more independent than in the process of agreeing upon visa system. Each state could indicate the detailed prerequisites which had to be fulfilled in order to make the employment (or self-employment) of foreigners legally permitted. Moreover, each state could decide individually if its labour market would be open after the accession to the EU. In general, the rule of reciprocity was the main factor influencing these decisions. The Czech Republic applied no reciprocal measures towards old EU countries (EU15) from the very beginning of its membership of the EU, while Poland and Hungary decided to resign from reciprocal measures later, in January 2007 and January 2009 respectively. Citizens of the youngest EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania, could enjoy the free access to the labour market in the Czech Republic and Poland already since January 2007. Hungary maintained restrictions for the citizens of Romania and Bulgaria till January 2009. This means that free access to the labour markets in the three CEE countries described is currently guaranteed for all EU citizens.

Current changes in migration policy regulating foreigners' access to the labour market seem to follow the main EU directives as well as express – at the EU level – priorities in neighbourhood policies. This is why, the main source countries for each of the CEE states described such as Ukraine and Moldova are usually taken into account while discussing special conditions of entry into the labour market in one of these countries.
4.4 Policy towards *irregulars*\textsuperscript{78}

It is worth noting, at the beginning, that the category of *irregulars* in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland includes usually those foreigners who undertake economic activity on an informal basis, which means that their work is either unregistered and/or not allowed due to the lack of work permit or another relevant licence. Among *irregulars* there can be also found foreigners who possess, as for instance in the Czech Republic, a trade licence but in fact are illegally employed. There can be also distinguished groups of foreigners involved in illegal activities, such as trade in fake goods or smuggling goods, and thus contributing to their irregular status. Other groups of *irregulars* are unsuccessful asylum seekers and *overstayers* namely foreigners whose residence permits of any kind have lost their validity. Foreigners crossing borders illegally, in turn, belong mainly to the category of transit migrants and they often head for other, usually Western or sometimes Southern European, countries. Thus, they do not constitute a significant group within the whole category of *irregulars* in these countries, which, however, does not exclude the obligation on the side of state’s authorities to deal with such migrants as well, especially now, when each of the CEE countries described belongs to the Schengen area.

In general, all measures aimed at preventing or combating irregular migration and dealing with *irregulars* are almost the same in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Each country applies preventive tools such as visa requirements with strict procedures, rejection of entries resulting from thorough control; controlling tools such as control over the legality of entry/exit, stay and employment of foreigners; repressive measures such as fines and expulsion and, with the exception of the Czech Republic, regularising instruments. Moreover, these instruments are not different from the catalogue of tools applied to deal with illegal or irregular migration in other European countries. Additionally, the standards of states’ reaction towards irregular migrants are, to a large extent, determined at the EU level and should be respected by the states. There are rather no innovations in national policies towards irregulars. However, the states still have the right to decide about the degree of the restrictiveness of the policy towards irregulars and, what is even more important, about the way of its enforcement.

Not ignoring the above, it should be stated that the practice of law enforcement in the area of migration policy towards *irregulars* is quite different from the substance of the rules included in the law. This is why, despite quite comprehensible system of dealing with irregular migrants and preventing illegal migration, particular instruments are not effective. Tolerant attitudes, mentioned above several times, towards different kinds of irregularity of foreigners' existence do also play an important, usually negative, role in effective law enforcement.

**Prevention**

Among the preventive measures the development and implementation of one can be worth describing here. It is the tool that allows to reject the entry of a foreigner suspected to pose an economic or security threat to the state. This instrument has been almost always present in the legislation. It cannot be called a perfect tool, however its proper application should play a real preventive role. It seems that only the external pressure on its thorough implementation followed by restricting conditions of entry helped make this instrument a bit more effective. Each of the CEE countries described has decided to use this tool more often, which has undoubtedly had an influence on the numbers of possibly undocumented workers or illegal transit migrants. However, after joining the Schengen area, this tool cannot be used as an important preventive tool any longer, at least in the Czech Republic, which territory does not

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\textsuperscript{78} In this section the term *irregulars* refers to different categories of migrants who break one or more immigration rules regarding either stay, entry or employment.
have any external borders. Still, rejecting entry can be possible in case of foreigners travelling by air to this country.

Another, still very complex, measure for preventing illegal migration offers legal channels for migration or supports the source countries in their efforts to reduce the push factors for their residents. In general, such tools can be found within the policy for admitting foreigners into the labour market. A special emphasis, in that context, is usually put on seasonal employment of foreigners, since the law ruling it is usually regarded as ineffective and unable to catch up with the demand in a particular sector, etc. Thus, the framework for legal travels and activities of foreigners undoubtedly influences the scale and mechanisms of irregular migration. Special programmes within migration policy are thought to be aimed at decreasing illegal employment of foreigners and increasing the level of the legal one through offering special legal frameworks for selected groups of workers. The existing schemes of seasonal employment have been not always successful, since as long as employment for a short time on informal basis constitutes a benefit for both employer and employee (because it allows for avoiding taxes and social contributions), even liberal and relatively cheap regulations for seasonal or short term foreign workers will be insufficient.

**Control**

Since in each country irregular migration is mostly related to undeclared labour of foreigners, often of a seasonal character and in sectors that are not easily controlled or even excluded from the system of controlling the legality of employment, one of the highest priorities expressed by the state is improving or amending the existing rules of labour inspections, especially those targeted at uncovering illegal employment of foreigners. Such sectors as agriculture, construction, domestic services and care work are known for attracting low skilled migrant workers, usually on an informal basis. It seems that the available measures of combating illegal employment of foreigners are insufficient not only because of their irrelevant design/construction or insufficient means spent on their application, but also because of very strong factors stemming from social attitudes towards the informal economy in general. In every country illegal employment seems to be tolerated, if not overtly, then quietly.

In general, it can be assumed that the control activities (over both entry and stay including economic activity) are not sufficient and, what is more important, do not address the real problems. To illustrate this, the case of controlling small companies or private firms in Hungary or Poland can be given. In Poland, for instance, despite the knowledge that agriculture sector is, to a significant extent, based on seasonal undocumented employment of foreigners, the labour inspections are not carried out there. Available statistics on labour market inspections and revealed cases of illegal employment of foreigners show, in fact, that the special tools aimed at combating irregular employment of foreigners are not effective. It is mainly because of the politics behind them and, especially, tacit tolerance of irregular employment.

**Sanctions**

Typical sanctions applied in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland include among others: 1/ expulsions; 2/ obligation to leave the territory of the country; 3/ fines for certain categories of law breaches such as performing economic activity without registration, overstaying, crossing border without authorisation; 4/ detention (which can be also a preventive measure). As far as sanctions are concerned, it can be stated that the less discretion the authorities have in deciding about the executions of sanctions, the more can be said about the effectiveness of those measures. Another regularity refers to the ailment of the sanctions and the inevitability of their application. If, for instance, the probability of being caught and
expelled is very high and, additionally, sanction is inevitable, it can be assumed that the system of sanctions also plays a preventive role. Nevertheless, while analysing different aspects of irregular migration in the three CEE countries, one can observe that the system of sanctions related to foreigners' behaviour is not tight in the sense that the regulations are not followed by relevant activities in practice. Sanctions, even strict, if applied rarely than it is needed, do not prevent potential *irregulars* from coming or working illegally.

**Regularising measures**

It is very important to emphasise that each of these three CEE countries does not offer wide catalogue of regularising mechanisms. The very few exceptions in Poland and Hungary seem to confirm the attitude toward *irregulars* in these countries. Preventive or repressive measures along with legislative solutions seem to be the most preferred, especially in the Czech Republic. These states are rather very cautious in offering undocumented foreign residents any opportunities for legalisation. Even if regularisation programmes (the case of abolitions of 2003 and 2007 in Poland and of 2004 in Hungary) or mechanism (such as permit for tolerated stay in Poland or special permits for unaccompanied minors in Hungary) were introduced, the criteria for applicants and the final results show that the aim of these programmes was legalisation of foreigners absolutely non-deportable and not harmful as far as interests and safety reasons of these countries are concerned.

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79 Understood here as permanent rules within migration law, including clear procedures and criteria regarding paths of legalisation of a foreigner’s stay.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic information</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularisation programme launched in 2004, lasting three months; individual procedure</td>
<td>“Great Abolition” launched in 2003, lasting four months; individual procedure</td>
<td>“Great Abolition – continuation” launched in 2007, lasting six months, individual procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Small abolition” launched in 2003, lasting three months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main objectives</td>
<td>Decreasing the number of irregular foreign residents, decreasing the number of persons who might potentially migrate illegally abroad</td>
<td>Decreasing the number of irregular foreign residents, decreasing the scale of illegal employment of foreigners,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of applicants</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>3,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive decisions (top three countries of origin)</td>
<td>1,194 (China, Vietnam, Romania)</td>
<td>2,747 (Armenia, Vietnam, and - far behind the first two - Ukraine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
<td>residence before 1st of May 2003 in Hungary; no criminal records; no detained in alien policing detention centres personal reasons, namely family ties, such as spouses of Hungarians or non-Hungarians who are lawfully residents in Hungary, or evidence of integration, e.g. the ability to handle affairs in Hungarian, - or economic reasons, e.g. ability to certify an income-generating activity in Hungary, e.g. to be the owner or executive officer of a company - or the expulsion of a person may not be enforced due to non-refoulment provision</td>
<td>residence continuously in Poland since at least 1st of January 1997; indicated place of accommodation and presented a legal title authorising to occupy such a place; possession of a promise of issuing a work permit in Poland or an employer’s written declaration confirming intention to either employ an alien or to entrust an alien with other gainful work or perform function in boards of legal persons carrying out economic activity; - or an income or property sufficient to cover the costs of alien’s maintenance and medical treatment (and of dependent members of alien’s family), without the need to claim social assistance for the period of one year; no threat to the state interests (security, economic interest, public order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status granted</td>
<td>Short term residence permit – mainly one-year residence permit (in Hungary with right to work without consideration the labour market situation and for non-deportable persons length of permit dependant on discretionary measures) possibility to apply for continuation of residence permit</td>
<td>No negative consequences of illegal stay (no ban of entry into the territory of Poland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional information</td>
<td>Difficulties in meeting the criteria of obtaining a residence permit after the permits granted within regularization programmes expired he</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration based on Final Reports of the REGINE Project (Dzhengozova 2009, Reichel 2009b).

Despite the significant number of undocumented migrants, according to the estimates, there are not even plans to regularize the stay or status of work of these foreigners in the Czech Republic. Authorities of this country have also noticed the role of regularisations in simulating illegal migration when an increased number of Egyptians – undocumented migrants – came to the Czech Republic and applied for asylum, however their target was Italy, where next regularisation was expected to be introduced. In general, the Czech Republic
does not consider regularisation programmes and mechanism as effective (Reichel 2009a). Hungary and Poland decided to introduce legal basis for legalisation of stay for foreigners who resided on the territory of these countries without authorisation. The time of implementing regularisation programmes (just about the moment of accession to the EU in 2004) referred to one of the main objectives of these policy instruments: decreasing the number of irregular migrants, who could potentially migrate illegally to other EU states. Poland decided to repeat the regularisation programme in 2007, which was aimed at regularising long term illegal residents just before Poland joined the Schengen zone. The second regularisation programme in Poland was, however, a continuation of the previous one, since it was designed mostly for those who did not apply for a residence permit in 2003, despite meeting the criteria.

Impact of Europeanisation

The development of migration policy towards irregulars has been mostly influenced by the Europeanisation process in each of these three CEE countries. Preventing and combating irregular migration became a clear priority especially in the course of the process of negotiating the membership in the EU and joining the Schengen area. In the pre-accession period, the legal gaps started being completed successively, which undoubtedly improved both the practice and legislation concerning border control, visa issuing procedures and control activities. Nevertheless, the quiet tolerance towards foreigners with irregular status, especially those undertaking work in the informal economy, as well as specific experiences of the natives related to their migration histories in the past, seem to constitute quite important factors hampering the enforcement of the existing instruments aimed at dealing with illegal migration and functioning of irregulars.

Each of these countries belongs to the Schengen zone, which creates the special migratory space. Interestingly, one of these countries, namely the Czech Republic, constitutes now a state without external borders. In this context irregular migration, and especially trans-border mobility of an illegal character is very important. It is also worth highlighting in here that the impact that the accession of these countries to the EU has had is of huge importance. Without the external pressure coming from the older EU members, the efforts aimed at securing the borders and dealing with irregular migrants would not be visible so much.

It can be concluded that migration policy towards irregulars in each of these European countries has been strongly influenced by the Europeanisation process. Concerns related to threats of mass undocumented migration transiting CEE countries in order to reach the Western ones were voiced firstly by Western European countries and then by adequate – assessing readiness for membership in the European Union – bodies at the EU level. However, despite the fact that some concerns had been raised before the process of preparation for the accession, these were rather EU requirements which made the CEE countries start more intensive activities in the field of preventing and combating irregular migration. Such a motivating effect was possible not only because the commitments to secure the borders and prevent undocumented migrants from coming and going further constituted a condition sine qua non in order for the process of accession to the EU to be concluded successfully, but also because material and, especially, financial support was provided, which doubled the chances for improvement. However, the practical outcomes can be less satisfactory.

Other instruments have also contributed to the comprehensiveness of migration policy towards irregulars. Such an instrument as visa system, if applied adequately, constitutes a good tool for preventing unwanted migrants from coming. Nonetheless, migration policies in this field are heavily criticised which is certainly due to the very imperfect enforcement of the
policies, the ignorance of existing gaps and very flexible and innovative strategies of functioning in an irregular situation, which can be observed among undocumented migrants.

4.5 Integration policy
Integration policies in the Central and Eastern European countries – contrary to Western and, to some extent, Southern European ones – are not very well-developed. Iglicka and Okólski (2005) emphasise selectivity of approach to integration taken in the CEE region – integration measures are usually addressed to specific, small immigrant groups or refer to limited aspects of integration. In the case of Hungary and Poland it may be even stated that integration policies are almost non-existent, particularly when understood as long-term, comprehensive and coherent strategies (to some extent it is true also for the Czech Republic, however its integration policy is relatively the most advanced among the CEE countries examined, at least conceptually – see point The Czech case). Admittedly, in Poland the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy released in 2005 a conceptualisation of a foreigners’ integration framework, but it was rather limited and, in fact, it included only rather general plan of actions (without time schedule) aiming at building a model of integration policy towards immigrants in Poland.

Only two special categories of immigrants are entitled to direct integration assistance financed from the state budget: refugees (and other persons under international protection) and repatriates in Poland. This very limited involvement of public authorities in financing and organizing activities and initiatives aiming at facilitating integration of foreign citizens is mainly due to the relative novelty of immigration phenomenon in the post-communist region and related to this a slight percentage of immigrants in total populations of the CEE countries (except the Czech Republic). This is also the result of a shortage of skilled personnel and financial means for this purpose (usually other competing urgent priorities win out). It has recently changed thanks to the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals created in order to support directly integration policies and measures in the EU member states. However, its first effects will be seen rather no earlier than in several years’ time. The projects co-financed from this EU budget are aimed at providing immigrants from outside the European Union with, among others, social counselling, language training and cultural orientation. The support is delivered usually by non-governmental organizations and local authorities.

It is worth adding, at this point, that in every country examined certain categories of immigrants are entitled to mainstream public goods, such as for example public education, public health care or public child-care support. Access to them usually depends on legal status. The widest scope of rights – almost the same as in the case of nationals – is assigned to foreigners with permits for permanent stay.

The Czech case
The Czech Republic is exceptional as it introduced integration activities towards other categories of immigrants than refugees and repatriates. They are addressed to foreigners legally staying in the country for at least one year. At this point it should be stressed that, generally, there are no state integration programmes or state integration courses in the Czech Republic, besides state integration programmes for recognized refugees. The integration policy is realized through various ministries which divide their “integration funds” among various

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80 Gropas and Triandafylidou (2007: 336) even claim that integration policies are non-existent in countries in transition such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
82 For the years 2007-2013.
projects (e.g. publication of brochures on selected topics tied to immigration and integration) or grants, which are mostly accomplished by NGOs’ integration projects (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic 2009).

The first conception of immigrant integration was created by the Czech government in 1999, and then it was detailed in 2000. It was implemented on a non-legislative basis by various ministries. One of the goals reached within the above defined integration policy was that in 2001 at each district authority an advisory board for integration of foreigners was established. Its purpose was to monitor and analyse “local” situation of immigrants. However, due to the administration reform these bodies were abolished one year later (Drbohlav et al. 2008).

The next important change in the Czech integration policy towards immigrants took place in 2004. That year the coordination of integration issues was passed from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. It marked a significant change in the perception of this area of policy towards immigrants. The most important result of that shift was the re-assessment of the Concept of Immigrant Integration (previously perceived as too general, vague and, hence, ineffective) (Drbohlav et al. 2008). It indicated: priority areas such as knowledge of the Czech language, immigrants’ self-sufficiency and orientation in the Czech society as well as their relations with members of the majority society; their main goals with time schedule for their fulfilment (Updated Concept 2006). One of the aims of the revised programme was the creation of a long-term framework of integration policies and measures. In 2008 integration matters were passed back to the Ministry of Interior in order to – as it was officially explained – re-integrate immigration and integration policy (Drbohlav et al. 2008).

Table below presents the distribution of state funding for projects targeting immigrant integration implemented in the framework of the Updated Concept across main state institutions in 2008. This year – as in two previous years – 25 million CZK was envisaged for this purpose (Šveráková & Kořinek 2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Total amount in CZK</th>
<th>Total amount in EUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
<td>10 800 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 417 000 EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Internal Affairs</td>
<td>5 000 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 195 000 EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>3 000 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 117 000 EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
<td>2 500 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 97 500 EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>2 000 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 78 000 EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry and Trade</td>
<td>600 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 23 400 EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry for Regional Development</td>
<td>600 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 23 400 EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Statistical Office</td>
<td>500 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 19 500 EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25 000 000 CZK</td>
<td>~ 975 000 EUR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In January 2009 standardized language tests were introduced. Language courses are not mandatory but the language competence test has to be passed. Certificate proving passing this exam is a prerequisite for obtainment a permanent residence permit (this requirement does not refer to the EU citizens, their family members and some other special cases) (Drbohlová et al. 2008)83. The costs of taking the examination by an applicant are reimbursed

83 Obligation to pass the language test before being granted permanent residence permit may be perceived as a selective rather than integration tool. However, it is treated as an instrument of contemporary integration policies, which aim not only at inclusion of immigrants, but sometimes – recently more and more often – at exclusion of “unwanted” immigrants (Orgad 2009).
by the Czech state only once. The Czech language tests organized by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Physical Activities can be taken only in selected language schools (there are approximately 2-5 such schools in each region).

**Political participation**

However, in the area of political participation of immigrants, which may be treated as a part of integration policy, Hungary is in a leading position. Foreigners residing in this country may join political parties as well as vote (but not stand for, except for the EU citizens) in local and EU elections (Niessen et al. 2007). On the contrary, in Poland and the Czech Republic foreigners are not allowed to belong to political parties (membership is restricted to adult citizens) and they do not have voting rights. Exception refers to the EU nationals who may take part in the European Parliament and local elections according to the EU law (see Table 4.3).

**Table 4.3 Voting rights of different categories of foreigners in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Local</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident EU citizens</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTR* third country nationals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* LTR – abbreviation from “long-term residents”
Source: own elaboration.

Consultative bodies with the participation of immigrants’ representatives function only in the Czech Republic, solely at the state level: the Committee for the Rights of Foreigners established under the Czech Government’s Council for Human Rights and the Council for the Integration of Immigrants at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Černík 2007). The authorities at the local level consult with immigrants’ representatives only on an ad hoc basis (Niessen et al. 2007).

**Immigration policy as a support for integration policy**

Some regulations of immigration policy, such as provisions facilitating and supporting immigration of foreigners who are expected to integrate easier into the society than other categories of newcomers or provisions making the granting of (temporary or permanent) residence permits dependent upon passing the language and/or integration tests, may be perceived as a part of integration policy. The project entitled “The Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” launched in the Czech Republic in 2003 or the “Green Card” introduced in 2009 – both addressed to highly skilled immigrants – may serve as good examples84.

**Impact of Europeanisation**

The regulations concerning immigrant integration in the countries in question have not been considerably influenced by the European Union law, mainly because integration issues are still an area of the member states’ sovereignty. However, they seem to be affected by so

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84 In the framework of the program “Green Card” low-skilled workers, if needed by the Czech economy, may also immigrate to the Czech Republic.
called soft policy of the EU, especially by adopted in 2004 “Common Basic Principles on Integration of Immigrants”, which triggered the formulation of national concepts of integration policies towards newcomers in the Czech Republic and Poland. Finally, it must be emphasized that immigrant integration in these countries has been recently strongly supported by financial programmes of the European Commission.

4.6 Citizenship policy
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – similarly to other Central and Eastern European countries (Liebich 2007) – adopted new citizenship laws after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. While in the first two countries it occurred relatively early, just after the beginning of the transition period, in the latter as late as in April 2009. The new Act on Polish Citizenship was, admittedly, passed by the Polish Parliament. However, it still awaits signature of the President, who referred the bill to the Constitutional Tribunal, which will examine its compliance with the Constitution. The Polish citizenship reform seems to be the most comprehensive, as it not only facilitates the acquisition of citizenship by former citizens (usually co-ethnics) including those deprived of the citizenship by the communist authorities, but simultaneously significantly eases the access to naturalization for other foreigners. Hence, if the new Polish citizenship law is judged by the Constitutional Tribunal as conforming to the Constitution, it will enter into force after being signed by the President, then it may be recognized as the most liberal and favourable for immigrants in the CEE region. So far citizenship rules of all countries in question may be described as rather restrictive (Niessen et al. 2007).

General rules of acquiring citizenship
Citizenship policy in the Central and Eastern European countries in question is traditionally based on the *ius sanguinis* principle, according to which a person’s citizenship – no matter where he/she was born – is dependent upon the citizenship of their parents (a child may acquire citizenship of a given country if at least one of the child’s parents possesses this citizenship). However, in exceptional situations the *ius soli* principle, stating that citizenship depends on the place of birth, is used (for instance, in Poland it refers to children found on the territory of Poland when their parents are not known). From immigrants’ point of view the most important is the *ius domicili* principle which regulates how they may become members of the state by naturalization through (legal) residence (see point *Naturalization requirements*).

Modes of acquiring citizenship
In the Czech Republic, Hungary as well as in Poland immigrants – besides automatic acquisition of citizenship *ex lege* (e.g. acquisition by birth or *via repatriation in Poland*) – may obtain citizenship through the naturalization process. In Poland certain categories of foreigners (stateless persons or persons with undetermined citizenship) have the right not only to the conferment procedure, i.e. discretionary naturalization, but also to the acknowledgement procedure, i.e. the entitlement to naturalization upon fulfilment of five years residence requirement (see Table 4.4), which leaves little space for discretion. Another specific modes of citizenship acquisition available in the countries examined are: reacquisition of citizenship in the form of re-naturalization (Hungary), declaration (for former Czechoslovak citizens who lived abroad and for Slovak citizens – in the Czech Republic; for former Hungarian citizens who were deprived of Hungarian citizenship by virtue of law and

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85 According to the new Polish citizenship bill (currently examined by the Constitutional Tribunal) right to acknowledgement procedure would be available for all categories of foreigners, however, on different conditions (see table 4.4).
whose Hungarian citizenship was terminated by expatriation between 1947 and 1990 – in Hungary; for, among others, foreigners who have been married to Polish citizens for at least three years, residing on the basis of permanent residence permit in Poland.86

**Naturalization requirements**

Residence requirements for naturalization vary in the countries examined: in Hungary - at least eight years of stay in the country on the basis of a permanent residence permit, while in the Czech Republic and Poland – five years (only three years – in the light of the new Polish citizenship bill). The residence permit can be obtained after five years of residence. This results in over a dozen of years of waiting period preceding the right to apply for citizenship. Another standard criteria for naturalization laid down in the law are presented in the table below.

**Table 4.4 Main criteria for naturalization in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for naturalization</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>According to the current citizenship law</td>
<td>According to the citizenship bill</td>
<td>According to the current citizenship law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence requirements</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean criminal record</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of sufficient income</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assured accommodation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the country’s language</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the country’s history, constitution or public values</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation to renounce previous citizenship</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No danger to public order or national security or state interest</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Conferment of Polish citizenship is a prerogative of President who establishes requirements. President is entitled to grant citizenship to every foreigner who has applied for it.

* In special justified instances a foreigner may be granted Polish citizenship even he/she does not meet the residence requirement.

* President may make granting Polish citizenship dependent on submitting evidence of loss or release from foreign citizenship.

Source: own elaboration.

As it stems from the above, citizenship in the countries examined is regarded as the crowning of the integration process rather than as means of integration. That is why, before naturalization, immigrants must fulfil certain conditions laid down in the law, proving their relatively long legal residence in the country and successful multidimensional integration into the society. These include, first of all, the knowledge of the country’s language and – as in the case of Hungary – general, historical and constitutional knowledge (cultural dimension) and the possession of sufficient income to support oneself (economic dimension). Moreover, in

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86 The new Polish citizenship bill envisages procedure of restoration of Polish citizenship for former Polish citizens deprived of the Polish citizenship by virtue of law due to illegal emigration usually for political reasons.
Hungary and the Czech Republic naturalized immigrants are obliged to take a citizenship oath (or pledge of allegiance) as an expression of loyalty to the new country.

**Preferential treatment**

In all the countries examined certain groups of immigrants have a privileged access to citizenship. Similarly as in other European countries, special naturalization rules refer to citizens’ spouses of a given country. The main difference in comparison to the general procedure is a much shorter period of stay required.

What is special about the citizenship policy of the majority of the Central and Eastern European region is that special preferences are given to former citizens and their descendants (usually co-ethnics) residing, or even not, within the borders of the state. It is connected with the difficult historical past (e.g. Stalinist deportations, shifted borders, losses of territories or illegal emigration to the West during communism), but also with a special understanding of the idea of “nation” – rather not as a community of citizens as in e.g. France but as a community of ethnic descent as in e.g. Germany (Brubaker 2001). As it was mentioned above, in the Czech Republic former Czechoslovak citizens and Slovak citizens can get Czech citizenship by declaration. The Hungarian citizenship law envisages that a non-Hungarian citizen claiming to be a Hungarian national, who lives in Hungary and whose ancestor was a Hungarian citizen, may be naturalized on preferential terms. In Poland special rights were given to repatriates – the people of Polish origin, granted a repatriation visa, who acquire Polish citizenship by virtue of law as of the day of crossing the Polish border (it is regulated by the Act on Repatriation of 2000)\(^87\).

Other groups of foreigners who are or may be privileged in the procedure of acquiring citizenship (e.g. by giving certain excuses for fulfilling certain conditions) are: in Hungary – parents of minor children who are Hungarian citizens, persons adopted by Hungarian citizens, refugees and stateless persons; in the Czech Republic – refugees and people living legally in the Czech Republic for many years; in Poland – persons who lost Polish citizenship by acquiring foreign citizenship due to a marriage to a foreigner or in relation to such a marriage, after this marriage has ended or invalidated\(^88\) and children which acquired foreign citizenship in accordance with decision of their parents if they submit appropriate declaration between their sixteenth birthday and six months after reaching legal age.

In general, in none of the countries examined are the so-called immigrants of the second and third generation (born in the given country) privileged in the naturalization procedure. They acquire citizenship on similar conditions as immigrants of the first generation. However, in the Czech Republic and in Hungary applicants born in this country (or even those who had established residence before reaching the legal age – in the case of Hungary) may be naturalized on preferential terms – namely, a shorter period of residence may be required in their case.

**Dual citizenship**

Dual citizenship is allowed in Hungary. In Poland it is tolerated, however, President may make granting Polish citizenship conditional on renouncement of previous citizenship\(^89\). In the Czech Republic, in turn, provisions related to dual citizenship are quite restrictive. Apart

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\(^87\) According to the new Polish citizenship bill former Polish nationals deprived of their citizenship in the period of the Polish People’s Republic would have the right to the restoration of their citizenship. Moreover, foreigners who possess a settlement permit issued in accordance with their Polish origin would be entitled to naturalization on preferential terms.

\(^88\) According to the new Polish citizenship bill categories of foreigners privileged in naturalization procedure are following: minor children (up to 16 years of age) adopted by Polish citizens, stateless persons, refugees and people living legally in Poland for many years.

\(^89\) According to the new Polish citizenship bill dual citizenship is allowed.
from several exceptions (referring to e.g. refugees) it is not allowed. In order to obtain Czech citizenship immigrants must renounce a previous citizenship.

At this point it is interesting to add that in December 2004 a referendum on dual nationality was held in Hungary. It concerned granting extraterritorial citizenship rights to non-immigrant, non-resident people of Hungarian origin living in nearby countries. However, due to insufficient attendance the referendum failed.

**Loss of citizenship**

In all the countries examined renunciation of nationality is possible. Hungarian citizens may waive their Hungarian citizenship only if they reside abroad and have a foreign citizenship or are able to render the acquisition thereof probable. In the Czech Republic and in Poland it is regulated similarly; but in the case of Poland living abroad (not residing in Poland) is not required by law.

Currently, Poland and Hungary do not provide for automatic loss of nationality. In the Czech Republic, however, citizens lose their citizenship in case of the acquisition of foreign nationality. It does not refer to the cases of acquisition of another country’s citizenship by marriage or birth.

In Hungary, and only in Hungary, it is possible to revoke citizenship, but only in the period of ten years from the date it was awarded, if it was obtained through unlawful means, in particular, by the recipient’s conduct aimed at misleading the authorities by disclosing false or untrue data, or by concealing any consequential data or information. Polish citizenship law and the Czech one do not envisage an institution of citizenship revocation against a citizen’s will.

**Impact of Europeanisation**

The European Union has not played a significant role in shaping citizenship policies in the CEE countries (member states from 1st of May 2004), mainly because it is still an exclusive, sovereign competence of the member states. The only important, but indirect, influence noticeable in the Czech Republic was exerted by the obligation to introduce the Council Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residents into domestic legislation. This has resulted in the shortening of a waiting period required to obtain a permanent residence permit from 10 to 5 years and this, consequently, shortened by 5 years the length of a waiting period for the right to apply for the Czech citizenship.

**4.7 Asylum policy**

Policies towards asylum seekers and recognized refugees as well as other categories of foreigners granted protection do not differ considerably in the Central and Eastern European countries examined. This is mainly due to the adoption of the same legal acts of international and regional law dealing with refugee issues (the Geneva Convention of 1951, the New York Protocol of 1967 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1953) as well as the later harmonization of domestic legislation with the legislation of the European Union – so called *acquis communautaire* – before and after the accession to the EU on 1st of May 2004. Another important reason for this similarity is the influence that the refugee law, in the more

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90 The referendum question read: "Do you think Parliament should pass a law allowing Hungarian citizenship with preferential naturalization to be granted to those, at their request, who claim to have Hungarian nationality, do not live in Hungary and are not Hungarian citizens, and who prove their Hungarian nationality by means of a ‘Hungarian Identity Card’ issued pursuant to Article 19 of Act LXII/2001 or in another way to be determined by the law which is to be passed?" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005).

91 In the Czech Republic it is being planned to introduce possibility for withdrawal of Czech citizenship owing to fraud in a citizenship acquisition procedure.
experienced in the reception of asylum seekers Western European countries, has on legal regulations of the CEE countries.

The introduction and development of a legal and institutional system concerning the reception and treatment of foreigners in need of protection started together with the beginning of the democratic transition period. During that time the CEE countries started to be perceived as safe countries for refugees. The most important and ground-breaking event was the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees and the New York Protocol of 1967 signed by Hungary as early as in 1989 (Hungary was the first of all the CEE countries to join this Convention), by Czechoslovakia in 1990 and by Poland in 1991. It is worth mentioning that until the late 1990s, Hungary, according to the restriction to the Refugee Geneva Convention made by this country, accepted only refugees from Europe and with European citizenship. Refugees from other continents were provided with international protection only by the UNHCR. This geographical limitation was lifted by the Act on Asylum, which was passed in 1997 and came into force in 1998.

**Influence of the European Union**

Another influential document from the CEE region’s perspective is the so called Dublin II Regulation, according to which asylum applicants must make their application in the first EU state which they enter. The regulation is especially important since Poland and Hungary are situated at the external Eastern boarder of the European Union and, therefore, are more vulnerable to large inflows of asylum seekers.

Convention refugees as well as foreigners benefiting from subsidiary protection (an institute included in the domestic laws of the CEE countries on the basis of so called Asylum Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC) enjoy similar rights to nationals and naturalized immigrants, except for political rights (only in Hungary they have the right to vote in local elections) and the right to free movement of workers within the European Union. Additionally, they are entitled to state-funded integration programmes, whose minimum standards are stipulated in the Refugee Geneva Convention.

Asylum policies may be described as the most Europeanized subfield of migration policies in the Central and Eastern European countries (Kicinger, Weinar, Górny 2007).

**Trends in asylum migration**

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have experienced a relatively significant influx of refugees (see Table 4.5) when compared to other CEE countries, but not considerable in comparison to Western European countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5 460</td>
<td>1 600</td>
<td>8 080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4 160</td>
<td>1 610</td>
<td>6 860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3 020</td>
<td>2 120</td>
<td>4 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1 880</td>
<td>3 430</td>
<td>7 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2 360</td>
<td>3 120</td>
<td>7 200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR 2009.

In 1990, in all three countries examined, fugitives dominated: mainly from former Yugoslavia in Hungary (also from Romania – ethnic Hungarians by reason of ethnic repression) and later on from Afghanistan and Iraq, while in the Czech Republic and Poland from Russia (Chechnya). Due to mainly poor welfare benefits perspectives, the CEE countries are treated
by asylum seekers and refugees as transit rather than settlement countries. Table below presents top-10 nationalities of asylum applicants in 2008 in the countries examined. Poland receives the largest number of asylum seekers, currently predominantly Russian nationals of Chechen nationality.

**Table 4.6 Top-10 nationalities of asylum applicants in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Fed.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhtan</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Rep.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR 2009.

In 2007 similar number of refugee status was given in three countries examined: the highest in Poland – 212, little lower in the Czech Republic – 191, and the lowest in Hungary – 69. Majority of recognized refugees in Poland originated from the Russian Federation (104), in the Czech Republic – from Belarus (32), the Russian Federation (31), Ukraine (19) and Iraq (17), while in Hungary – from Iraq (64), Somalia (30) and Cuba (28). Much more significant disproportion has been observed in the number of subsidiary protection status granted: 69 in Hungary – mainly for citizens of Serbia-Montenegro (16), 191 in the Czech Republic – mainly for citizens of Belarus (52), Iraq (33) and the Russian Federation (31) and as many as 2919 in Poland – predominantly for citizens of the Russian Federation (2834).

**4.8 Repatriation policy**

Among policies towards compatriots living abroad pursued in the Central and Eastern European countries, three main types of policies may be distinguished: resettlement policy, policy facilitating immigration and/or (in the future) settlement and policy towards diaspora aiming at giving cultural and economic support to co-ethnics abroad, fostering ties with homeland, but rather encouraging to remain in the countries of birth. The latter – carried out, on the vast scale, by Hungary – is rather beyond the scope of this article, but for the purpose of comparison the Hungarian Identity Card shall be analyzed.

What is meaningful, in Hungary and in Poland the states’ responsibility regarding compatriots from abroad is stipulated in constitution – the principal source of law. It marks the range of this issue in these countries. According to article 6 section 3 of the Hungarian Constitution “The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for what happens to Hungarians living outside of its borders and promotes the fostering of their relations with Hungary”. In the Polish Constitution it is formulated similarly, but there are also other provisions which go further and say that “Anyone whose Polish origin has been confirmed in accordance with statute may settle permanently in Poland” (article 52 section 5). It is worth adding that the issue of relations with co-ethnics abroad was not covered by constitutions of these states in the communism-era (Fowler 2004).

It must be stressed that policies towards foreign co-ethnics in countries examined are motivated by moral and sentimental reasons rather than economic ones. Such an approach is

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92 Representatives of other nationalities constituted groups of 5 or less persons.
rather supported by public opinion – privileged legal position of compatriots from abroad is generally accepted in the societies of these countries.

Resettlement policies

Resettlement policies directly aiming at the stimulation of settlement immigration of co-ethnics from abroad and facilitation of their integration in a homeland – similar to the model of Germany’s policy towards so called Aussiedlers – have been adopted only in the Czech Republic and Poland. In Hungary such state-funded resettlement programmes have not been organized due to treating co-ethnics policy not as an immigration policy (although non-nationals of Hungarian ancestry are granted preference in the immigration and naturalization procedure), but as a policy of shaping national identity (Toth 2000, Hegyesi and Melegh 2002, after: Hárs et al. 2008).

Resettlement policy was introduced in the Czech Republic as early as in the beginning of 1990. The first wave of repatriation took place between 1991 and 1993 and it consisted of foreigners of Czech origin coming from countries hit by the Chernobyl disaster, namely from Ukraine and Belarus. It embraced 1812 resettlers. They were provided with housing and work. Additionally, they acquired permanent residence permits; and later on naturalization procedure was eased for them. The second wave of repatriation occurred from 1996 to 2001. This resettlement programme was targeted at Czech compatriots from remote and endangered territories, mainly from Kazakhstan, but also from such countries as, among others, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. Within its framework, 818 compatriots moved to the Czech Republic. They were also given help in finding accommodation and work. After that, people of Czech origin could come to their homeland only through the standard immigration procedure without the state support. The last one-year repatriation programme took place in 2007 and it was addressed to Czech compatriots from Kazakhstan (157 persons). This time resettlement aid for repatriates (similarly like in the case of successful asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status) consisted of flats owned by municipalities, language and social assistance. Their stay, as in previous programmes, was legalized on the basis of permanent residence permit (Drbohlav et al. 2008).

In Poland first provisions concerning repatriation of compatriots (obviously, not taking into account legal acts regulating the first two big waves of repatriation, which took place just after the Second World War in 1940. and 1950.) were passed later than in the Czech Republic – as late as in the second half of 1990. They were included in the new Act on Aliens of 1997. They referred to all foreigners of Polish descent including compatriots coming from Western countries. However, in the new Act on Repatriation of 2000 the right to repatriation procedure was restricted to ethnic Poles permanently residing in the territory of certain countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or the Asian part of the Russian Federation; generally speaking – in the territory of the Asian part of the former Soviet Union.

Foreigners of Polish origin moving to their homeland via repatriation procedure are granted much more complex state-financed aid than Czech compatriots in the Czech Republic. Not only they are given the right to a flat or house (in the form of a rent or ownership), but also to other benefits, such as, among others, a settlement and maintenance grant, reimbursement of the costs of education in Poland of minors who are subject to compulsory education, partial reimbursement of costs associated with repairs or adaptation of a dwelling, free course of the Polish language, free courses on the adaptation to life in the Polish society. Moreover, they are granted Polish citizenship, which entitles them to all rights that Polish citizens have. The aid financed from the state budget is offered also to employers of repatriates in the form of the refund of part of the costs of remuneration, bonuses and social insurance contributions, work station equipment and vocational training of the repatriate. So
far more than six thousand Polish ethnics and members of their families have resettled to Poland within the repatriation procedure, predominantly from Kazakhstan.

**Policies fostering immigration and settlement of co-ethnics**
The second type of policies concerning co-ethnics is policy aimed at facilitating immigration and/or settlement in homeland, without any special integration programmes financed from the public budget. Such legislation is existent in Hungary: facilitated immigration in the framework of the standard immigration procedure and facilitated naturalization as well as, to some extent, provisions related to the Hungarian Identity Card (Hárs et al. 2008). It is applied also in Poland: facilitated settlement on the basis of article 52 section 5 of the Constitution (cited above) without any residence requirements and immigration on the basis of the Card of the Pole, which entitles its holders to the facilitated access to the territory of Poland and to some additional benefits (see point The Hungarian Identity Card and the Card of the Pole).

On the basis of the Act on Entry and Residence of Third Country Nationals a special entry and residence possibility for people with Hungarian ethnic background or affiliation was provided. According to the law, if an international treaty provides, third country nationals are entitled to a national visa and a national residence permit, if they want to stay in Hungary with the aim of preserving and maintaining the Hungarian language or their cultural and national identity; enrolment in education outside the statutory secondary and higher education system; or strengthening family relationships, apart from family (re)unification. The national visa and residence permit are valid for maximum of five years, which can be extended with a maximum of other five years at a time. Neither the national visa, nor the national residence permit authorize their holders to work or engage in any other income-generating activity in Hungary, and they authorize their holder to enter and stay only in Hungary, not any other member state in the Schengen zone.

Legalization of stay on the basis of the permanent residence permit in Poland by way of article 52, section 5 of the Polish Constitution, in turn, is available to foreigners of Polish origin from all countries of the world. This type of permit obtain mainly Poles with citizenship of Kazakhstan and Russia.

**The Hungarian Identity Card and the Card of the Pole**
Now, let us move to the topic of the Card of the Pole and the Hungarian Identity Card – documents certifying Polish and Hungarian nationality, respectively, on the basis of which a set of entitlements is granted (see Table 4.7). The most important difference between these two documents is that while the first introduced the possibility of immigrating to Poland and working or running a business here under the same conditions as Polish citizens (without obligation of possessing work permit), the latter was established mainly in order to enhance protection for co-ethnics and to stimulate their relations with homeland (what obviously eventually may result in immigration).

The Hungarian Identity Card was introduced by the Act on Benefits for Ethnic Hungarians living in Neighbouring Countries (the so called Status Law) adopted in 2001 and significantly changed in 2003 due to the reservations of some neighbouring countries and international protests (among others members of Hungarian minorities abroad were deprived of the right to work in Hungary without work permit) (Fowler 2004). The Act on the Card of the Pole, in turn, was passed as late as in 2007, although parliamentary works on the legal act introducing this document began 10 years earlier. It is worth adding that Polish provisions were inspired by the Hungarian ones (after changes of 2003), but due to amendments introduced by parliament (granting the right to work and run a business under the same conditions as Polish citizens) – they became closer to the German model which accepts and
even promotes migration into the homeland rather than is focused on preservation of the identity of co-ethnics living in historically determined host states (Singh 2006).

In order to obtain both the Hungarian Identity Card and the Card of the Pole certain conditions must be fulfilled, among which the most important is proving Hungarian or Polish ethnicity and not possessing Hungarian or Polish citizenship, respectively. In both countries geographical limitations are set out. In Hungary the inhabitants of adjacent states (except Austria): Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Romania and Ukraine have the right to apply for a certificate of Hungarian nationality. In Poland the right to obtain the Card of the Pole refers to the inhabitants of the following Eastern countries (former Soviet Union): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Hungarian Identity Cards are issued by the state’s authorities, but on the recommendation of ethnic Hungarian organizations from countries of origin. In the case of the Card of the Poles this competence belongs solely to the consulate clerks.
### Table 4.7 Benefits assigned to the Card of the Pole and to the Hungarian Identity Card

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Card of the Pole</th>
<th>Hungarian Identity Card</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visas and residence permits</strong></td>
<td>Right to a long-term visa enabling a multiple Polish border crossing (national visa).</td>
<td>Right to a long-term visa enabling a multiple Hungarian border crossing (national visa).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Right to work on the same conditions as Polish citizens – without work permit.</td>
<td>No benefits (before the amendment of 2003 - right to work permit granted regardless of labour market conditions for three months per calendar year, with possibility of extension).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Right to run a business on the same conditions as Polish citizens.</td>
<td>No benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Right to public (primary, secondary and higher) education free of charge.</td>
<td>Right to public education (primary, secondary and higher) free of charge. Grants to attend schools or universities in Hungary. Subsidies for Hungarian schools abroad. Mutual recognition of academic diplomas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Right to medical services in emergencies on the same conditions as Polish citizens. Entitled to healthcare provisions in line with health insurance contributions paid.</td>
<td>No benefits (before amendment of 2003 – entitled to some healthcare provisions in line with taxes paid, non-tax payers could apply for help with healthcare costs in Hungary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security</td>
<td>No information.</td>
<td>No benefits (before amendment of 2003 entitled to some pension rights in line with employment taxes paid).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalization</td>
<td>No benefits.</td>
<td>Residence requirement, but no permanent residence requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Visiting national museums free of charge.</td>
<td>Access to cultural institutions (libraries, archives, museums) on the same conditions as Hungarian nationals (in some cases at reduced fee or free).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transport</td>
<td>Railway transport at reduced fee.</td>
<td>Public transport at reduced fee or even free.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other benefits</td>
<td>Applying, in the first order, for financial support from the state budget or from the commune authorities devoted to supporting the Polish citizens abroad.</td>
<td>Scientists can become external members of Hungarian Academy of Sciences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Fowler (2004) notices, co-ethnics benefiting from the possession of the Hungarian Identity Card and the Card of the Pole are neither residents, nor citizens. In her opinion it is justified to call the relationship created by the Hungarian and Polish legislation on this matter a form of citizenship. She proposes to name it “fuzzy citizenship” and distinguishes four parameters of this legal relationship between the state and the individuals: 1. are not full citizens, 2. not or not necessarily residents, 3. defined by their membership of a cultural nation, not a state’s citizenry, 4. entitled to state-services in the kin-state.
It is worth mentioning that all the Central and Eastern European countries examined pursue policies targeted at strengthening relations with members of compatriot communities abroad, which are the most developed in Hungary. This is particularly characteristic of states with histories of shifting borders (Bauböck, Perchinig & Sievers 2007).

**Impact of Europeanisation**

Foreigners who are considered to be co-ethnics are a privileged category of immigrants in all the Central and Eastern European countries examined, which is not common in other parts of Europe. Thus, repatriation policy seems to be the most independent subfield of migration policy, also from the EU influences.

**4.9 Conclusions**

Although the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, due to its geopolitical location, historical past and other characteristics, have shared similar challenges concerning international mobility, each of the countries examined has developed during the last two decades the particular migration regime based on a distinctive pattern of policymaking system. Examining the process of developing legislation and policy related to migration in these countries, it is clear that the Czech Republic has achieved a leading position. Low scale of real immigration in Hungary and Poland and its characteristics (fluid, circular immigration, especially in the last case) does not create a necessary impact for policymakers to be active as intensively in the field of migration management as it has happened in case of the Czech Republic. Taking into account the internal and external impulses motivating policymakers to evolve migration policy, the Czech case was the only one when real immigration was one of them. Hungary and Poland are examples where it has developed rather as a response to external pressures, particularly related to the fact of joining the EU. As it was presented in this chapter, the Europeanisation process influenced to large extent all of the polices analysed here (naturalisation and repatriation policy are probably the only exceptions).

The analysis suggests that the examined countries do not necessarily reproduce the same migration cycles of Western or Southern European countries. Nevertheless, policymakers from CEE states have followed the traditional line (developed by the EU and Western countries) in conceptualization and implementation of migration policy during the time of harmonisation and adaptation of the EU rules. Simultaneously, all three countries draw the inspiration from more mature and experienced immigration countries both in terms of perception of immigration as well as models of management of migration inflows. The best prentice which follows more experienced European countries is the Czech Republic. This is the most mature case from the point of view of formulation of migration doctrine, implementation of particular activities aiming at the encouragement of inflow and settlement of foreigners. The distance between this country and the two others is noticeable especially in the case of the development of integration policy and policy of admitting foreigners to the labour market. However, it is worth pointing out that in Poland and Hungary there are also some examples of more systemic and complete state’s activities in migration management; policy towards co-ethnics and repatriation system is one of them.

Taking into account the institutional model which has developed in all three countries, it seems to be very similar. The competences on the immigration issue are divided among several bodies and coordinated by the Ministry of Interior, which has a dominant role in migration policy making. The institutional system is highly centralized and there is a marginal influence of the lower level of administration or NGOs’ sector. However, the Czech Republic is, to some extent, an exception here (especially with regard to the position of NGOs’ sector).

Additionally, in all the countries special bodies (as inter-ministry committee or inter-departmental group) dealing exclusively with migration issue were set up very recently. Their
main aim was declared as a formulation of long term strategy of migration policy (migration doctrine) and the coordination of activities of a variety of institutions dealing with immigration.

While Hungary and Poland are still at the stage of preparation of the draft proposal of national migration strategy, in the Czech Republic this process is much more advanced. The basic policy principles related to international migration were agreed upon and announced by the Czech Government in 2003. Although they are criticized by some experts as very general and vague, with no impact upon migration policy, still the process of its conceptualization is more developed in comparison with other countries. At the same time it has to be noticed, however, that even if in the case of Hungary or Poland there is no single document where migration doctrine is clearly stated, state’s migration strategy could be extracted from other sources such as various documents and statements of policymakers.

The data show clearly that the Czech Republic has attracted more immigrants in comparison with Poland and Hungary. It is also a consequence of the state’s policy towards foreigners. While the Czech Republic has actively encouraged labour and settlement migration (even through small-scale programmes), Poland and Hungary had a rather opposite priority – accepting short-term immigration from neighbouring countries and supporting the settlement of only one particular group of co-ethnics. The situation has changed recently and in all the three countries the case of active encouragement of foreign workforce has became an issue of debate. Furthermore, more liberal rules of admission of foreigners to national labour markets have been introduced. A growing demand for foreign labour seems to be the most powerful factor influencing this process. The leader was again the Czech Republic; there in 2003 a pilot project for attracting skilled migrant workers to settle in the country was introduced. Very recently the Czech Parliament passed the law (in force since January 2009) on new labour immigration programme called the Green Card Project addressed to both high- and low – qualified immigrants from selected countries. In Poland and Hungary this process, which could be described as “controlled opening” has been also noticeable, however on a much more limited scale in comparison with the Czech case.

What is a common characteristic to all the countries is that immigration occurs very rarely in a political or public discourse. Generally speaking, any debate on immigration has been highly bureaucratic without any wider engagement of public opinion. Neither the process of drafting of legal acts related to migration nor setting up succeeding institutions were accompanied by any extensive dispute. On the contrary, it was restricted to the technicalities and has taken place exclusively within the state’s administration. Additionally, in particular situations some groups of interest, such as employers or labour unions, announced publicly the point of view on immigration in the context of labour market and employment.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the analysis of migration impacts. Special emphasis is put to the socio-economic impacts of migration upon the receiving societies of CEE states, which are by far the most important ones taking into account the great share of “circulators” among immigrants and a short period of time since immigration patterns have developed. We will also touch upon the outcomes of immigrants’ integration into the society, although immigrants’ presence within the societies in question is still quite a recent phenomenon in order to say any far-reaching conclusions on integration outcomes. The importance of the capital city for immigrants’ work and stay is a traditional migration pattern (Castles & Miller 2003) which was also observed in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and to some extent in Poland (see section 5.2.). Finally, naturalization trends will be compared in all three countries.

5.1 Socio-economic impacts of migration

The Czech Republic

Economic impacts of immigration are the most important ones upon Czech society due to the overwhelming economic character of migration. Other migration impacts have not yet become too visible because of the mentioned circular character of labour migration and because only a short time has elapsed since large-scale immigration has started (Drbohlav 2004). Foreign labour largely assists the growth of the Czech economy in the most important regions of production – firstly in Prague and secondly in other urbanized areas where there is a permanent and continued demand for foreign labour force due to plenty of developmental activities together with a lack of the respective domestic labour force (Drbohlav 2004). As has been proved in the Czech Republic (Drbohlav 2004, Český statistický úřad 2006, or Horáková 2006), labour migration grows as unemployment falls and vice versa. This further implies that labour migrants supplement rather than compete with Czechs on the labour market, since they mostly take unattractive and poorly paid jobs. Moreover, foreigners’ “spatial flexibility”\(^\text{93}\) represents an important advantage for the Czech labour market.

When assessing the economic impacts of migration, one can also look at the level of immigrants’ economic integration. As economic reasons are the main reasons for immigration to the Czech Republic, it is not surprising that economic activity rate of foreigners has recently reached more than 80 per cent, compared to about 60 per cent of the total population of the Czech Republic. Parallely, the unemployment rate of foreigners is thought to be much lower than the overall registered unemployment rate in the Czech Republic, however, also due to strict legal regulations which almost do not allow long-term migrants to stay in the country when made redundant (for more on this see Drbohlav et al. 2009). Distribution of foreign labour force among the economic sectors is different to that of nationals - foreigners are overrepresented in construction, and wholesale and retail trade, due to high shares of third country nationals in these sectors. On the other hand, real estate and renting activities employ more foreign workers than Czech nationals (in relative terms), however, this is more the case of EU citizens. In general, more than a half of foreigner labour is currently employed or runs a business in agriculture and industry, although only slightly more than 40 per cent of Czech nationals do. This implies foreigners’ employment in low paid and low social status jobs

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\(^\text{93}\) Internal migration of Czechs is very low compared to other developed countries (Lux, Sunega, Mikeszová, Večerník & Matyáš 2006, Čermák 2004). Nevertheless, recently the rates of internal migration among foreigners have been almost twice as high as among Czech citizens.
which are more prone to cyclical crisis, hence, an unfavourable condition for immigrants’
integration. On the other hand, it seems that the relation between immigrants and Czech social
system (e.g. drawing of social benefits) has been rather weak (Drbohlav et al. 2009).

Although the share of foreigners in Czech population is not a negligible one, the
impacts of immigration upon other non-economic structures have so far been rather marginal.
As documented by Burcin, Kučera and Drbohlav (2007) the impact of immigration on the
demographic profile is and more importantly will be significant only in terms of the overall
numbers, the structural parameters have not been influenced\textsuperscript{94} yet. Hence, the current (and
also any other potentially feasible) volume of immigration into the Czech Republic might be
sufficient only for preservation of the population size, it cannot solve at all the problem of
population ageing (Burcin, Kučera & Drbohlav 2007). Concerning migration impacts, one can
also look at the relation between migration and criminality, though this link has not been so
much pronounced in the Czech Republic. However, in the Czech Republic the number of
convicted foreigners has been stable since 1993 (about 6% in 2007), though the number of
immigrants has significantly been growing (Drbohlav et al. 2009). Generally, in the Czech
Republic not many ethnic social or political structures have evolved which would organize the
life of immigrants in the country. Accordingly, the cultural contributions, demographic
changes, social structure changes, and the like related to immigrants and their impact upon
Czech society is rather small (Drbohlav 2004).

Immigrants’ integration is a complex process that usually takes several years. Because
of the above mentioned reasons and also due to the fact that there is no proper monitoring of
the integration process, one cannot say much about the outcomes of immigrants’ integration
in the Czech Republic. So far, there have not been any major problems with immigrants’
integration and it is only currently that the second generation of immigrants has started to
become visible. However, based on several empirical studies (e.g. Drbohlav & Ezzeddine-
2003) it seems like successful inclusion in Czech society is connected to the assimilation
mode of integration (e.g., rejecting close ties to their country of origin, adopt Czech life style
and language). Moreover, this “assimilation philosophy” corresponds to the perceived and
proclaimed nature of the Czech public attitude towards immigrants adjustment to Czech living
style - a strong preference of full immigrants’ adjustment to Czech living style has been
observed (CVVM 2008).

\textbf{Poland}

Unlike the Czech Republic, migration impacts in the case of Poland are tied not only to
immigration of foreigners but also to emigration of natives (not too much discussed in the
volume). As concerns the impacts of immigration, the economic aspects dominate. Most
immigrants in Poland are temporary labour migrants, working both in official and unofficial
(‘shadow’) economies, sometimes even combining the two (e.g., having an official job in the
house construction sector and an unofficial afternoon job in the housing maintenance and
improvement sector). Migrants have generally high economic activity rate, albeit
differentiated across gender and the legal status. Based on the 2002 Census, the level of
unemployment was relatively low among immigrants, on the contrary to the high rate of
unemployment of natives (about 20%). As has been proved by Górny et al. (2009), the labour
immigration can be described as ‘supplementary’ rather than substitutive as most jobs

\textsuperscript{94} Foreigners’ share on natural reproduction in The Czech Republic is rather low and the total fertility rate of
foreign females is a mere 0.6 children per woman (less than a half of the overall value for The Czech Republic)
(Pospíšilová 2007).

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occupied by foreigners are newly created, or left vacant due to, among other factors,\footnote{Such as restructuring of formerly state-owned companies; early deactivation of domestic labour force (early retirements); low internal mobility rate etc.} emigration of former Polish employees. The accession of Poland to the EU in 2004 brought about a reinforced outflow of native workers from Poland which caused several labour shortages in certain regions and economic sectors (such as construction, trade or seasonal agriculture) or occupations (e.g., physicians, anaesthesiologists and radiologists) (Okólski & Mioduszewska 2008). The outflow of workers coincided with a favourable economic climate and a strengthened demand for labour, which led to an increase of wage rates in Poland. This increase might have constituted encouragement for immigration of foreigners\footnote{The introduction of the euro currency could constitute additional encouragement for some foreigners. The Polish government has declared 2012 to be the date of the introduction of euro in Poland.}. However, it is still too early to assess the relation (if it exists) between crowding-out of the Polish labour market and immigration of foreigners (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008).

As concerns the integration outcomes, it is even more difficult to assess it as Poland has a high share of short-term migrants. Based on the 2002 Census results, it seems that the inclusion of permanent immigrants into the labour market should proceed smoothly as highly educated individuals and those with vocational training were predominant among permanent immigrants in Poland.

Interestingly, there are only certain economic sectors in Poland which facilitate more permanent forms of migration. These sectors are trade, gastronomy and education. On the other hand, agriculture and domestic services are sectors predominantly stocked with “circular migrants”. When assessing the integration outcomes, it makes sense to distinguish between Vietnamese and others since Vietnamese are the only group which has something to do with traditional settlement and integration patterns. Other groups either do not settle in Poland definitively (Westerners) or circulate (Easterners). It can be further argued, that with the exception of Vietnamese, the process of immigrants’ settling in Poland is virtually limited to one path of settlement – via marriage with a Pole – implying a particular pattern of migrants’ integration.

**Hungary**

When assessing the migration impact on Hungary, one can observe a similar trend as in the case of the Czech Republic and Poland – the economic impacts are the most visible ones. Legal immigration is primarily a labour driven phenomenon, however, with a co-nationality playing an important role. According to the 2001 Census over 40% of the legal immigrants (foreign citizens) were employed, which is somewhat above the level of the nationals while the share of the unemployed was lower than that of the nationals. However, the labour market position differs for various ethnic groups. The employment rate of the largest immigrant groups (Romanian, Asian, and the EU-15) is higher and the unemployment is lower than that of the nationals. On the other hand, the labour market position of Ukrainians, ex-Yugoslavians is less favourable.

Economic activity of foreigners is complementary to that of nationals - an overwhelming majority of unskilled and low paid jobs not easily filled by natives are occupied by foreigners. In addition, skilled manual assembling jobs with disadvantageous work conditions are also filled up with foreigners. There is a clear difference across jobs taken by various groups of foreigners.

Integration of foreign citizens but of Hungarian ethnicity is relatively easy due to the common language and ethnic ties. On the other hand, integration of other groups is rather controversial.
Immigration impacts are to some extent also visible on the demographic situation in Hungary, however, only when it concerns overall population number - immigration can only compensate for some of the population loss, as in the Czech case (see more Hárs 2009).

5.2 Spatial distribution of migrants and the role of the capital city
The Czech Republic

The spatial distribution of foreigners in the Czech Republic is rather uneven compared to the distribution of the majority population. Moreover, foreigners with permanent residence permits are more evenly spread (see figure 2) within the Czech Republic than foreigners with long-term residence permits (Novotný, Janská & Čermáková 2007). The current spatial distribution of foreigners (see figure 5.1) is typical of a strong preference for Prague (one third of all foreigners stayed there) along with its neighbouring districts (Prague-East and Prague-West), followed by urban and industrial districts such as Brno, Ostrava, Mladá Boleslav and also West Bohemian districts of Cheb and Karlovy Vary. On the contrary, rural districts and districts of the so-called internal periphery are not target regions for migrants. There is a so-called East-West gradient visible in the spatial distribution of foreigners in the Czech Republic - with the intensity of foreigners’ presence increasing from eastern parts of the country westwards.

Note: Share of foreigners (%) in total number of foreigners living in the Czech Republic.

Figure 5.1 Spatial distribution of foreigners in the Czech Republic, 2007 (as of December 31)
Source: Český statistický úřad 2008a.

When looking at the spatial distribution of foreigners separately for both legal categories of migrants - economic migrants (holders of visas or long-term permits) and permanent migrants (who came mostly for family reasons) (figure 2), one can see that economic migrants are more concentrated and very often stay in big cities and other urbanized areas that function as main economic motors of the Czech economy (Drbohlav 2004). It is obvious that the distribution of foreigners with long-term residence (see figure 2, left) is much more influenced by current demand for labour force. More than 37 per cent of foreigners with long-term residence stayed in Prague which further supports the role of the capital city as the major immigration hub.
Note: Share of foreigners with long-term residence (%) in total number of foreigners with long-term residence in the Czech Republic. Foreigners with long-term residence include foreigners with visa for a period exceeding 90 days, EU citizens with temporary residence permit and foreigners with long-term residence permit.

Source of data: Český statistický úřad 2008a.

Figure 5.2 Spatial distribution of foreigners with long-term residence and permanent residence in the Czech Republic, 2007 (as of December 31)

So far, ethnic groups have not created very significant areas of concentration within cities or regions as are known from developed immigration countries. Only several exceptions can be found - notably the concentration of the Russian community in Karlovy Vary, Vietnamese concentrations in several small towns and villages chiefly along the Czech-German border, a firmly established well-off community of “Western” immigrants in Prague district of Nebušice, or a newly created Mongolian community in a town of Blansko.

As the capital city is concerned, Prague represents the most important migration centre (probably for both legal and irregular migrants) in the Czech Republic. Foreigners (staying more than 3 months) made up about 10 per cent of Prague population which clearly confirms the notion of Prague as an emerging immigrant city. Foreigners staying in Prague are mostly third country nationals, however, with an important proportion of EU citizens (Slovaks, Germans, or Britons) as well as US citizens (Drbohlav et al. 2009).

Poland
The spatial distribution of foreigners in Poland (based on the 2002 Census) is uneven. The largest Polish cities of Warsaw, Lodz, Krakow, Poznan, Gdansk, Wroclaw and Szczecin represent the major settlements of foreigners. Differences in spatial distribution between both categories of migrants (permanent versus temporary) have been found. Permanent settlers in general tended to concentrate more than Polish citizens. They were clustered in highly industrialised areas or rapidly developing centres (e.g., around Warsaw, Katowice or Lodz), but also in Bielsko-Biala, Czestochowa and Torun in the north. Generally, the centre of gravity in case of permanent settlers seemed to be central and southern Poland (see figure 3). The nationality group with the highest propensity to concentrate (in large cities) were Vietnamese.

On the other hand, temporary migrants displayed quite a similar pattern of settlement but were less territorially concentrated. In particular, their presence in big cities (except Warsaw and Poznan) was less visible than in case of permanent migrants. Moreover, they clustered in the less urbanised provinces of eastern Poland, close to the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Ukrainian border.
The capital city of Warsaw is the most popular city among migrants in Poland (more than 16% of all permanent settlers resided there). Permanent settlers represented about 3.2 per cent of total Warsaw population (Górny et al. 2009).

As of 2004, according to the data of the Office for Foreigners, there were 84,729 foreigners living in Poland out of which almost every fourth lived in Warsaw (Grzymała-Kazłowska & Piekut 2007).

Among the biggest groups of foreigners, the highest level of spatial concentration within the capital city was observed for the Vietnamese. A quarter of them lived in only one district (Wola), furthermore 56 per cent of the Vietnamese lived in three centrally placed left-bank districts. Foreigners from former Soviet Union and Western Europe are more equally dispersed in the city (Grzymała-Kazłowska & Piekut 2007).

**Hungary**

Central regions of Hungary – especially Budapest and the surrounding county (Pest) are the essential target regions for foreign permanent settlers in Hungary. An important part of immigrants reside also in Eastern and Southern Hungarian counties near to the Romanian and Serbian borders (see figure 4). On the other hand, in the North-Western counties (more developed parts of Hungary) much fewer foreign permanent settlers reside there.
The capital city of Budapest has a distinguished position in migration process. The migrant population is overrepresented in the capital and also (legal as well as irregular) labour migration is very much centralised in Budapest. Almost 43 per cent of immigrants (speaking about the resident immigrant population) resided in Budapest. The proportion of immigrants in Budapest was 2.5 times higher than in the country, however, still rather moderate of about 3 per cent. Hence, Budapest is not a particularly immigrant city. Cultural differences among the natives and immigrants are rather low as about 80 per cent of the immigrants come from other European countries. Interestingly, however, there is a remarkable residential concentration of immigrants in some inner-city districts located in a close proximity to the city centre.

5.3 Naturalizations
Finally, naturalisations (i.e. acquisition of citizenship based on foreigner’s application and fulfilment of several requirements) are an important aspect of both migration impacts and integration outcomes. The number of naturalizations is influenced not only by the size of migrant population (eligible for naturalization), but also by the citizenship policy and regulations (see more chapter 4). The number of naturalizations per year in all three countries in question is presented in figure 5.5.
The naturalization figures for Poland and the Czech Republic are quite modest (ranging from about 500 to about 2,500 per year). Naturalization regulations in Poland as well as the Czech Republic have been rather restrictive.

Naturalization in Hungary is connected to the high share of ethnic Hungarian immigrants. The early peak of naturalizations in Hungary followed the refugee inflow peak of 1989-1990. The number of naturalizations in Hungary peaked in 1992 (more than 20,000) and kept on in the following years as well. Following the unregulated period, the Act on Nationality has been passed in 1993 and made preconditions for naturalisation more restrictive with preferences based on ethnic and family ties (Kovács & Tóth 2007).

The share of (former) Romanian citizens in all naturalized persons is remarkable and was particularly high in the early 1990s. Since mid-1990s the structure of naturalised persons has become more heterogenous with an increasing share of Ukrainians and ex-Yugoslavians, nevertheless overwhelmingly also with Hungarian origin although the share of some others are on slightly increase.

In the Czech Republic, the dominant group of naturalized foreigners are Ukrainians (altogether 5,086 naturalized in the period 1993-2007), firstly immigrants of Czech origin who immigrated from Chernobyl area and Volhynia region in 1990s and only later “standard labor migrants”. Other numerous groups such as Russians (2,014 naturalizations in the given period) or former citizens of Kazakhstan (539 naturalizations) were also compatriots of Czech origin with an easier access to naturalization. On the other hand, Poles (2,012 naturalizations), Bulgarians (1,512 naturalizations), and Romanians (1,090 naturalized persons) can be thought of being mostly “labor migrants” from 1980s. The growing heterogeneity of the naturalized

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97 In Poland, new Act on Polish Citizenship will be applied which will, however, be the most liberal among the three CEE countries (see chapter 4).
persons (in terms of former citizenship) has been confirmed also in the Czech case, with Slovaks and Vietnamese recently emerging among the most often naturalized foreigners, whilst Ukrainians are still on top. In Poland the dominant group of naturalized foreigners are citizen of former Soviet Union, including Baltic States. In 1992-2001 they composed 20 per cent of acquisitions by conferment procedure of all 8 979 acquisitions in this period, following Germans (16 per cent), Israeli and Canadians (8 per cent respectively). In 2002-2006 the share of ex-USSR citizens naturalized via the conferment procedure more than doubled and they comprised more than half of 8 612 acquisitions98, with Ukrainians being the leading group: 27 per cent (Górny & Pudzianowska forthcoming). This reflects the dominating role of ex-USSR citizens in immigration wave to Poland who since 1980s constitute the main segment of inflow to Poland and in fact that they have started to qualify to naturalization procedure in the second half of 1990s. Górny & Pudzianowska (forthcoming) state that termination of bilateral conventions on the prevention of dual nationality in fact had enhanced ex-USSR citizens to use the conferment procedure in order to stay in Poland.

5.4 Summary
The main aim of the fifth chapter was to analyze and compare the impacts of migration processes on the societies of the CEE countries. More specifically, we tried to look what are the outcomes of migration in the socio-economic sphere. More attention has been paid to the outcomes in relation to the receiving society, outcomes of the integration processes were not so much addressed due to a relatively short immigration period and large share of temporary/circular migration which are the main reasons why integration outcomes have not been clearly shaped yet. Moreover, we focused on three particular issues tied to migration impacts – the spatial distribution patterns of migrant populations, public attitudes towards migration and migrant populations, and naturalization trends.

Clearly, the economic impacts of migration are the most important ones in all three countries. Immigration into CEE countries is chiefly a labour motivated, temporary or circular process. Migrant populations are characteristic of high economic activity rate above the level of native populations together with low unemployment (below national average). Importantly, foreign labour force in all three countries seems to be rather a supplement than competition vis-à-vis native workers. The recent situation on the labour markets of the Czech Republic and Hungary is characteristic of migrant workers taking up rather low paid jobs in manufacturing, construction, trade or hotels and catering, although there is a segment of EU citizens working in jobs at the opposite end of the social status ladder. This high-end segment is even more important in Poland (for legal employment), but also there is a higher importance of agriculture and domestic services as concerns migrant employment (the latter being dominated by illegal workers).

One of the greatest differences in migration impacts among the countries in question is the role of the emigration on natives. Neither the Czech Republic, nor Hungary has experienced such a large scale emigration as has taken place in Poland, especially after the accession to the EU. This outflow of Polish workers has already caused some labour deficits which might in turn encourage further immigration, especially return migration (Okólski & Mioduszewska 2008, Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008).

The CEE countries have recently started to face the problems of population ageing. However, immigration flows might not serve as the right remedy as has also been proved in other countries. Their possible impact is only on reducing the decrease of the total population size but population structures will probably not be influenced too much.

98 Excluding acquisitions by repatriation.
Mostly temporary migration and, in terms of migrants’ integration, of only recent origin has not yet brought about significant outcomes of migrants’ incorporation into the receiving CEE societies. Integration of migrant population as well as (state) integration policy seem to be in an infancy stage. So far, there have not been any major problems concerning immigrants’ integration and it is only currently that the second generation of immigrants has started emerging, at least in the Czech Republic.

By the same token, no major separated or segregated concentrations of migrant population (such as ethnic enclaves) have been established in CEE countries, though, the spatial distribution of migrant populations is uneven. The capital cities have proved to be the most important centres of migrant settlement – Prague hosts one third of all legally staying foreigners and Budapest even about 40 per cent of foreign permanent settlers, while Warsaw hosts about 25 per cent of foreigners living in Poland. The dominance of the capital city in migrant settlement patterns is lower in Poland, which is probably in relation to the overall suppressed dominance of Warsaw within the Polish settlement system (see Weclawowicz 2001). The aspect of settlement hierarchy (reflecting socio-economic development of cities) influences the distribution of foreigners in the Czech Republic. Moreover, there is a “zonal effect” when the western part of the country is inhabited by immigrants more frequently whilst also making use of more work opportunities in industry there (employees) and of closeness to German and Austrian clientele (businessmen). Thus, the so called East-West gradient is visible. Similar relation has not been proved in Hungary where other factors seem to intervene (e.g., ethnic character of migration, proximity to countries of origin – also, to some extent visible in the Czech Republic). Out of the three capitals, Prague seems to be a possibly fastest emerging immigrant city with a high share of foreigners in relation to the native population.

Finally, when assessing the naturalisation trends in CEE countries it became clear that these figures speak rather a lot about the state naturalization policy as such. Obviously, there is no direct relation between a number of immigrants and number of naturalised foreigners. This can be documented on the Hungarian case where the level of naturalization (due to preference of migrants of Hungarian origin) were manifold higher than in the Czech Republic, though the Czech Republic seems to be more attractive immigration destination country. On the other hand, in both countries a similar trend of growing heterogeneity of (former) citizenships among naturalized persons became visible.
6 Conclusions

Dušan Drbohlav, Izabela Grabowska-Lusińska, Lenka Medová, Ágnes Hárs and Magdalena Lesińska

This synthesis report dealt with three countries in the region of Central and Eastern Europe: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. We have mapped both their contemporary and historical migration patterns (flows and stocks). We have also focused on factors and determinants of the immigration movements, migration policies, and, finally, the impacts of migration upon the given countries. All of these were evaluated in a comparative perspective and in relation to the conceptual framework built within the IDEA project based on the concept of ‘migration transition’ from emigration to immigration country (Arango et al. 2009, Fassmann, Reeger 2008).

During the 1990s, all three countries underwent deep systemic transition/transformation processes from communist systems with planned economies towards democratic systems based on free-market economies, and all were successfully incorporated into Western political, economic and military institutional structures. These changes were accompanied by transformations of migratory patterns that evolved from ‘closed-border’ regimes with minimal levels of international movement into diversified migration modes. The Czech Republic is by far the most attractive migration destination country within the CEE, with high rates of natives’ immigration and low rates of their emigration. Hungary also experienced positive net migration with low emigration rates, although it saw a lower intensity of immigration and low levels of ethnic diversification. Poland, on the other hand, showed high rates of native emigration and rather low rates of long-term immigration. This means that all the countries in question had an initial chance to undergo a ‘migration cycle’, also called a ‘migration transition’, and experienced its various stages: from preliminary, through take-off, stagnation and maturity. However, all the countries in question, even now, seem to be differently susceptible to the transition process from emigration to immigration countries.

This brings us to the crucial conclusion that, as shown throughout the analysis presented in this volume, although all three countries are in early stages of the ‘migration cycle’, they each differ significantly. Whereas Poland and Hungary still seem to be in a preliminary stage (although in different ‘substages’: an embryonic preliminary in the case of Poland and a proper preliminary in the case of Hungary) the Czech Republic has most likely already entered so-called take-off stage of the migration cycle. The differences have their roots both in the past (and present), mainly in the process of the systemic transitions and their outcomes. This primarily includes the socio-economic structures of the labour markets – which also translates into the predominance of labour-type migrants in all three countries in question.

As we have decided to apply, and to some extent evaluate the concept of the ‘migration cycle’, within the presently evolving migration processes in the CEE countries, we

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99 One may hypothesise that in this context, the lesson of the Southern European migration model (Bonifazi et al 2009) is important for drawing parallels to changes in the CEE region. The transition from emigration to immigration in countries in the Southern belt of Europe had been occurring as a result of high rates of emigration and subsequent return migration, which was originally regarded as being part of the preliminary stage. A high and sharp increase in non-returnees within the total inflow to Southern European countries marked the beginning of the take-off stage. Emigration and return migration trends are thus crucial for Poland’s present experience of the emigration-immigration transition; unfortunately, however, this is not uniformly observed in any other country in question.
also need to answer questions about the validity and applications of factors responsible for the migration transition, which had been termed ‘drivers of immigration’ by the IDEA consortium. As the subject of the analysis was complex – CEE countries are latecomers to the immigration system – we also needed to take other specific conditions for CEE into consideration. We necessarily took into account the real and the anticipated drivers of immigration in the countries in question. The selection of drivers was based on the analysis of ‘old immigration countries’ (Fassmann, Reeger 2008), which followed the usual migration theories and are results of lengthy debate: the economy and labour market, demographic development, migration regulation and control capacity, historical context (chronology of immigration) and political and other crises in surrounding countries. The drivers are interdependent and interactive (Fassmann, Reeger 2008: 6). One cannot consider any of the drivers in the ‘migration limbo’. They also display different sensitivities to time: demographic factors bring about long-term effects, while economic factors bring about both short- and long-term effects.

Historical experience is one of the most important determining factors for any given current migration situation. All the countries considered here used to be emigration countries before WWII. A process of ethnic homogenization of the population took place in CEE countries after WWII, and it was even strengthened by the isolationist policies of the communist era. The resulting effect was that there was almost no immigration experience had by this region before the 1990s. As regarded the Czech Republic (at that time Czechoslovakia) and Hungary, one rather specific exception is identifiable – due to international aid shared by socialist countries, these two countries hosted meaningful numbers of trainees, workers and students from far-away developing socialist countries. Some of these migrant groups (mainly Vietnamese in the Czech Republic) re-appeared after the 1990s and established new immigrant communities there.

Current immigration to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland has been triggered mostly by pull factors, namely mismatches between demand and supply levels of domestic labour, natives’ low motivation to work, high labour costs, low internal spatial mobility and, importantly, tolerated practices of undeclared work. However, only in the Czech case did the booming demand side match the foreign supply side, which is one of the crucial components of robust immigration. In Poland this occurred only very recently and, to some extent, it could be attributed to the continuous, intensive emigration of Poles abroad – which has increased demand for a foreign labour force. In Hungary, due to the economic structure and recent economic downturn, the demand for labour has been rather low; this is a result of long-lasting jobless economic growth.100

Despite different levels of labour demand, this factor’s structure seems to be very similar in all three countries. Labour shortages mainly affected the construction sector, services, manufacturing and agriculture sectors (though not in the Czech Republic or in Hungary). These branches are typical areas where regular as well as irregular immigrants operate in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Moreover, there is also a rather small but important segment of labour migrants: professionals who come from other developed countries (mainly the EU15) and who are chiefly involved in more intellectually-demanding jobs. By contrast, legal migrants in Poland are mostly concentrated in only this sector. All in all, it seems that foreign labour is complementary rather than competitive vis-à-vis domestic workers in all three countries. However, this can be related to the still small shares of immigrants in the labour force in all countries in question (although the shares vary across three countries). With the growing size of the immigrant population, however, one could foresee that the complementary effect might begin to exert some pressure and foreign workers

100 The global economic crisis which began in mid-2008 may, to some extent, disturb these processes; however, it is too early to assess its impacts.
could start pushing natives out of their workplaces more extensively (making for a competitive effect) as we can observe it in countries with more ‘mature’ immigration systems (Grabowska-Lusinska & Zylicz 2008; Gorny et al. 2008).

Clearly, labour-motivated immigration, along with more or less the same migratory source countries (countries of Central and Eastern Europe, post-Soviet countries, Vietnam and China) are, among others, important common features of the countries in question. On the other hand, there are important differences in terms of length of stay in individual countries, with significant numbers of migrants who stay for a long time (several months) or permanently in the Czech Republic and Hungary, and migrants who prefer short-term stays (accompanied by so-called petty trade activities) in Poland.

One of the most important determinants of irregular migration is the existence of shadow economies. This phenomenon, as regards its size, is a remnant of traditions of the communist era. Its extent and impacts greatly resemble realities that one can find in Southern European societies. It should be emphasized that foreign irregular labour represents only a marginal segment of the shadow economy, which is mainly constituted by the native population.

All the analysed countries share similar demographic characteristics (e.g., very low fertility, growing life expectancy). Together, these inevitably lead to population ageing processes, with immigration as one of the alternatives (not solutions, however) for reducing the negative effects of this population burden.

The most important moment for all three countries – and not only from a geopolitical perspective – was their accession to the EU in 2004. Within the existing migration patterns one can find (for logical historical and political reasons) unique geopolitical interests being exhibited. Poles have special ties to neighbouring former post-Soviet countries; Hungary to Romanian compatriots; and the Czech Republic towards Slovakia.

It has not yet been proven (there are no sufficient analyses at present) that attitudes of the majority population towards foreigners/migrants serve as important determinants of migration trends. On the other hand, migration policies (or rather, ‘non-policies’, as in the CEE context of the 1990s) play an important role in shaping migration patterns. As has been documented in other aspects of migration, the Czech Republic, as compared to Poland and Hungary, has already established a more mature migration policy framework in terms of legal regulations, practices and an overall institutional setting. The involvement of NGOs in migration and integration issues also seems to be much more intense in the Czech Republic than in the other two countries. Similarities among the countries are based on the dominant role of the EU in migration policy design as well as on the centralization of migration policy management, with very limited involvement of regional and local institutions. Migration issues are still not a priority for any important political party. Across the given countries, pro-active and more systematic approaches for creating migration policies have recently emerged.

Because of the relatively short time that has elapsed since the establishment of new migration era – and also due to prevalence of temporary migration movements – the impacts of immigration on the countries in question have so far been visible mostly in the economic spheres of society. Immigrants have generally higher economic activity rates along with lower unemployment rates as compared to domestic populations. This confirms that the predominating type of immigrant is that of one who comes for job-related reasons.

Clearly, integration outcomes have not been documented yet, though, for example, thousands of foreigners are being naturalized every year. Within naturalization policies, Hungary represents a distinctive model: many ethnic Hungarians have made use of the country’s preferential naturalization regime. As far as spatial distribution is concerned, the capital cities of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary are among the major immigration hubs of the countries; however, only Prague can be considered a real ‘immigrant city’.

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In sum, the countries in question do not follow, in a uniform way, the model of becoming immigrant countries while fulfilling three crucial, ‘traditional’ preconditions or generators of immigration, which need to happen in sequence:\(^{101}\): the massive outflow of surpluses of labour, which may enhance the modernization of the economy (this has been happening only in Poland, and is very recent); demographic factors and intense demand for foreign labour. Apparently, only Poland has experienced a massive outflow of labour but we cannot make an assessment at this stage as to how, if at all, it may enhance the modernization of the economy and, consequently, mass immigration (as was the case for ‘old immigration countries’). The Czech and Hungarian economies seem to have different mechanisms in place that may help those countries modernize (the countries have not experienced a post-accession outflow of labour). They also have huge regional discrepancies, with a disproportionate predominance wielded by the capital cities, which also have an impact on the inflows of labour.

\* \* \*

Even while considering the group/test set of hypothetically similar countries of the region of Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) in terms of their starting/entering conditions (e.g., transition economies) in becoming ‘new immigration’ countries, one cannot rely upon only common, uniform policy approaches based on past learning experiences and by repeating models used in other ‘old immigration countries’ (France, Germany, Austria, Great Britain) or even ‘new’ immigration countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece).

Analyses suggest that the countries in question do not imitate the same exact migration cycles of Western and Southern European countries, but rather may, à la carte, locally readjust to involve some successful developments or learn lessons from unsuccessful ones. This seems to be a crucial consideration for the migration policy-orientated recommendations offered below.

Migration policy developments for Central and Eastern European countries must take heed of major deficiencies or even deficits in the existing migration policies of the three countries. Among them one can find: the non-existence of a long-term, strategic migration policy attributable to the lack of a migration doctrine; the creation of \emph{ad hoc} solutions, reactive kinds of \emph{post-factum} policy activities; underdeveloped integration policies (although they differ among the three countries); the lack of awareness-raising campaigns and educational activities and, last but not least, incoherent, selective, non-systematic approaches to irregular migration.

1. There is a strong need for the development of a more complex and long-term migration policy. Especially in the cases of Hungary and Poland, a rigorous political debate on immigration is required to define national interests and specify long- and short-term goals to be achieved through migration policies, as well as the main target groups and tools to be used. The sole outcome of such limited debates on immigration and migration policy is that there are no migration doctrines, documents which should serve as normative bases and reflect states’ needs according to economic, demographic, cultural, and social conditions. Policy-makers should clearly describe what kind of immigration is desired and implement effective policies according to previously defined aims and needs. A migration doctrine as well as a migration policy should be elaborated via wider debate. It should be based on the consensus of a variety of political and social actors, including experts, labour

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\(^{101}\) Which in fact happened in Southern European countries.
unions, employers’ organizations and immigrants’ associations, all of which should be involved in all phases of crafting migration policy. These include: conceptualization, implementation and evaluation. Moreover, a framework for regular political and social consultation should be developed and moderated within states’ administrative bodies at national and regional levels.

2. Countries in the CEE region require more pro-active migration policies. Until now, policies could be described as passive, reactive (post–factum activities) and consisting of unrelated and casual activities which do not involve long-term perspective or deeper analysis (ad hoc activities). Migration policies should be recognized by policymakers as a key part of the solutions to current and future problems related to population (i.e., negative natural growth, low fertility, prolonged life expectancy and, consequently, population ageing) which lead to a weakening of human resources. Moreover, an increasing foreign labour force can help fulfill shortages in the national labour markets since representatives of some professions are not available in the country, or else there is no willingness on behalf of the local people to accept non-attractive jobs. Effective labour market monitoring and structured circular migration schemes are required to manage short-term labour migration, especially from neighbouring countries. Migration policy in these cases should be treated as a part of foreign and community policy; other good practices include special bilateral agreements regulating human movements in borderland regions as well as the enhancement of legal channels for seasonal labour migration.

3. Integration policy should be more advanced and more multidimensional. The successful integration of immigrants is one of the top priorities of the EU. It is rather well-developed in the Czech Republic, along with settlement migration. In the cases of Hungary and Poland, permanent/settlement migration is not perceived as might be desired (the only exception is the group of repatriates and their families), and the states’ initiatives towards the integration of immigrants are very limited. More attention, as well as more financial sources, should be allocated to integration activities – especially at regional and local levels. Institutional structures dealing with immigrants’ integration on the ground should be more developed. Training for local civil servants is needed in the field of intercultural communication, and primary education systems should be better prepared for the inclusion of foreign migrants’ children. Although the NGO sector is more and more engaged in the integration of immigrants because of its implementation of a variety of integration projects targeting different groups of newcomers, it requires better coordination and evaluation in order to create an effective system that is supplementary to states’ initiatives undertaken within the migration integration policy framework.

4. A targeted information campaign and educational programmes are a precondition of social cohesion in countries of increasing immigration levels. As societies become more and more multicultural, there is an urgent need for proper information campaigns as well as inclusion in school curriculum courses focused on issues of multiculturalism, tolerance, human rights, cultural diversity, etc. Education is a crucial component of a given state’s activity – especially in the CEE region, where immigration and is a rather new phenomenon. Moreover, immigration is a sensitive issue and, taking into account the power of stereotypes, an objective information campaign driven by the media on immigration flows and on foreign communities living in the country is recommended. Despite the fact that the situation has been improving over time, there is still a tendency for mass media to pinpoint negative rather than positive aspects. More intensive work by the respective ministerial bodies and academic circles is necessary in order to spread many
more pieces of objective and verified information about migrants and migration as such. It requires effective channels of information between politicians, mass media representatives, GOs, NGOs and the public.

5. **Tackling irregular migration in a multifaceted way** is a priority that requires a more complex approach in order to deal with the origins of this phenomenon. There is a number of systemic factors which originate from the state’s regime that support irregular inflows and the irregular employment of foreigners. Among others, the most important factor is the large-scale shadow economy and the fact that it is widely socially accepted in countries of the CEE region (more irregular individuals than irregular companies). The size of the shadow economy goes along with the weakness of labour market controls. Given this reality, labour market inspections should be accompanied by wide public campaigns against informal work. High non-salary costs of work and time-consuming and complex administration procedures required to register a foreign worker also effectively support irregular employment. In all the countries described here there is a problem with transparent regularisation schemes. Once a migrant has the status of an irregular, it is very difficult to change it into a legal one. Policy-makers should elaborate individual regularisation schemes. More attention should be paid by the state to traditional niches in the labour market filled by irregular migrants, such as agriculture, petty trade, and especially the domestic work sector. Some legal incentives such as tax relief for those who officially employ a babysitter or caregiver for an elderly person, or the introduction of flexible insurance schemes for cleaners, construction workers and domestic servants who have more than one employer could be introduced per the developments in Southern countries, but re-adjusted locally.
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Annexes

Annex 2.1 Foreign population according to different sources in Central and Eastern European New Immigration Countries: (around) 1993, 2001 and 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country /categories</th>
<th>Absolute values (in thousands)</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Czech R.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+ months</td>
<td>12 918</td>
<td>104 445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+ year</td>
<td>12 900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident permits total</td>
<td>77 668</td>
<td>212 069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which permanent (1+ year)</td>
<td>31 072</td>
<td>69 816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which long-term (prior 2001 1+ year since 2001 3+ months)</td>
<td>46 070</td>
<td>140 978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register of work permits</td>
<td>51 600</td>
<td>103 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+ months</td>
<td>44 367</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+ year</td>
<td>16 397</td>
<td>20 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident permits 1+years</td>
<td>123 184</td>
<td>110 028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work permit</td>
<td>17 600</td>
<td>38 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1 year</td>
<td>5 900</td>
<td>6 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resident permits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census</td>
<td></td>
<td>64 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register of work permits</td>
<td>9 800</td>
<td>19 800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute values (in thousands) and percentages of total population (at the end of the year or at the reference day of census data)

Source: national statistics & Eurostat online data.
Annex 2.2 Foreign citizens by age and share of women according to Census 2001 and register in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / age groups</th>
<th>% by age groups</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
<th>% female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>14 015</td>
<td>25 163</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>17 603</td>
<td>40 267</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-39</td>
<td>47 394</td>
<td>122 417</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-64</td>
<td>35 872</td>
<td>99 293</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 +</td>
<td>5 910</td>
<td>9 096</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121 187</td>
<td>296 236</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hungary              |             |              |            |              |         |        |
| 0-14                 | 11 533      | 13 363       | 0.7        | 0.9          | 47.9   | 47.5   |
| 15-24                | 18 261      | 22 412       | 1.2        | 1.7          | 51.9   | 51.0   |
| 25-39                | 33 066      | 62 411       | 1.6        | 2.7          | 48.7   | 47.6   |
| 40-64                | 2 350       | 54 298       | 0.7        | 1.6          | 53.7   | 48.6   |
| 65 +                 | 6 615       | 15 389       | 0.4        | 1.0          | 59.4   | 56.8   |
| Unknown              | 393         |              |            |              |        |        |
| Total                | 92 975      | 167 873      | 0.9        | 1.7          | 51.3   | 49.2   |

| Poland               |             |              |            |              |         |        |
| 0-14                 | 5 009       | 2 689        | 0.1        | 0.0          | 48.5   | 49.7   |
| 15-24                | 3 573       | 4 831        | 0.1        | 0.1          | 53.7   | 48.7   |
| 25-39                | 11 179      | 14 536       | 0.1        | 0.2          | 52.2   | 57.8   |
| 40-64                | 10 634      | 26 202       | 0.1        | 0.2          | 45.3   | 51.3   |
| 65 +                 | 3 293       | 6 625        | 0.1        | 0.1          | 62.6   | 55.2   |
| Unknown              | 20          |              |            |              |        |        |
| Total                | 33 708      | 54 882       | 0.1        | 0.1          | 50.7   | 53.2   |

### Annex 4.1 Development of migration policies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland

#### 4.1.a Development of Migration/Integration Policy and Legislation in Czech Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>General legal trends</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Specific Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td><strong>Migration policy</strong></td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Act on Aliens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Liberal, chaotic without conceptual design</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Act on refugees 498/1990 Sb. – basic and brief definitions on asylum procedure and refugee status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Aliens Act – set up basic parameters (structures) of residence statuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ratification of Geneva Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Integration policy</strong></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Government formulated basic principles on integration of refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Repatriation of compatriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1998</td>
<td><strong>Migration policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Shift from liberal to more systematic and restrictive policy oriented adjustment to the EU legislation and regulation</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Alien Act – amendment (e.g. necessity to prove enough financial sources, impossibility to change purpose of a long-term stay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulation of employment and entrepreneurial activities of foreigners</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Act no. 286/1995 Coll (foreigners with permanent residence permit were granted the same rights as Czech citizens concerning running a business)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>the labour offices have started enforcing more strict policies when issuing work permits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Integration policy</strong></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>“State Assistance Programme for Integration” targeted at refugees (rented housing, social and employment counselling, and free Czech language courses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td><strong>Migration policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Restrictive policy towards, economically motivated migration</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tightened rules especially for economically motivated foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event/Policy</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New visa regime</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Act No. 326/1999 Coll. [on Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Czech Republic] (e.g. apply for a visa at Czech embassies in countries of origin, 2 types of stay)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of the Dublin Treaty</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Act No. 325/1999 Coll. [on Asylum]. New definitions (asylees, asylum applicants), prohibition of work for asylum seekers in the first year of procedure, one instance procedure, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New visa policy towards certain countries</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>New visa policy towards certain countries (e.g. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) according to a standard regime in the EU countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration of Czech compatriots continues</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>The state program for compatriots from distant and endangered territories was officially terminated (persons from Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Integration policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event/Policy</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response to the increased number of immigrants</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>“Principles of the Concept of Immigrant Integration in the Territory of the Czech Republic” (15 main theses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximation the status of foreign nationals legally residing in the CR on a long-term basis to that of citizens of the CR</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>“Concept of Immigrant Integration in the Territory of the Czech Republic” (on non-legislative basis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration programme for asylees incorporated onto the Act No. 325/1999 Coll. [on Asylum].</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 – up to now</td>
<td><strong>Migration policy</strong></td>
<td>Conceptualization of migration with EU legislation continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-active labour immigration policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st of May 2004</td>
<td>The Czech Republic joins the EU (different treatment of the EU citizens vis-à-vis third-country nationals, e.g. Act 220/2003 Coll. EU citizens are freed from applying for residence and working permits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effort/tendency for conceptualization of migration</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6 basic policy principles of migration strategy defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage of foreign experts, specialists, highly-skilled workers, to settle along with their families in the country</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Program “The Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Asylum Act 165/2006 Coll. – inclusion of the institute of temporary protection and the institute of subsidiary protection was recognized as a distinctive form (besides asylum) of international protection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The length of stay necessary for getting</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
a permanent residence permit was shortened from 10 to 5 years, so the Czech citizenship could be acquired after 10 years of residence.

Assumingly growing numbers of fake mixed marriages and paternity declaration

2007 Alien Act 379/2007 Coll. - a family member of Czech or EU citizen might get a permanent residence permit after 2 years of legal residence in the Czech Republic.

Obligation for foreign visa holders of having a valid health insurance when entering the Czech Republic has been set.

2009 Green cards - alternation of the programme „The Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” and substitution of planned the Blue cards program

Integration policy

Shifting the responsibility for integration policy coordination (activities tied to the Concept of Immigrant Integration) from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

2004

A re-assessment of the Concept of Immigrant Integration.

2005 Updated Concept (4 key priority areas were defined) (e.g. standardised Czech language tests will be applied as a necessary prerequisite for being granted a permanent residence permit since January 1, 2009)

2008 Anti-discrimination legislation still not incorporated (the Czech Parliament adopted it but president vetoed it)

4.1.b Development of Migration Policy and Legislation in Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>General legal trends</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Specific Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>late 1980s</td>
<td>Migration without legislation – the quasi-refugee migration</td>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>Two amendments of the 1982 Decree on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early 1990s</td>
<td>regime</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Establishment of the Settlement Fund, supporting foreigners arriving in Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Amendment of the Constitution including paragraphs on asylum and naturalisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Government Decree on the Recognition of Refugees</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Hungary’s accession to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>UNHCR opens its office in Hungary</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>IOM opens its office in Budapest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Act on citizenship comes into force</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Establishment of the Refugee Support Fund</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Establishment of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Act on entry and stay of foreigners comes into force</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Detention of Foreigners is taken over from the Police by the Border Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Act on asylum comes into force</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Lifting the restriction on recognising refugees from outside Europe – cases are taken over from the UNHCR</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Establishment of the Office of Immigration and Nationality</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>New act on the entry and stay of foreigners</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Thorough amendment of the Asylum Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Act on Hungarians Living in the Neighbouring States ‘Status Law’</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Hungary’s accession to the 1954 UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Accession to the EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Amendment of the immigration and asylum acts</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>One-time regularisation scheme for 3rd country nationals residing illegally in Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Establishment of the Interministerial Committee on Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>Drafting the National Migration Strategy – eventually taken off the agenda in 2007</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Referendum on granting extra-territorial citizenship to Hungarians living outside Hungary (proposal failed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Coordination and supervision of migration and refugee affairs are moved from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Justice and Law-enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>New act on the entry and stay of EU nationals</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>New act on the entry and stay of 3rd country nationals</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>New act on asylum</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Hungary’s accession to the Schengen-zone</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Bilateral agreement with Ukraine on</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>General legal trends</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Specific Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Act on Polish Citizenship</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Act on Aliens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-2001</td>
<td>Institutionalization: building of legal system; security oriented policy; development of asylum system</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Introduction of work permit system on the grounds of the Law on Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Agreement with Schengen countries on the visa-free movement (including readmission procedures)</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Ratification of Geneva Convention</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Involvement in “Berlin-Budapest process” aimed at combating irregular migration</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Establishment of Migration and Refugee Office (within Ministry of Interior)</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Readmission agreement between Poland and Germany (Agreement on the Cooperation on the Effects due to Migratory Movements)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>New Act on Aliens; restricted admission policy and tightened control measures</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Act on Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>Europeanization: harmonization of legal system with EU standards</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Revision of Act on Aliens; Establishment of Office for Repatriation and Foreigners (within Ministry of Interior and Administration); introduction of institution of temporary protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2002 (revised in 2006)</td>
<td>The Act on entry, stay and exit of citizens of the European Union and members of their families</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>New Act on Aliens; introduction of visa requirement for citizens of neighbouring countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The Act on granting protection to aliens within the territory of the Republic of Poland; new form of humanitarian protection – permit for tolerated stay</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>Introduction of regularisation programme for illegal foreign residents on the basis of the new Law on Aliens</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Act on Social Assistance; individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st of May 2004</td>
<td>Poland joins the EU</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2004 till present</td>
<td>Stabilisation: development of normative and administration system related to implementation of migration policy; initiatives towards labour immigration;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The proposals of activities toward complex policy of foreigners’ integration in Poland by Ministry of Social Policy – as normative base for integration policy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Establishment of Department on Migration (within Ministry of Labour and Social Policy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Establishment of Department of Migration Policy (within Ministry of Interior and Administration)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Establishment of the Inter-Ministry Team for Migration; adopting the resolution on directions of activities linked with the employment of foreigners in Poland</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The Act on the Card of the Pole - Introduction of the regularization programme for illegal foreign residents – continuation of the programme launched in 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st of December 2007</td>
<td>Poland joins the Schengen Area: revised visa system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Further liberalization of the law on foreigners’ access to the labour market in Poland</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4.2 Comparative data on irregular migration, its control and activities aimed at combating it

Table 1. Number of migration related border apprehensions including foreigners and citizens of the reporting country, 1997-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland*</td>
<td>10.462</td>
<td>7.023</td>
<td>5.289</td>
<td>5.500</td>
<td>6.075</td>
<td>4.269</td>
<td>5.063</td>
<td>6.012</td>
<td>3.231</td>
<td>2.741</td>
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</tbody>
</table>